Special Playbook post here today on behalf of James Ham from Cowbell Kingdom. James has produced a tremendous documentary on the current plight of the Sacramento Kings franchise. When you have some time to give it a view (it’s a little over an hour), please do so, it is well worth your time.

If the Nuggets are to pull off the impossible and rally from a 3-1 deficit to come back and beat the Lakers, they need one of their core members to elevate his play. (Impossible may be a slight exaggeration, but the ‘highly unlikely’ just doesn’t have the same ring to it) All season long, Arron Afflalo has been a the definition of ‘steady contributor’. His blue-collar attitude and accurate shooting were one of the key reasons why Denver remained afloat despite a myriad of injuries and a blockbuster trade mid-season.

Against L.A., however, Afflalo’s has seen that steadfast marksmanship dissappear. Perhaps competing possession after possession with Kobe Bryant on the defensive end of the floor plays a role, but his shooting numbers are a far cry from his 47.1 FG% and 39.8% he posted in the regular season. In fact, Afflalo has yet to shoot over a measly 42.9% from the floor the entire series. If Denver is going to win Game 6, much less buck long shot odds and win the series, the former Bruin must find a way to regain his shooting touch.

A possible solution to this problem could be a return to the off-ball action Denver used near the end of their Game 5 victory. Afflalo’s high hoops I.Q. lead contributed to great reads off the ball that lead to a number of great looks for him. Late in the 2nd quarter, we see an example of why he is so dangerous in these situations.

Denver tries to run a double stagger for Afflalo on the left wing. Bryant, being the wily defender that he is, positions himself to deny Afflalo from getting to the screen, essentially forcing him to backcut into help. However, because Afflalo makes his read so decisively, he leaves Bryant flat-footed and beats an attempted switch from Matt Barnes. Thanks to a nifty Andre Miller pass, the play ends with a layup.

Now the threat of Afflalo moving off the ball becomes even more fearsome when he’s involved in screening action with JaVale “massive threat to slip the screen for a dunk” McGee (nickname is an unofficial working title). After running some pin down action between Afflalo and McGee in a few previous possessions, the Nuggets staff either calls for (or alerts McGee to) a slip. Thanks to a disengaged Andrew Bynum, the result is a massive dunk by McGee.

Slightly later on the 4th quarter, the two are back at it again. This time Bynum, worried about the lob and generally disinterested in defending, doesn’t show up to the level of the screen and Afflalo is able to attack the rim and draw a foul.

The final act between this screening duo is a mixture of the all three of the previous examples. Steve Blake is checking Afflalo this time, and similar to the first video, tries to deny him from getting to the screen. Bynum, still allergic to proper help positioning, doesn’t even attempt to slow or impede Afflalo in anyway. Thanks to this, Afflalo simply pins Blake on his back as he cuts across the paint and receives another pass from Miller for an easy layup.

Thus far in the series, Afflalo has found little success in isolation attacks. Mirroring the fact he ranked 195th in this category (per SynergySports) during the regular season. If George Karl can put an emphasis on screening action involving his shooting guard, they could perhaps get Afflalo back on track. Something the Nuggets desperately need if they want to beat the odds.

For those of you following the Thunder this postseason, there will be a familiar site at the start of every second quarter. It is during this time that Scott Brooks employs a bench unit led by supersub James Harden and, well, not much else. Because of the dearth of gamechangers around him, Brooks will consistently use a specific set early in the quarter to try and generate a good look for his primary playmaker.

The play starts with Harden always in the right corner (so he can drive middle with his dominant left hand) and the ball in the hands of the Thunder’s backup point guard, currently Derek Fisher. Dirk-stopper Nick Collison begins the action by sprinting to set a ball screen for Fisher at the top of the key. This screen, commonly referred to as false action (because it’s used to set up the real threat of the play), forces a quick hedge by Collison’s defender freeing him for a catch on a pass back from Fisher.

This false action now sets up the real design of the play; to get Harden into a dribble hand-off (DHO) while sprinting up from the deep corner.

