Twist action is defined by some as any pick and roll that includes a screen-re-screen combination. Whether that features two screeners or simply some clever pivoting by one, it puts a tremendous amount of pressure on opposing defense. Normally, the Clippers scheme isn’t exactly the birthplace of clever concepts. But in the second quarter of last night’s game against Minnesota, they defied expectations and the result was one of Chris Paul’s patented floaters finding the bottom of the net.

The play starts with Paul receiving a screen from Reggie Evans near the left slot. The T’Wolves decide to send the on-ball defender (Martell Webster) over the top of the screen while having Evans’ man (Derrick Williams) zone up the paint to protect against Paul penetration.

Evans, instead of diving down the middle of the lane, instead screens and loops high around an on-coming DeAndre Jordan. Jordan is coming to complete the re-screen part of the “twist” and free Paul toward the middle of the court. The way the Clippers’ bigs exchange put quite a lot of strain on Kevin Love and Derrick Williams to communicate and execute the right coverage.

With Williams having zoned up near the paint on the first screen, he is in no position to offer any type of hedge on Jordan’s screen. Love, Jordan’s original defender, now is faced with the choice to either switch to Evans (and prevent a possible lob) or hedge/zone-up on the on-coming Jordan screen.

Love ends up being caught in no-man’s land and the Wolves D find themselves at the mercy of Chris Paul coming free off a ball screen in the middle of the floor. With the sharp-shooting Mo Williams on the wing, JJ Barea can’t commit to stopping the ball and this allows Paul to get deep into the paint.

Here is a look at the play in real time:

Here’s how the Heat hassled and harrassed Jeremy Lin into a long night down in South Beach.

Just a short while ago, Beckley Mason shook the basketball world to the core (hyperbole alert) with his mind-blowing, end-of-game timeout research. The stats in that article (albeit containing a few variables) show that NBA coaches, perhaps hemmed in by the expectations of their profession, are overusing timeouts and playing with worse odds than a drunk tourist in Vegas at a blackjack table. Thankfully, the NBA saw a number of close finishes last night. Armed with this new data, a fresh perspective, and a gambling metaphor, it was interesting to watch these games unfold. Of particular interest was the conclusion of Golden State’s 106-104 win in Phoenix.

In a back and forth game, Golden State winds up with a two point lead and a fresh shot clock thanks to an offensive rebound by Dominic McGuire. With 38 seconds left, the Warrior’s still must try to score so Dorell Wright drives to the rim late only to have his pass tipped by the Sun’s Channing Frye toward fellow Sun, Marcin Gortat. Gortat immediately finds the ageless Steve Nash who begins to the move the ball upcourt. The setting is ripe for possibilities as the two-time MVP dribbles at a backpedaling Warrior’s defense, but all that excitement fades when Phoenix calls for a timeout after advancing past halfcourt.

The play itself has no real influence, but is worth viewing to see the subtle advantage the Suns may have had after the steal. Take a look:

While Phoenix didn’t have a primary break opportunity (or even a numerical edge), the video shows that the Warriors defense was still retreating in transition as the ball crossed the timeline. With Nash being, well, Nash, it seems like anytime he can work with an advantage, he should be allowed to do so. However, even the possibility of a timeout forces Nash to further restrain the break by looking back toward head coach, Alvin Gentry, to see if he does, in fact, want to take one.

It seems like a possible opportunity lost until Gentry conjures up some late-game magic with his whiteboard and black marker. He sets up a sideline out-of-bounds play that calls for Hill to inbound, then quickly downscreen for forward Jared Dudley. Dudley makes the play work by catching off the screening, ripping baseline and engaging Hill’s defender with dribble penetration. Hill uses this advantage to circle behind, attack the rim and, viola, tie game. Check it out:

So Gentry is a genius…right?

It certainly is debatable that allowing Nash to orchestrate on the fly after the Gortat steal would have produced a similar result, but there is one thing that Suns timeout caused that isn’t. Before the whistle stopped the action, the Warriors quintet on the floor was David Lee, Nate Robinson, Wright, Monta Ellis and Dominic McGuire. After the timeout, Golden State trotted out a much stauncher unit.

