Serbia’s Deep Three

What was interesting about yesterday’s ending, especially Serbia’s possession, was the strategy that was implemented (and the strategy that wasn’t implemented):

Serbia starts out in a 1-4 flat set that you commonly see in the NBA.  However, instead of the ISOs you normally see, Serbia sends a screener to pop out and set a screen.  The sole purpose of this screen is to force Spain to switch on defense.

However, good on and off ball defense by Spain really throws off Serbia’s timing on the initial screen.  The screener doesn’t get close enough to the ball handler, and the Spanish defender is able to get in between and stick with Milos Teodosic.

Instead of scrapping their plan, Serbia simply runs another screen at Teodosic’s defender.

Now this is where we see of of the trends we have seen the entire tournament.  Late in games, defenses switch screens.  It happens so much, offenses know that it is coming and they have now started taking advantage of this.  Here, the screens are not being run to free up the roll man or provide a lane for the ball handler.  The only purpose of these screens are to force a switch.

With the switch you now have Jorge Garbajosa, a forward, covering Milos Teodosic, a guard.  With the court spread out by Serbia’s offense, Garbajosa has no help and needs to play off of Teodosic to prevent penetration.

With that space, Milos Teodosic is able to knock down the eventual game winning three pointer.  Here is the play in real time:

Milos Teodosic’s Three Pointer

The strategy that we didn’t see was Spain taking the intentional foul foul while Serbia was dribbling out the clock, even though the game was tied.  I know it seems unorthodox based on what we see in the NBA, but according to Chris Sheridan:

In FIBA, it is not uncommon for the team playing defense to commit an intentional foul and send the opponent to the free throw line — even though this gives its opponent a chance to make two foul shots for the lead. It happened in the 2006 World Championship semifinals in Japan when Argentina and Spain were tied, and the Argentines intentionally fouled Jose Calderon so that they would get the final shot. Calderon made one of two, and Argentina got an open look for Andres Nocioni just before the buzzer, but he missed.

This time, Spain coach Sergio Scariolo told his team there were two Serbian players whom they should intentionally foul if they got the ball (he would not name them), and three whom they should leave alone.

The ball went to point guard Milos Teodosic (obviously one of the three untouchables), who plays for Olympiacos in Greece, and the Serbs executed a play that forced Jorge Garbajosa to switch onto Teodosic.

Spain ended up not taking the foul, and they paid for it as Serbia knocked down the three pointer.

Spain’s Turnover

Even with that three pointer, Spain still had a chance to send the game into overtime with a three pointer of their own in the final 3 seconds of the game.  However a poor combination of bad playcalling and bad execution (we will never know the ratio) meant that Spain wasn’t even able to get a shot up.

As the ball gets handed to the inbounder you have Rudy Fernandez at the top of the key and Jorge Garbajosa at the three point line, and you also have two Spanish players standing in the corner.  Garbajosa sprints directly to the basketball as Rudy Fernandez runs to the block.

This action is the only action you see, and this is my issue with the playcalling.  There are no screens or anything.  Just one player sprinting to the basketball.  Also, the corner men continue just to stand there.

Jorge Garbajosa is a forward, and he is catching the basketball 40 feet away with his back turned to the hoop.  This is a big problem.

Garbajosa isn’t comfortable putting the basketball on the floor, and the result is an eventual turnover.  Here is the play in real time:

Spain’s Final Turnover

Now I think that Spain chose the correct person to try and get the basketball to.  Garbajosa shot 57.7% from the three point line during the tournament, including going 4/6 against Serbia.  The problem is how they got him the ball.  As previously mentioned Garbajosa is a forward who isn’t comfortable putting the basketball on the floor.  So, if you are Spain, you want to get it to Garbajosa where he can simply catch and shoot and not have to worry about anything else.  There are two plays I would have considered running if I was spain:

The first would have involved Rudy Fernandez setting a screen for Garbajosa.  Fernandez would have looped around from his position at the top of the key, and then getting in position to set a screen.  Garbajosa would then come off the screen, but not running directly at the basketball.  He would curl his cut right at the three point line so that he can simply catch and shoot.

The second play would involve using the 5 man standing in the corner to set a screen for Garbajosa, freeing him up.  Again, Garbajosa wouldn’t run straight to the basketball, but he would curl it at the three point line.

—

Spain didn’t necessarily blow this game (at least late), if a player who has gone 1-7 from the three (which was what Teodosic was shooting before the final shot) knocks down a 30 foot jumper, it’s tough luck.  However, when given a chance to tie it (especially with a timeout before the possession), you need to do better than what Spain did.  Now could Spain have ran a perfect play and still lost?  Sure, but seeing a top team like Spain go out with a whimper is a little disappointing in my opinion.