Harden’s read are simple:
- Backcut if denied getting to the screen
- Curl if the screener’s defender offers no hedge protection
- Straight cut (usually for a 3pt shot) if both defenders sag under or Harden’s man gets caught in the screen

And if no initial opening appears after the DHO, Harden and Collison can re-engage in screening action (Either a step-up or traditionally side pick and roll).

The key to all this is the weakside spacing. The other two perimeter players and second post form what is referred to as a “Triangle Away”. The alignment that allows for gaps to be open both on the baseline and for any middle attack Harden chooses to make off the bounce.

In Game 1 against Dallas, Harden finds the space for 3-point shot thanks largely to Dirk Nowitzki cutting in front of his defender (Delonte West) while trying to recover to Collison’s roll to open space after the DHO.

This set is used so frequently by the Thunder because it is a read-based play. Harden essentially just has to react to both his defender and the screener’s to make the cut that puts the most pressure on the defense. So the result in Game 1 maybe nothing like the results you see the rest of the series. The only certainty about this play is that you will see it.

The Washington Wizards not only played the role of spoiler against the Milwaukee Bucks last night, but they also provided Playbook’s Play of the Night. Taking the ball out of bounds early in the fourth quarter, head coach Randy Wittmann drew up a gem that resulted in a wide open layup. The Wizards didn’t exactly need much help dicing up the Bucks defense, but some clever X’s and O’s never hurt. Let’s take a look.

The play starts with Shelvin Mack inbounding on the right sideline and with the rest of his teammates in a box formation (both blocks, both elbows). Nene starts off the play by coming to the ball off the right elbow. Mack hits him with a pass then cuts past him to receive a dribble hand-off.

Mack then continues his dribble toward the top of the key while forward James Singleton sprints up to set a ball screen.

While that is going on, Nene has begun to cut from his initial position toward the left block. In the process, he receives screens from both Maurice Evans and Cartier Martin. Both players are looking to headhunt (as opposed to screening an area) Nene’s defender Drew Gooden hoping to either force a switch for an iso post up or free Nene entirely for a shot at the rim. The timing on this play is important as Nene must time his cut with Shelvin Mack’s movement on the perimeter. If he moves too soon, Mack may not be in a position to deliver the ball.

The play works as scripted as Mack, despite dragging two defenders with him off the ball screen, finds Nene open with great position near the rim. (Note: On the backside of the play, James Singleton prepares to screen for Martin to come to the top as a second option in triangle or screen-the-screener action. However, Martin forgets this and simply floats to the top.)

Then end result is a wide open layup for Brazilian big man. Here is the play in real time:

There is perhaps no more pressure-filled, part-time role in basketball than that of the shooting specialist. They enter the game with a sole purpose; to soak nets with ridiculously wet jumpers. Defense, rebounding and perhaps even the ability to dribble are often overlooked if one of these players can change a game with his deadly accuracy from behind the arc. If the shots fail to fall however, this player often finds his minutes and value to his team spiraling downward.

With this type of existence, a shooting-specialist sounds about as desirable as being a kicker in the NFL. Despite all this, they dot rosters around the league in a variety of shapes and sizes. Some hail from the East (Steve Novak) and some from the West (Daequn Cook). Some are tall (Vlad Radmanovic). Some are short (Boobie Gibson). And some are gingers (Matt Bonner).

But no matter height, race, creed or hair color, the effectiveness this type of player is normally measured solely by raw percentages. However, when letting that type of empirical data rule the day, one can sometimes miss the many subtle impacts a shooting specialist can have despite their lack of a well-rounded game. Sometimes, even when not making shots at a blistering rate, these marksmen impact a game in ways that can’t be measured by the traditional box score.

Kyle Korver is one of these snipers. His particular set of shooting skills just so happens to include what is arguably the quickest release in the game today. The main component in that release is his ability to set his feet (and be balanced) at lightning speed. Twice in last night’s game against the Heat, he showed off this hair-trigger release with great results.

This combination of speed, shooting accuracy and off the ball movement causes an entire defense to account for Korver’s whereabouts at all times. This is when a shooting specialist becomes truly dangerous to an opponent as even a split second without focus can result in a quick three points. During that time, a player like Korver, averaging just a shade under 23 minutes per game, can find himself forcing three or more defenders to focus on his presence on any given play. A right normally received for superstars.