Gone were Robinson and Lee (two subpar defenders) and in their stead were Brandon Rush and Ekpe Udoh (two much more effective ones). Clever screening action or not, the Suns did themselves a major disservice. By stopping the play, Gentry allowed his counterpart, Mark Jackson, to employ a much tougher group to score on.

It brings up the hard truth about the empirical data just released; coaches often put themselves in a worse spot by applying “conventional wisdom”. Instead of letting Nash operate against a weaker, unsettled defense, Gentry made the Suns inbound against a stingier, set one. While the play design was solid and executed well, Gentry, like the intoxicated Vegas tourist, essentially hit on 17 and got a 4.

Jackson, however, also opened himself up for second-guessing by calling a timeout right after the Hill make with 11 seconds left in the game to draw up this:

A zipper cut to an isolation with Ellis isn’t exactly a form of tactical brilliance. In fact, it’s probably the same thing that would have occurred had the Warriors just inbounded Hill’s make and pushed up the ball up the floor right away. The flip side is that the timeout did allow Jackson to pull McGuire and Udoh for the more offensively inclined duo of Lee and Robinson. Rush, brought in during the earlier timeout as a defensive sub, stayed on the floor.

Did the changing of personnel offset the call of an isolation against a set Phoenix defense? Given that Hill was still able to force Ellis into an extremely challenging attempt, it doesn’t appear so. That’s also not even factoring that having Ellis surrounded by four Ray Allens may not matter when the pass-challenged guard has the ball during end of game scenario. So it begs the obvious question, if the plan is to let Ellis go all John Wayne on Phoenix in the clutch, why not let him do so against an unsettled defense?

Going simply by the results, this game appeared to be managed well down the stretch. All the timeouts produced points (except for the Sun’s final one to set up a desperation 3) and the Warriors escaped with a win by, in coach-speak, putting the ball in the hands of their best player. A closer look, however, seems to reveal that the two head coaches, in this instance at least, may have just been beneficiaries of good fortune. Perhaps they should book a trip to Vegas.

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Fatigue factors into the Blazer’s poor offensive performance last night.

The deciding points in the Thunder-Rockets game last night were scored in a relatively innocuous fashion. There were no tricky screens, backdoor lobs or buzzer-beating jumpers. Instead, it was just a patient, benign possession involving multiple actions from the one of the games two, 30-point scorers.

Down one with 38.5 seconds left, Kevin Martin found himself with the ball on the right wing. After an initial pick and roll was thwarted, Martin got the ball back on the left wing and tried again. The second time around he drew a foul on Thunder big man Kendrick Perkins that got to the line for the game-deciding free throws. Here is a look at the play:

What made this play wasn’t so much what Perkins did poorly, but what Martin did well; he acted. In the following series of photographs you will exactly how he sold this call.

In the first picture will show Martin before Perkins makes contact with his body.

In the next one, Martin reacting as if someone just threw a football at his face, despite contact from Perkins that could be viewed as something far south of “jarring”.

This maneuver isn’t something Martin pulled out from the very bottom of his bag of tricks either. For years, despite not being an overly physical, Martin has consistently been among the league leaders in free throw attempts. It is part of what has made him such an insanely efficient scorer.

He (and a few others) has mastered the art of violently throwing his head back to accentuate any contact he receives with or without the ball. This allows him to pile up foul calls and those, in turn, get him to one of the easiest places in the game to score from; the free throw line. In game officiated by human beings that are trying to correctly make calls on plays that are happening at warp speed, it’s a huge advantage to consistently be able to make contact look worse than it really is. It may not be a step-back jumper or a nifty runner, in today’s NBA, it’s a skill.

You can call it flopping. You can complain about its place in the game. What you can’t do, is argue it’s effectiveness. The Rockets win proved that last night.

In a game last night that featured the 3rd and 4th best records in the West, the Mavericks spoiled the return of Caron Butler with a 96-92 win over the Clippers. This was the second meeting between the two teams this season, with the previous meeting being decided on a Chauncey Billups game-winning 3-pointer with 1.0 second remaining. With Billups now out the Clippers needed more from other sources if they wanted to prevail. Being at the game live, I wanted to pay close attention to Blake Griffin and how he has adapted to the new personnel around him.