Scola In The Post

As Argentina brings up the basketball, we see Scola setting up on the ball side elbow.  Make sure to focus on him here.

Scola then becomes the second man in a double screen.  Argentina is going to use this screen to get the ball on the high post.

The comes the Argentina’s second double screen.  This gets the ball on the wing and helps create space in the post.

As the catch is made, the defender needs to respect the shot and close out hard.  This creates a nice little gap on the block for Scola to post up to.

He makes the catch in the post, a little further out then you would like to see, but it is still solid position.  Now, look at the rest of the Argentinian players, they are all spread out.  Argentina simply could have walked the ball up and entered it into the post, but that would have allowed for double teams.  All that action away from the basketball spread out the offense and in effect spread out the defense.  The middle of the lane is now wide open, and Scola immediately goes for it.

Scola gets to the middle with no help and he is able to knock down the turn-around jumper.  Check out the play in real time.  The thing to focus on is Scola’s hard seal fighting off Anderson Varejao’s attempt to front him.  That makes the play:

Luis Scola Post Up

Scola’s PNR Defense

Now up three, Argentina needed a stop.  The way the game was going, you just knew that if they were going to get the stop, Scola would have to be involved.

Scola PNR Stop

This is pretty standard defense, but what I really like what Luis Scola did here was that he didn’t attack the ball on his hedge.  That probably would have resulting in a foul, sending Brazil to the line.  Scola actually backpedals a bit, lets Barbosa dribble into him, and then goes for the steal, which he gets.

Scola’s Pick And Pop

After getting the steal, Argentina had a chance to put the game away for good.  It was only fitting that Scola was the one to finish off Brazil.

As the point guard brings the ball up, Scola comes from the low block to set a ball screen and get involved in a pick and roll.

Scola doesn’t actually set a screen as much as he just kind of gets in the way and quickly rolls before there is even contact.  Scola also doesn’t roll all the way to the rim, this is because it is a pick and pop rather than a pick and roll.  Varejao, who is very good at showing and then recovering, shows and Brazil has their defense in position to defend the roll (notice Splitter in the middle of the lane).

However, since Scola only pops instead of rolling, he is wide open (Splitter is too far away, anticipating the roll, to make a play on Scola).  Huertas tries to get back in time…

…but it doesn’t matter because he can’t get there to challenge the shot.  Scola knocks down the open jumper, gives Argentina a five point lead with 24 seconds left, and clinches their trip to the quarterfinals.  Here is the play in real time:

Scola Pick and Pop

Two things that you should watch for.  First is Scola’s quick turn, releasing before contact is made.  The second thing to notice is how Brazil is ready to defend the roll (with Splitter in the lane), but the pop throws everything off.

Serbia Fouls Up Three

In the NBA or the college game, whether or not teams foul when up by three points is a big debate.  However, in the international/FIBA game, you don’t really see any hesitation when it comes to these situations.  Every time a team has a chance to foul with the lead late, they take advantage of it, and that is what Serbia does here:

Serbia Fouls Up Three

Fouling up three isn’t as easy as it looks, you want to let some time come off the clock, but you don’t want to let the offensive player get in his shooting motion behind the three point line.  Here, Dusko Savanovic does a very nice job of taking the foul while letting some time come off the clock before taking the foul (a whole six seconds).  He lets the ball handler dribble it on the outside, and as soon as he makes his move, Savanovic takes the foul.

Serbia’s Turnover Under Their Own Basket

After Croatia hit both of their foul shots, Serbia still held a one point lead.  With 0:15 seconds left, all they needed to do was get the basketball inbounds and continue the foul shooting contest.  However, some poor execution lead to a turnover:

Croatia takes the man covering the basketball and turns him around to double anyone who breaks to the basketball.  Serbia counters by using two players and having them stay near foul line, sending one to the corner.

Now, you see this type of press breaker at every level of basketball.  The second step is to send the player that doesn’t go to the corner straight to the inbounder to be an outlet.  However, that never happens and Dusko Savanovic just stands there.  Also hurting Serbia is that the inbounder doesn’t take advantage of the ability to run the baseline (which players are allowed to do off of made baskets).  Instead of running to the corner and making the pass a shorter one, he throws it from the corner.  Even worse, it is a bounce pass.