Korver, unlike a James, Anthony or Bryant, does most of his damage off the good ole’ NBA single-double screening action (where he can choose to go off a single screen on one side of the floor or a double on the other). The threat of a catch and shoot out of this action can not only create offense for Korver, but a create series of closeouts with a single well placed pass out of it.

Against Miami, Korver twice drew three defenders to himself out of this set, moved the ball and allowed a teammate to attack rotating defense. In both the following clips, he does exactly that only to find the ball coming back to him in the end. When that happens, well, he does what he does best; knocks down the shot. Take a look.

But sometimes that first pass leads directly to a great look for a teammate. In a set that may look somewhat familiar, Carlos Boozer sets a quick ball screen for Derek Rose then looks to free Korver with a pin-down late in the game. As Korver comes off the screen, Ronny Turiaf (Boozer’s defender) immediately jumps out to contest a possible shot. Korver delivers a deft hook pass over the top and Boozer drains a jumper over a late-rotating Chris Bosh.

However, the threat of a Korver shot attempt never had a bigger effect than during the Bulls final possession in regulation. Down three, out of a sideline out-of-bounds, Korver receives a dribble hand-off from Boozer only to find himself surrounded (once again) by three Heat defenders. With some quick and accurate ball movement, Korver and Boozer combine to find CJ Watson all alone on the opposite of the floor. Watson then uses a great shot-fake, dribble-adjustment against a Dwyane Wade closeout and ties the game. A game (spoiler alert) the Bulls eventually ended up winning in overtime.

Korver’s play last night helped his Chicago team take down Miami and all but lock up home-court advantage throughout the playoffs. While a player like Korver will never be the key to winning an entire series, his presence (especially during his more torrid stretches like last night) can certainly help the Bulls win a single game come playoff time. Yet Korver’s line (6-8, 17 points, 5-6 from 3), while impressive, fails to tell exactly how much his presence on the court for 19 minutes affected the game. Such is the life of a shooting specialist.

With Jason Kidd, Steve Nash and Andre Miller entering their twilight of their careers, the game is on the verge losing a trio of players that excel at the simplest notion; getting the ball to their teammates where they can be their best. It is not so much passing as it is the idea of distribution. Perhaps due to a changing game, it is an idea fewer and fewer in today’s game seem less capable of embracing.

To be an elite distributor one has to possess a certain amount of guile and moxie, traits that combine to produce a clever variety of ways to deliver the basketball into the hands of open teammates. Distributors, in a sense, find “angles of deployment”. Whether contorting their bodies, dribbling to new space or using crazy amounts of spin and pace, they find windows that allow for the ball to be delivered at exactly the right time.

At just 26 years old, Rajon Rondo already finds himself as a lonely master of this particular craft. Last night, he showcased just how devastating a black-belt in the art of distribution can be, especially when your teammates make long 2s at the same rate Dwight Howard converts dunks. Thanks in part to that torrid jump-shooting by his teammates, Rondo tallied 15 assists against a Heat defense that spent most of the contest overwhelmed and bewildered.

Quite of few of his dimes came due to Rondo working hard to find great angles of deployment. Part of what helps him do that so well is his tendency in transition to change sides of the floor with the dribble. This concept, which a mentor of mine termed, “changing boxes” (picture a court split into four equal quadrants) creates all sorts of subtle angles to find open teammates. Thanks to this great habit, Rondo is able to create an open shot for Greg Stiemsma on the break.

When Rondo gets the ball on the break and pushes it down the left side of the floor. He forces two Miami defenders to defend him.

Noticing Stiemsma coming down late as the trail post, Rondo pushes across the court. This is where he finds a clever way to distribute the pass. Due to the angle of his drive and the pace of the on-coming Stiemsma, Rondo delivers a flick-pass off the bounce with his right hand instead of stopping and pivoting around. It is a much quicker deliver that guarantees Stiemsma jumper will have no chance of being contested.