Starting out in the 1st quarter, Blake seemed to really tailor his game and his aggressiveness depending upon who was his defender. In my notes, I had the following:

With 8 points and 4 rebounds to set the tone early, Griffin had forced some tough defensive decisions on the part of the Mavs. So far this season, Blake hasn’t been as great as advertised in pick-in-roll situations. For the year, Griffin is averaging just .957 PPP leaving him just below the halfway point in that category.However, as noted above in the table, Griffin did perfectly executely a slip on a ball screen very similar to a play you might have seen once or twice. Here is the result of last night’s slip:

Griffin’s ability to finish atthe rim causes all sorts of problems. On a slip by Blake toward the rim, another defender (in this case Dirk) has to step over from his man and stop the potential dunk, unless he wants to share the same fate as Kendrick Perkins. With the opposite side of the floor open, Chris Paul can now make a decision as to how to dissect the defense.

This play worked well last night, as the shooter on most occasions was the aforementioned Butler. Butler in the 1st quarter went 3-4 from the 3-point line, sticking it to his old team early on and finishing the game an efficient 5-10 from the arc. In fact, the Clippers have been very successful at spot-ups this year, according to Synergy they have the 6th best PPP at 1.01. This can all be traced back to the attention Blake gets and of course that point guard of theirs who happens to be pretty good himself.

However, Griffin isn’t the only person in Lob City that draws this type of attention. In the following possession, DeAndre Jordan dives toward the rim allowing for another open shot on the weak side.

The Clippers used this set quite often last night against the Mavs, trying to exploit all options from it. Paul only played in six minutes in the first, a quarter which saw the Clippers have tally only 19 points. In the 2nd, however, Mo Williams had a great effort off the bench, going for nine points and playing the entire quarter.

In the fourth quarter, the Mavericks eventually took control of a back and forth game. A key factor in Dallas’ eventual win was Griffin’s either inability, or just plain apprehensiveness, to take the ball to the rim. Griffin has shown this trend so far this season where he will drift further away from the basket late in games, not wanting to risk going to the free-throw line. When he does actually catch the ball down low, his attacks seem to mirror his lack of confidence in his free-throw shooting. Take a look at a key possession down the stretch where Blake had just missed three free throws, allowing Dallas to grow their lead and let the crowd take over.

Blake certainly started the game off on a great note, being aggressive and allowing himself to be set up through the work of Chris Paul. As the game went on, he deferred to his teammates when he could have spent the last part of the period at the line. Blake must make sure his confidence is on par with his energy in order to maintain consistent success. After all, with his team poised to make a deep playoff run, Griffin will have to show he is he able to come through when it matters most.

After being last year’s playoff darlings, Memphis was picked as a dark horse contender for this season’s Western Conference crown. Things have been up and down thus far for the Grizzlies, however, and now they find themselves fighting for their playoff lives. The main problem has been their offense, or more aptly put, their lack of it. Memphis currently sits at 24th in the Hollinger’s Offensive Efficiency rankings with the potential return of the injured Zach Randolph looking like the most practical way of improvement.

The pieces outside Rudy Gay, Mike Conley and Marc Gasol aren’t exactly equipped to light up scoreboards. The rest of the surrounding personnel in Memphis probably could be best described as “athletic” more than anything else. Jeremy Pargo, Quincy Pondexter, Tony Allen and Sam Young compromise a group that lacks polished basketball skills but can certainly fly around the floor, particularly on the defensive end. Perhaps that is why, last night, Lionel Hollins threw a small twist at the Jazz; he pressed.

At the start of the second quarter, the Grizzlies pressed the Jazz for back to back possessions with mixed results. In the first possession, coming right at the start of the quarter, a Grizzlies unit Pargo, Pondexter, Gasol, OJ Mayo and Dante Cunningham forced a 24-second violation on the Utah. Make sure to note the time in which the Jazz finally were able to settle into their offense after working hard to get the ball up the floor.

