The Miami Heat Were More Prepared For The Spurs’ PNR Offense | NBA Playbook

The Miami Heat Were More Prepared For The Spurs’ PNR Offense

When the Spurs beat the Miami Heat by thirty points ten days ago, they were able to use the three point shot (making 17 on 60 percent-plus shooting) to their advantage.  They got most of these three point makes (nine of them) from running their pick and roll offense where they like to get a kickout to the corner for a three after a ballscreen.

So when the Heat were preparing for their rematch against the Spurs tonight, I tweeted that they might want to switch things up.  The Heat didn’t, opting to stick with their defensive philosophy of crowding the ball handler coming off of the screen until he makes the pass.  Despite the Heat playing the same defense, the Spurs did not have the same success from the three point line, going 6-22 (27.3%) from three.  So what was the difference?  The Heat were prepared for what the Spurs were going to do, and they were ready to close out hard on the three point shooters.

Here is what the Spurs’ pick and roll looked like during their first match-up:

Notice that the man helping on the roll man never closes back out on his man.  This wasn’t a one time thing either, on just about every play, the Heat sold out when defending the roll man, not even considering the possibility Now, let’s take a look at the Heat’s defense a second time around:

It looks almost identical except for one thing.  Mike Bibby, the man defending the George Hill in the corner, is anticipating the pass to the corner so when it happens, he is ready to closeout.  Sure, he bites badly on the pump-fake, but that closeout turns a catch and shoot into a three point shot off of the dribble, and that takes Hill out of his rhythm and forces a miss.

Here is another example.  If you watch Wade (the man covering Hill in the corner this time), he is helping on the roll man, but not too aggressively.  He knows that there is a good chance the pass is going to the corner, so when it does, he is able to close out effectively.

I completely expected the Heat to switch up what they did when defending the pick and roll, opting for more of a Laker-like strategy.  This wasn’t the case.  Credit to the to Heat coaching staff here, watching the tape and determining that they could stop the Spurs’ pick and roll/three point offense with their standard defense, if they anticipate the pass to the corner.

15
Mar 2011
POSTED BY Sebastian Pruiti
DISCUSSION 14 Comments
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  • Houkany

    I agreed that the Miami Heat must of recognized and anticipated the things that Spurs wanted to do off pick and roll, but those are still very decent shots, very makeable shots that just didn't go in.

  • Houkany

    I agreed that the Miami Heat must of recognized and anticipated the things that Spurs wanted to do off pick and roll, but those are still very decent shots, very makeable shots that just didn’t go in.

  • Matthias

    Totally agree with you, Houkany. Those were very good shots. The close outs could have been a lot more aggressive in my opinion.

  • Matthias

    Totally agree with you, Houkany. Those were very good shots. The close outs could have been a lot more aggressive in my opinion.

  • http://nba-point-forward.si.com/2011/03/15/heat-serve-notice-with-dominating-win/ The Point Forward » Posts Heat serve notice with dominating win «

    [...] the three-pointers that killed them in San Antonio — particularly the corner threes. As Sebastian Pruiti and Kevin Arnovitz have already pointed out, the Heat made no dramatic changes to their [...]

  • http://www.48minutesofhell.com/spursheat-links Fallout from the Miami Heat’s stomping of the Spurs

    [...] Sebastian Pruiti does a remarkable job—I’m an original member of the Pruiti’s Groupies, a fan club of sorts—of demonstrating how the Heat defended the Spurs’ PNR. [...]

  • drbearclaw

    On PNR 3 Closeout, while Bibby did a good job getting back to Hill, I think the success of this play really relied on Joel Anthony moving his feet quickly and not letting Manu into the paint with ease. Since Manu didn't have a clear path to the lane, Bibby didn't have to sink too deep to help. Also, Bibby meets the roll man around the elbow, as apposed to meeting him closer to the hoop. The help man definitely looked prepared for the pass to the corner though, good preparation by the Heat.

  • drbearclaw

    On PNR 3 Closeout, while Bibby did a good job getting back to Hill, I think the success of this play really relied on Joel Anthony moving his feet quickly and not letting Manu into the paint with ease. Since Manu didn’t have a clear path to the lane, Bibby didn’t have to sink too deep to help. Also, Bibby meets the roll man around the elbow, as apposed to meeting him closer to the hoop. The help man definitely looked prepared for the pass to the corner though, good preparation by the Heat.