Here is a video of the play in real time:

That isn’t the only time during last night’s game where Rondo found a proper angle to feed Stiemsma for an open shot. Late in the third, a staggered screen for Ray Allen leaves the former Badger wide open in the short corner. Rondo, after using a pass fake, then whips an overhead pass to Stiemsma for the jumper.

While that pass looks pretty ordinary, it’s that Rondo delivered it overhead that made it work. Notice Dwyane Wade’s hands in the following picture. They are down near his waist but could quickly get up to deflect or even steal a pass delivered from chest level. But by delivering the ball with an overhead pass, Rondo insures it gets to his target unmolested.

The following two clips involve Rondo finding clever angles to deliver to Paul Pierce. In the first clip, Rondo attacks the paint after an offensive rebound. On his drive, Pierce relocates to the wing. Rondo does an excellent job of using his body to shield his defender while delivering an inside hand shovel-pass. The result is a wide-open Pierce 3.

For lower levels, coaches would most likely teach and drill a jump-stop to a reverse pivot to make that pass to Pierce. However, in the following picture you will see that the timing and speed of the game factor into Rondo’s decision. Wade, who had leaked out down the floor on the initial shot attempt, was coming back into the play. Had Rondo taken the more “fundamental” but slower approach, Pierce might have found his shot blocked or altered by Wade.

In the final video, Rondo makes an absolutely fantastic delivery in the post from the top of the key. Words don’t do this justice, so just take a look:

With a step and some sickening spin, Rondo makes a spectacular entry to Pierce on the block. The natural tendency for a player is to throw it to the wing there and let entry come from a better angle. However, take a look at where the shot clock is in the following picture.

With that little time left, a wing entry could be denied long enough to force Avery Bradley (the player on the wing) to most likely create a contested shot for himself with very little time to do so. But thanks to Rondo’s ability to seek out creative angles, the end result is a Pierce layup instead.

So while Nash, Kidd and Miller may be hanging it up soon, fear not for the demise of the distributor. Thanks to Rajon Rondo (and perhaps Ricky Rubio), this rare breed will avoid extinction.

….you usually find Steve Nash involved. No real post today. Just read this before you watch the video.

On Sunday afternoon against the Heat, Rajon Rondo had his way with the Miami Heat defense en route to his fifth triple-double of the season. It was hard not to notice him as he did it either. Multiple Celtic possessions featured Rondo galloping into the paint unmolested, a trend that helped a rather pedestrian Boston offense suddenly look invincible despite the absence of Ray Allen.

Most have pointed to Erik Spoelstra’s decision to go over the top of any Rondo pick and rolls as the primary culprit. But in the NBA, it is important to remember two very important keys. First; pick and roll defense is always based off who is involved and in what area of the floor. The second is that on the NBA level, whatever the coverage is, a team is always going to be giving something up.

That second part is particularly important to note when looking at the pick and roll action involving Rondo and Paul Pierce. The standard line of thinking with that duo, when the screen is set in the middle of the floor, is stay attached (or jam) with Pierce’s defender and have Rondo’s defender go under. In theory, that coverage should leave the only thing open a Rondo shot. And if we go by Key #2, a Rondo jumper from 15+ feet seems like an okay thing to give up.

However, because Rondo is so explosive at turning the corner on the ball screen, the on-ball defender, who must go under at an angle to cut off any deep penetration near the rim, finds himself at a severe disadvantage. This forces the hedging defender (assigned to Pierce) to stay with Rondo longer than he would like.

All Pierce has to do is simply screen and pop back behind the three-point line and waits for the pass. On the catch, Pierce simply reads the closeout. In the following edit, Pierce not only picks and pops for 3, but is also able to counter into a shot-fake attack and get to the rim. Take a look.

The scary part is that’s not the only negative result teams can experience from this stay-attached-and-go-under coverage. Much like Dallas does with Dirk, Pierce can cleverly (and illegally) bull rush or move into the defender going underneath and force a switch. Naturally, a pinch post isolation match-up between Pierce and a small guard is hardly a good result for a defense off this action.