With only 14 seconds left on the clock, the combination of Utah’s lack of flex set and poor clock awareness led to a wasted possession. However, the next time the Jazz inbounded under their own basket, they handled the pressure much better and the result was two foul shots for Paul Millsap. The key to Millsap’s layup attempt came early from a blown coverage during the initial trap.

Take a look:

After this, Hollins called off the dogs outside of a few token man pressures from time to time. But this series brings up a more interesting point. To help make up for their woeful offense, and perhaps find more rest for the overworked trio of Gay, Conley and Gasol, should the Grizzlies press more?

Memphis could trot out a designed pressing lineup of Pargo, Allen, Pondexter, Young (if healthy) and either Cunningham or Hamed Haddadi for 3-4 minute stretches to perhaps confuse wear down an opponent. Unlike high school or college, the press’ goal wouldn’t be to turn the other team over. At the NBA level, there are too many composed ball handlers for that to happen with any consistency. The press would have three distinct goals:

- Wear the opponent down for the final quarter
- Shorten their operating time in the half-court
- Allow more rest time for Gasol, Gay and Conley without completely sacrificing the minutes due to playing non-productive players

(To elaborate on point three a bit more, a struggling player like Pondexter or Pargo has a bigger negative effect on the team when employed for long stretches in their standard scheme. However, when employed with a bigger purpose that doesn’t show up on a stat sheet, their negative impact is minimized justifying them being on the floor for more minutes.)

It’s a certainty the Pargo-Allen-Pondexter-Young-Haddadi/Cunningham group would be a trainwreck offensively, but Memphis could simply look to run at every opportunity and use some basic dribble-drive concepts when stuck in the half-court. Again, this lineup would only be on the floor for brief stretches and, if they accomplish their intended goals, punting offense during this time wouldn’t be a total killer.

The final upside is that by using Allen in this role if could switch up the substitution pattern in a way that allows a much better shooter (Mayo) to be on the floor with Gay, Conley and Gasol during crucial stretches. And let’s face it, those three could use the operating room. With eleven teams competing for eight spots, the Grizzlies should explore any avenue they can in order to stay in the thick of the playoff race.

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With Brandon Roy being forced into retirement due to knee issues, there were plenty of grumblings around Portland wonder if LaMarcus Aldridge was going to fill the void of team leader for an organization that just lost it’s most noticeable figure. The improvements that Aldridge has been able to make, mainly his low-post game, has given him the ability to carry a team on a nightly basis. His ability to adapt his game and improve in the needed areas over the course of the past two seasons has been extremely impressive

Aldridge’s numbers so far this year have been great; 23.3 PPG, 8.5 RPG, .51% FG%. Aldridge is in the midst of a great season and has turned Portland into one of the more dangerous teams in the West. In fact, LaMarcus’ PPP has went up from 1.001 to 1.013. It doesn’t seem like much until you consider he’s in the top 14% of all players in overall offense, a 20% improvement from last season, according to Synergy.

But one of the more noticeable on-court improvements come in the form of additions to LaMarcus’ game, particularly his array of moves in the low post.  If you study the trends of Aldridge’s game, you’ll see that the large part of his game is spent posting-up, which isn’t a surprise. If you dig a little deeper, you’ll notice when posting-up, most times Aldridge sets up shop on the left block, a whopping 76% of all his post-up possessions. While other players have similar tendencies, what separates Aldridge is his effectiveness from his preferred area of the floor. Here are just a few clips of LaMarcus on the left block.

Aldridge is going to his left shoulder in each of the four clips. In 2010-2011 season, Aldridge went to his left shoulder while on the left block 58% of the time. That is a decent enough number for coaches to catch on to and set up the defense to adjust for when LA turns that left shoulder and is ready to fire. This can make the double-team easier because most often that is where it will be coming from, the inside. However, 2011-2012, LaMarcus is using his left shoulder on the left block just 48% of the time, down a good 10% from the previous season. Coupled with what we’ve seen from Aldridge over the course of his career, we know this is a concerted effort on his part to add more variety into his low post game. Let’s take a look at some of the areas in which he has now gone to in that 10% difference and where he is using it.