The bounce pass never reaches the ball handler and it gets stolen in the corner.  The reason I have the midcourt area circled is because this is where the two remaining Serbian players should be.  At least one of them (if not both) should be sprinting towards the basketball, giving their man an safety valve.  However, nobody shows up.  Here is the play in real time:

Serbia Turns It Over Under Their Own Basket

To make matters worse, Serbia ends up taking a foul right after the turnover.  Croatia bails Serbia out though, only connecting on one of the two foul shots.

Croatia Gives Up An Open Lay-Up

After Croatia hit one of two foul shots, the game was now tied and Serbia had the ball at halfcourt, looking to take the lead.  Croatia was looking to get themselves a stop, but some miscommunication prevents that from happening:

Serbia is in a simple box set, and they are going to put the two players nearest to the basketball in motion.  You are going to see a backscreen in the hopes of freeing up a player on their way to the basket.

This is where the miscommunication takes place.  Croatia has to decide whether or not to switch here.  The man covering the screener sticks with him, as if Croatia isn’t switching the screen, however the man covering the guy cutting off of the screen switches and stays with the screener as well.

The result is a wide open path to the basket for Aleksandar Rasic.

Rasic makes the catch and finises with the lay-up.  Here is the play in real time:

Croatia’s Miscommunication On Defense

This mix-up from Serbia comes off of a timeout, and in my opinion there is no excuse for that happening.  It is the coaches responsibility to let the players know what they are doing on defense, and here, the coach didn’t do a good job of that, because the two defenders were not on the same page.

Serbia Fouls Up Two

While you see a few NBA teams that do in fact foul when they are up three points late, you never see anyone in the NBA foul when they are just up two, but that is exactly what happens here.  This wasn’t a foul that got picked up just because the defender was playing hard defense, this was an intentional foul.  John Schuhmann (who has done fantastic work all through the worlds) explains the foul:

Worst case: OT, instead of losing on a 3. Common decision w/ European teams. RT @JamesPayne5: whats with the foul when they up 2??

Using that logic, the play does in fact make sense.  Also making sense, the timing of the foul.  Serbia doesn’t wait for Croatia to take the basketball into the frontcourt, instead they foul right away, giving themselves :06 seconds to work with after the foul shots.

Serbia Fouls Up Two

Croatia takes the two foul shots and makes them both, tying the game at 72-72 and setting the stage for one final interesting possession.

Croatia Fouls With The Game Tied

This foul was most definitely not an intentional one:

Croatia’s Foul With The Game Tied

Serbia chooses to work without calling a timeout (or they may have not had any left, not sure), and I think this catches Serbia off balance a little bit.  After making the catch, Aleksandar Rasic turns and just busts it up the court.  He beats his defender to the spot, causing his defender to lose his balance.  The only thing he can do is foul Rasic:

As you can see, the defenders hand is firmly placed on the back of Rasic, so yes, it was in fact a foul.  Serbia hits one of two foul shots, locking up the win as Croatia sends a full court shot that doesn’t even come close.

The set starts earlier, but this is where it makes sense to start looking at it for our purpose.  The matchup we are paying attention to here is Leonardo Gutierrez from Argentina against Dusko Savanovic from Serbia.

As the ballhandler works his way towards the lane Gutierrez drops off of Savanovic and gets into help position.  As he should.  Right now, he is in good defensive position.

However, once the ball gets deeper into the lane, Gutierrez starts making mistakes.  The first one is that he turns his head away from the man and focuses on the basketball.

This allows Savanovic to float to the top of the key with Gutierrez not really knowing where he is.  Now, Gutierrez has to be where he is, helping and defending in the paint.  But when the pass is made, Gutierrez hesitates for a second before starting his close out.  This is because he didn’t keep an eye on his man, so he didn’t know where he was.

That split second hesitation allows for Savanovic to catch the pass, gather, and knock down the big three that eventually lead to Serbia’s win.  Here is the play live:

Click Here For Serbia’s Game Winning Three

The Quick Hitter

This play looks simple, and while it is, there are a few little things that Russia did here (with some mistakes from Greece mixed in) that allowed for this play to work:

As Russia brings the basketball up the court you have a backscreen being set for Alexey Zhukanenko.  This is where Greece’s biggest mistake is made.  Why is Zhukanenko’s defender all the way out on him at the three point line?  He’s not a three point shooter.  If the defender is back where he should be off the ball (around the foul line), he would have a feel for the screen coming.

Instead he doesn’t.  This is where the little things Russia did come into play.  They know that they are going for the lob, and they position their wings accordingly.  Both are way out on the wing, rather than being in corner or on the block.

The result is that there is nobody in the paint and the highest you see a Greek player is slightly below the foul line.

With that, there is nobody to help at the rim, and Russia is able to get a good look at the rim, and extend their lead to nine points.  Here is the play live.