Pierce misses the shot in the clip, but the bottom line is he was able to engineer a switch onto a 5’9” guard at the nail. In theory the “stay-attached and go-under” coverage seems like the right ploy because it should force Rondo to be the scoring option. In practice, teams end up with Pierce getting all the great looks.

As they did prep work for the Boston match-up, Spoelstra and his staff must have decided the key to defending this action was to keep the ball out of Pierce’s hands. The way to do that was to switch up the coverage to a “show and over” scheme.

The coverage is just like it sounds, the player guarding the screener shows hard, forcing the ball handler to re-direct towards halfcourt while the on-ball defender goes over the top of the screen. By going over the screening Pierce, the on-ball defender took the option of being dragged into a switch off the table. Hedging hard allowed the Pierce’s defender a much better chance at not being forced into a long a closeout. So what does a coverage like that give up? Take a look at the following clip.

Of the three clips, the ideal result was the Rondo floater. Assuming the on-ball defender doesn’t make a heroic effort at getting back in front while going over the top of the screen, a mid-range Rondo shot is what that coverage is conceding to give up. Given the hierarchy of efficient basketball shots, a floater from Rondo seems to be a better option than an open Pierce 3-point shot or attack on the rim.

While the other results make it seem like the coverage was a complete and abject failure, it actually hides the fact that it accomplished one key goal: it kept Pierce from getting the ball. And for those still skeptical, the coverage does actually work. Check it out.

In the last clip, the Nuggets execute incredibly well and completely stop the play. That was what Miami was hoping to get out of the scheme except they were quicker rotations and better awareness from help defenders away from accomplishing that.

Greg Popovich has made an amazing career of using the regular season in a way that better prepares his teams for the post season. Spoelstra’s decision is in that same vein. Should Miami go to war with Boston in a playoff series this spring, the Heat are now better prepared to stop them. In the end, Spoelstra essentially tried something new in a relatively meaningless game and it failed (rather miserably). It doesn’t mean, however, that it wasn’t worth trying.

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People tend to forget that before a few thousand extra crapes, Boris Diaw was a key cog in the Phoenix Suns “Seven Seconds or Less Era”, particularly in the 2006-07 season. A versatile player who could play every frontcourt spot, Diaw often found himself manning the pivot in the undersized Suns lineups. There his ability to handle and pass made an offense predicated on ball movement harder to stop. Last night, against one of his former teams, Diaw showcased that ability once again.

In the first clip, Diaw catches the ball from the trail spot and, thanks to a defensive mix-up, finds a plethora of open space. Not too many bigs are capable of making this type play at this pace, but despite the extra poundage, Diaw puts the ball on the deck and attacks the defense. He drives deep into the paint before locating a wide open Matt Bonner in the corner for a wide open 3-point shot.

A few posts ago, I wrote about Marc Gasol’s ability to pass while diving after a ball screen. Diaw possess the same type of ability. Here he screens on the ball, dives hard towards the rim, then delivers a quick, accurate, interior pass to a cutting Kawhi Leonard for a dunk.

The final clip showcases a little of both skills. Diaw catches early on his roll after a screen and uses his dribble to put pressure on the rim. The defense is forced to collapse to him on his middle drive and finds Leonard again, this time for an open three.

Diaw is clearly not the same player he was a few years ago, but he still will provide value to a Spurs team whose offensive scheme requires willing ball movers. Even with teammate Tiago Splitter expected back soon, Diaw will still provide plenty of value. Fighting to hold onto the second spot in the West, the Spurs need a quality fifth big that can produce in a pinch. If Diaw can continue to have solid nights off the bench, it will allow Greg Popovich to find more and more spots to rest aging star Tim Duncan. Resting Duncan without a major hit to his team’s chances of competing in games down the stretch seems like a win-win for a team expecting a deep playoff run.

This is the set that can win Oklahoma City a championship.

For the past year, the Thunder have been criticized for their perceived inability to execute in the half-court, especially in the playoffs. But it appears Scott Brooks and his staff designed a play that fits their team’s personnel so perfectly it was almost impossible to defend.

The set usually begins with some false action that leads into a dribble flip (DF) between Kendrick Perkins and of the Thunders two primary ball handlers (Russell Westbrook and James Harden). Perkins then sprints out of the DF into either a rim run or a pin down with Kevin Durant moving off either action on the weakside. The strongside of the floor is usually spread opposite, giving Durant the option to tight curl into the paint and attack the rim.

That is the normal pattern of the play which, even without any wrinkles, poses enough problems for an opposing defense. But in the fourth quarter of last night’s game, the Thunder (perhaps by accident), introduced a new wrinkle that made it nearly indefensible.

Out of a dead ball walk-up, Westbrook passes ahead to Harden and shallow cuts across the key toward the opposite wing. Durant begins to position himself on the left block.

Harden swings the ball to the trailing Perkins who catches and immediately performs the dribble flip with Westbrook.

Here is where the new “wrinkle” comes in. As Perkins goes to pin down for Durant, Ibaka, instead of spacing the floor as a spot up option, begins to move toward Westbrook as if to set a ball screen. With the threat of a ball screen, Haslem must come up with Ibaka in order to be in a position to hedge should Westbrook choose to use it.

Due to Durant’s effectiveness as a catch and shoot player, the defender guarding the screener must be very active in help. Here, Chris Bosh shows well above the screen (which Perkins immediately slips) in order to make things difficult on Durant. Normally, there would be a low defender to rotate over to Perkins in order to prevent a lay-up, but Ibaka’s move toward the top has pulled everyone near or above the free throw line extended making a rotation extremely difficult.

The result of the play is a wide open dunk by Perkins with nary a Miami player in sight.

Here is the play in real time:

This type of outcome screams “blown rotation”, when in all reality, it’s not. Any help defender who might rotate over to help out on the pin down action would free up something equally destructive

James dropping leaves Westbrook free in the middle of the court to do as he pleases. A rotation from Wade (hidden behind Ibaka in the fourth picture) is not only impossibly difficult, but has the side effect of leaving Harden alone on the wing. Haslem, as mentioned before, is the closest rotation, but leaving Ibaka opens up three dicey propositions: Ibaka can

- sprint from the elbow to the right side of the rim for an uncontested lob
- screen away for Harden on the wing with no big to protect Wade
- screen on the ball for Westbrook without a big to slow the explosive point guard down as he turns the corner

Perhaps the simplest way to defend this play is for Bosh to stay flat with the screener, instead of hedging so aggressively out on Durant so no rotation is necessary. If that’s the choice, than the result is letting Durant tight curl for a shot or rim attack 10-12 times per game while his defender (Shane Battier in this case) trails helplessly behind. Oh, and if Durant’s defender decides to shoot the gap instead of trail, he’ll be met with a fade cut and a barrage of wide open corner 3’s.

Just when it seems all hope is lost for a defense, it’s important to remember that any offense with Kendrick Perkins will still have a weakpoint. On a set like this, the ball should be funneled to him, just not in the manner which leads to Perkins getting easy shots at the rim.

One way teams could try to slow this maneuver down is by switching the pin down between Durant and Perkins. Durant’s defender could jam Perkins while the big guarding Perk would switch out hard on Durant, looking to deny him the ball. The hope would be that the Thunder, if unable to get the ball to Durant, would either be forced to run secondary action or feed the ball into Perkins on the block. Given the aforementioned scenarios above, Perkins in the post against a wing defender seems like pretty palatable.

The danger would be Durant getting the ball against the switched out big. Whichever player ends up isolated on Durant, should pressure the ball (looking to deny a 3-point attempt) and force Durant baseline in hopes a swift rotation forces him to settle for a mid-range pull up. Not ideal, but something an opponent could consistently concede and still stay in the game. (The Heat, with Bosh, Ronny Turiaf, Joel Anthony and Haslem are probably better equipped to handle this strategy better than most teams.)

The play won’t work every time. Durant will occasionally get bumped off his curl by his primary defender, or another Thunder player won’t make the right read. But this set is just more proof that the Thunder no longer are searching for the best way to incorporate their outstanding talents into a cohesive whole on the offensive end.

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