In the first clip, Aldridge uses a quick fake to the left, a move that has been very effective this year in getting the defender off-balance, then turns to his right shoulder and has a lay-up that he misses but follows his shot. You can tell he wasn’t totally comfortable with that move, somewhat herky-jerky as he tries to get used to that action. In the second and third clips, the defense half-heartedly commits to a double-team, Aldridge sees this movement from the defense and uses his move to his right shoulder, converting on one play and getting fouled on the next.

According to hoopdata.com, LA’s usage rate has been increased this year, so in order for him to continue to be successful, mixing up the array of moves is going to be very important. By being a good jump shooter as well, 45% on jump shots this season, it gives LaMarcus the ability to create on the low block and keep the defense guessing as to what might come next. In fact, Aldridge is shooting 44% on shots from 16-23 feet, according to hoopdata.com.

Finally, Aldridge has improved his face-up game and even used it more often this year, again going back to his committment to really change the pace on the defense. By stretching the floor with his jump shot and also with the ability to face-up, it gives Portland more room for cutters. Take a look at a few clips of LaMarcus using that ability on the left block, his favorite side.

While these possessions are all pretty simple in thought, they are just another terrific example of the expanded game that Aldridge has shown so far this season. We’ve seen LA steadily improve each season, now with a greater burden, he’s become a dynamic players that can score multiple ways. Already this season; games of 39 and 30 points verse the Thunder, 28 points and 14 rebounds verse the Kings, and a very impressive 29 points on 72% shooting against Denver.

As the numbers indicate, the left side is the best side for LaMarcus and he’s proving that to all the other coaches that voted him into the all-star game this season. He has approached this season with a fresh mentality and a new batch of moves. Next time you watch a Portland game, take notes on which block he sets up on, on which shoulder he turns to, and also what move he goes to while there. One thing is for sure with Aldridge’s new-found collection of moves, you will most certainly have a full box score after it’s all said and done.



Pau Gasol’s brilliance will be given much of the credit, but a it was a poorly executed Boston possession at the end of regulation that actually paved the way for Gasol’s game-saving block.

With 9.8 seconds left on the clock and the ball being taken out of bounds near the hash, Doc Rivers drew up a late game gem. The play called for Rajon Rondo to act as the triggerman entering the ball into a Paul Pierce cutting off a Kevin Garnett screen toward the top of the key.

After Rondo clears through opposite, Ray Allen comes off a Mickael Pietrus screen sprinting toward Pierce.

Upon reaching Pierce, Allen sets a brush screen (or perhaps simply slips) while Garnett moves from the short corner to flare screen for Allen toward the wing.

However, two things happen that send this promising design spiraling out of control. First, Metta World Peace (my goodness is it ridiculous to type that) because too pre-occupied with Pierce leaving Allen open on the wing and Garnett with no-one to screen. Pierce makes an even bigger mistake by taking his vision away from both Peace (still ridiculous) and the weakside action in general. In a perfect world, Pierce should already be delivering a hook pass that leads Allen to an open spot on the wing.

Even though Pierce fails to read the play right, it is still savable at this point. Garnett could have chose to screen down on Gasol (or slipped to the rim, dragging Gasol with him), opening up a passing lane to Allen who still is freed from Artest (much better). Garnett also could have popped to the middle of the floor hunting a mid-range shot for himself.

He fails to do either and this is how the play ended up:

A moment that could have seen Paul Pierce or Ray Allen plunging a late-game dagger into a hated rival instead saw Mickael Pietrus wildly flinging toward the rim with a desperate heave. The end result was the overtime period that ended with Gasol’s emphatic rejection. If not for some shoddy execution by normally steady veterans late, Boston’s winning streak would still be alive and well.

Two games cannot provide a definitive answer on a player but like a good mystery novel, two games can offer clues. These clues can be used to paint a clearer picture of what a player is or is not capable of. Jeremy Lin’s case is no exception. Well it can be easy to rush to judgment on Lin before having an ample amount of data, let’s first see what information can be gleaned from his incredibly productive two game stretch.