Click Here To View Russia’s Lob

Continuity

The next time down the court, Russia is up by eight points and looking for another basket.  Instead of going for a quick hitter, Russia works the ball around and gets into their offense.  Here is the video:

Click Here To View Russia’s Continuity

Now there is so much action here, I couldn’t even get the screenshots up (believe me, I tried and got confused), but it all has a purpose.  They show that quick lob action and then get into a whole bunch of dribble handoffs and screens.  The big thing to key in on when watching the play is the Greek defense.  They just looked lost, not knowing whether to switch or not.  The end result is that a Greek big man is covering a Russian guard:

He obviously isn’t quick enough to contain penetration.   The second thing is that there is nobody in help position for the Greeks.  This is because nobody on defense really knows what is going to happen next.  They are up on their man ready for a screen or a cut, not really focusing on helping.  This allows the Russian guard, Vitaliy Fridzon to get to the rim and put in the dagger.

Post Threat Opens Up Outside

Slovenia’s offense involves a lot of cut, dives, and post ups.  In addition to having that stuff get open looks, it also draws the help side defense, and that is what freed up Slovenia’s first three up by five with right around 3 minutes left.

Up five with around three minutes left, Slovenia is trying to milk the clock.  Instead of having their point guard dribbling out the clock, they do it the correct way though in my opinion, they run through their offense.  The first step is having a double screen set for their point guard.

The first screener dives to  the ball side block on a roll while the second screener pops out.  As this happens, the two players on the weakside exchange for each other.

The ball gets swung to the top and Slovenia now executes a dribble handoff.

The handoff turns into a screen, and after setting the screen the Slovenian big man rolls to the block.

Slovenia now has two players setting up on the block, posting up.  This strong seal causes Brazil’s outside defenders to sag in a bit.

A no look pass (seriously, this pass is fantastic, you need to see it live) to the outside gets the outside defender to jump the wrong way.

The defender can’t close out in time, and Slovenia is able to knock down the three and extend the lead to eight points while taking valuable time off of the clock.

Click To View Slovenia’s First Three

What I like about this is that Slovenia effectively used their offensive sets to not only burn clock, but get them a wide open look.  Good execution by Slovenia.

Forcing A Switch

After that first three pointer, Brazil was able to scrap their way back, cutting Slovenia’s lead to five once more, this time with around 0:30 seconds left.  Brazil was making their final stand here, get a stop they still have a chance to win, allow a basket and it is all over.  Slovenia used this to their advantage by forcing a switch.

After getting the ball from the side, Slovenia runs a pick and roll, with Tiago Splitter’s man as the screener.

After coming off the screen, the ball handler pulls the basketball out.  This shows that the purpose of the screen was to force a switch, and not and try to get a basket.  Brazil does in fact switch the screen, and now the big man Splitter is forced to cover a quicker guard.

The quicker guard is able to get in the lane, and this penetration forces a ton of help to come over.  This leaves the corner three pointer wide open.

The guard hits the man in the corner and he rises up for the uncontested three, knocking it down and essentially clinching the game for Slovenia, as they now lead by eight with twenty seconds left.

Click To View Slovenia Forcing A Switch

Just like in the NBA, teams in the FIBA Worlds like to switch screens late when they need a stop.  The purpose of this is so that they prevent penetration and keep ballhandlers on the outside.  Slovenia knows that Brazil is going to switch any screen, so they are able to use this to their advantage.  Slovenia uses a screen to force the switch and they use that switch to get a drive and kick basket.

Instead of pouting after the miss, Tony Douglas got back on defense and got himself in position to take the offensive foul.  Was it a bit of a flop here?  Sure, but credit to Douglas for reading Cartier Martin’s move and jumping into position to take the charge.  Also, once Martin’s arm swings out when the contact is made, it’s foul no matter what.

Now, Sam Cassell was livid after the play, and it wasn’t with the officiating.  According to the announcers calling the game, Cassell was giving it to Lester Hudson for not getting the ball and bringing it up.  I get the logic, Martin isn’t a point guard while Hudson is.  Hudson probably would have been more comfortable bringing the ball up late (Martin looked a little tentative then picked up the offensive foul).  However, the way the situation transpired, Martin was the only option for the Wizards.

Sure, Hudson could have came down and me the ball, but he still would have been double teamed.  Good work by the Knicks here, they identified the primary ball handler and made sure they didn’t let him catch the basketball.  This is what allowed for Tony Douglas to take the offensive foul.