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    In the examples shown from Game 1 and Game 2 between Miami and San Antonio there IS a MAJOR difference between the way the Spurs chose to run their 2-5 Middle Pick and Roll With 4 Perimeter Shooters and 0 Interior Players. i.e. Blair is setting the Pick in Game 2 and Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 2.

    The MAIN reason Bibby is able to recover back to the corner kick-out shooter in Game 2 has nothing to do with the different way that Miami chose to defend the action … but, rather, was connected with the fact that Blair is a much less experienced Pick and Roller” than Splitter and therefore failed to do 2 important things well that Splitter did exceptionally well in the example from Game 1: A. He rolled aggressively toward the rim; and, B. In the process, he completely wiped out Chalmers, who was “sinking in” from the corner shooter. When Coach Popovich made the decision to insert McDyess [i.e. back-up] into Blair's former role [i.e. starter] this season, it completely changed the dynamics of the Spurs. IMO, Pop knows full well that his team is going to struggle more playing this way for the next 15 games, or so … but what he is doing during this stretch is ensuring that Blair gets the in-game reps that he needs in order to perform better in these types of specific situations going into the post-season when he is going to be called on to execute these specific manoeuvres in a more effective way than what he has shown to this point in his still early career in the NBA.

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    Sorry .. that should read as: “Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 1.”

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    In the examples shown from Game 1 and Game 2 between Miami and San Antonio there IS a MAJOR difference between the way the Spurs chose to run their 2-5 Middle Pick and Roll With 4 Perimeter Shooters and 0 Interior Players. i.e. Blair is setting the Pick in Game 2 and Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 2.

    The MAIN reason Bibby is able to recover back to the corner kick-out shooter in Game 2 has nothing to do with the different way that Miami chose to defend the action … but, rather, was connected with the fact that Blair is a much less experienced Pick and Roller” than Splitter and therefore failed to do 2 important things well that Splitter did exceptionally well in the example from Game 1: A. He rolled aggressively toward the rim; and, B. In the process, he completely wiped out Chalmers, who was “sinking in” from the corner shooter. When Coach Popovich made the decision to insert McDyess [i.e. back-up] into Blair’s former role [i.e. starter] this season, it completely changed the dynamics of the Spurs. IMO, Pop knows full well that his team is going to struggle more playing this way for the next 15 games, or so … but what he is doing during this stretch is ensuring that Blair gets the in-game reps that he needs in order to perform better in these types of specific situations going into the post-season when he is going to be called on to execute these specific manoeuvres in a more effective way than what he has shown to this point in his still early career in the NBA.

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    Sorry .. that should read as: “Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 1.”

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    In the examples shown from Game 1 and Game 2 between Miami and San Antonio there IS a MAJOR difference between the way the Spurs chose to run their 2-5 Middle Pick and Roll With 4 Perimeter Shooters and 0 Interior Players. i.e. Blair is setting the Pick in Game 2 and Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 2.

    The MAIN reason Bibby is able to recover back to the corner kick-out shooter in Game 2 has nothing to do with the different way that Miami chose to defend the action … but, rather, was connected with the fact that Blair is a much less experienced Pick and Roller” than Splitter and therefore failed to do 2 important things well that Splitter did exceptionally well in the example from Game 1: A. He rolled aggressively toward the rim; and, B. In the process, he completely wiped out Chalmers, who was “sinking in” from the corner shooter. When Coach Popovich made the decision to insert McDyess [i.e. back-up] into Blair's former role [i.e. starter] this season, it completely changed the dynamics of the Spurs. IMO, Pop knows full well that his team is going to struggle more playing this way for the next 15 games, or so … but what he is doing during this stretch is ensuring that Blair gets the in-game reps that he needs in order to perform better in these types of specific situations going into the post-season when he is going to be called on to execute these specific manoeuvres in a more effective way than what he has shown to this point in his still early career in the NBA.

  • http://khandorssportsblog.com/wordpress khandor

    Sorry .. that should read as: “Splitter is setting the Pick in Game 1.”