The first thing that stood out about Lin’s two games actually didn’t have anything to do with him. The most noticeable thing was that the two defenses (Utah and New Jersey) he carved up were bad (Utah 21st in defensive efficiency) and atrocious (NJ dead last in same category), respectively. When looking at the tape you can see that Lin was definitely the beneficiary of some poor effort and execution by his opponents.

The first video contains three clips of Lin attacking these porous D’s. Against Utah, a simple dribble flip from Iman Shumpert and oncoming ball screen from Tyson Chandler somehow open a huge driving gap for Lin. His wide open layup is mainly a result from poor communication between Devin Harris (Lin’s defender) and Al Jefferson (Chandler’s defender). Then on the backside of the play, Gordon Hayward finds himself slow to rotate over and stop the drive.

The next clip in the sequence is particularly embarrassing for the Nets. Lin and Jared Jeffries engage in a pick and roll in the middle of the floor while Amar’e Stoudamire, located behind the action, is looking to fill behind. This play is typically designed for Stoudamire to get open near the weakside (in this case, left) elbow/pinch post for a jumper or isolation attack as his defender sinks in on the roll. However, for reasons unknown, his defender Shawne Williams, completely ignores his help responsibilities and faceguards Stoudamire. This results in a wide open dive to the rim for Jeffries and an easy pocket pass for Lin to tally one of his seven assists that night.

The final play against the woeful Nets defense shows Lin finding another easy scoring opportunity for himself. While going under screens will be a typical coverage he sees going forward, in certain areas of the floor, it simply can’t happen. In this third clip, Jordan Farmer goes under a screen set at the elbow allowing Lin to rhythm dribble into a wide open jumper a step inside the foul line. While Lin has historically had some shooting issues, a vast majority of NBA guards will hurt teams if given easy looks from this spot consistently.

It should be noted that bad defense isn’t a knock against Lin. In fact, if Lin hadn’t taken advantage of these situations (and others like them) I wouldn’t be writing this. It is simply worth noting that a fair amount of points and assists were opportunistic endeavors that he simply won’t see that often, especially against elite defensive teams.

Bad defense or not, though, Lin was still able to do a great job of getting to the rim. However, one noticeable thing was that he failed to utilize his left (weak) hand effectively during his forrays to the hoop. Looking back at old scouting reports, it seems as though this has been a consistent issue for Lin. In the following edit, we’ll see a rim attack that ends poorly due to a forced, right-hand finish as well as an awkward left-hand attempt that Lin fails to convert.

Being dominant with only one hand isn’t a total death sentence. in fact, players like Corey Maggette and Jason Terry have forged long careers as scorers despite showing a complete inability to do much with their off-hand. Lin, though, doesn’t possess physical advantages like Maggette’s strength and Terry’s quickness to compensate for it. One thing Lin can use to offset this malady is develop a nice two-foot floater or one-foot runner (preferably with both hands).

The next video showcases two clips. In the first, Lin attacks middle and is forced into an awkward runner that barely draws iron. Notice on that attempt how Lin pushes too deep instead reading what the defense is giving him. This a result of two things; his comfort level in his runner as a weapon for him to use and Lin being a typical young player who attacks without a plan. In the second clip, we see a tough missed jumper in the paint that could have easily been a great opportunity for a left-handed runner.

Despite some of these shortcomings, Lin definitely has some real positives to his game. The first is his ability to change speeds. For a guard without top end burst, being able to shift gears with the dribble (while changing body position or “status”) is an absolute must. Here is a great example of Lin doing exactly that:

The final thing, as Coach Thorpe also pointed out in his TrueHoopTV segment, is that Lin takes tremendous, attacking angles when coming off a ball screen. Pick and roll play is perhaps the trickiest thing for a player to get a feel for doing. A vast majority of young players really struggle with it so the fact that Lin has this nuance down bodes well for his future. Here is a look at such an example of taking a great, downhill, attacking angle coming off a screen:

While the evaluation of Lin will be an on-going for the next few weeks, these two games have given us some answers. He has certainly given a struggling Knicks team a spark, but there are enough concerns with his game to wonder if he can continue to do so going forward, especially against better teams. However, another big game or two this week could provide more clues that only deepen the mystery.

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