When the ball gets tossed to the trigger man, Pooh Jeter comes down and set a brush screen for Marquis Gilstrap.  Gilstrap come out can receives the basketball from the inbounder Aaron Jackson.  After the quick screen, Jeter floats out towards the corner.

Gilstrap receives the pass and quickly hands it back to Jackson.  This handoff bascially become a screen, as Jackson comes off of Gilstrap after getting the basketball.

This forces the Bulls’ defenders to switch (because as we know, defenses like to switch every screen late) and this results in a big man covering a guard.

Jackson uses his speed advantage to get around his new defender with ease.  Jackson does the smart thing here by attacking the basket, he doesn’t hang around the perimeter or settle for the mid range jumper.  He dribbles right at the help defender, forcing him to make a choice, either stay with his man (Pooh Jeter) or stop the basketball.

The help defender chooses to help on the penetration, allowing Pooh Jeter to spot up wide open behind the three point line in the corner.

Jackson does a great job of finding Jeter wide open and he is able to rise up and attempt the jumper before the defense can close out on him.  Here is the play in real time:

This play is initially run to either get Cartier Martin an open shot on the curl off of a Javale McGee brush screen (he doesn’t really get set for the screen, they just rub off of each other) or to hit McGee on a backdoor lob.

The first two options for the Wizards are well defended by the Hornets.  Both Martin or McGee are well covered, and the Wizards needed to move on to the second option.

That option is a downscreen for Lester Hudson to receive the ball at the top of the key.  While the simple downscreen won’t get Hudson a wide open look, it does provide a safety valve for John Wall (the man inbounding the basketball).

Wall hits Hudson with the pass, and since he has a big man covering him (the defense was forced to switch the downscreen) he was able to take a dribble to create some separation.

That is just enough room for Hudson to rise up and take the jumper.  He knocks it down, winning the game for the Wizards.  Here is the play in real time:

If the added option of hitting Lester Hudson coming off the downscreen wasn’t drawn up in the play, Wall would have had to either force it to Cartier Martin or Javale McGee for a low percentage shot (or even a turnover).  Instead, the Wizards were able to get the win because they had multiple options late.

Bucks vs. Mavs

With 0.3 seconds left, the Bucks were holding onto a 2 point lead.  Here, there is just enough time for a catch and shoot, but more than likely the opposing team would be running a play right at the rim:

As the ball gets to the trigger man, J.R. Giddens gets a staggered double screen set for him from the two Dallas Mavericks’ bigs.  These screens are set so Giddens can curl around the screens and get freed up by at least one of the screens.

As this takes place, Dominique Jones flashes from the weak-side block to the ball side corner.  His defender, Dominic James, stays attached to his hip and follows him into the corner.  Now, we have talked about Jones lack of a jump shot, so there is no real reason to follow him into the corner.  James’ best bet would have been to let Jones run to the corner uncontested and stay in the paint to defend any lob.

With James running into the corner, the weak-side is completely left undefended by the Bucks.  Larry Sanders is covering a Mavs’ big man setting a screen.  He is right on his hip instead of being in help position, another mistake.

With the ball in the air, Sanders seems to see what is up, and he tries to recover to J.R. Giddens, who is cutting to the basket undefended.

Giddens makes the catch at the rim and hits the buzzer-beater, sending the game into overtime.  Here is the play in real time:

Bucks vs. Grizzlies

The next game, the Bucks were faced with yet another late game situation.  This time, there was .7 seconds left for the Grizzlies to try and win the game.  It’s funny, the Grizzlies come out in a similar set that the Mavs used a day earlier.  The one difference is that instead of the three ball-side players being in a straight line, you have two players bunched next to each other with another in the block.

As the basketball gets handed to the trigger man, both players (one big man and one guard) start towards the block at the same time.

As the big man stops and sets a screen in the middle of the lane, the guard cuts to the corner off a screen being set.  At the same time, Sam Young takes a few steps to the corner and then quickly changes directions, flashing to the top of the key off of the screen that is being set in the middle of the lane.  His defender, DeMarcus Nelson bites hard on the flash to the corner and runs himself out of position.

Sam Young is now running to the top of the key with nobody near him.  Not only is this important because he will be able to get up an uncontested shot, but because he is so wide open he can turn into the ball before making the catch.  While this doesn’t sound like a big deal, it saves valuable tenths of a seconds in a late-game situation like this.  Another thing to look at is the man defending the inbounder, Deron Washington.  Washington is doing a good job being active and taking away the pass to the corner, but that isn’t where the ball is going, and he leaves the passing lane to Sam Young wide open.

Sam Young makes the catch, rises, and fires before the Bucks can get someone to close out on him.  Here is the play in real time: