After beating the press and getting the ball to Bo Lester McCalebb, their point guard, Montepaschi Siena’s two bigs set up around the three point line to set a staggered ball screen for McCalebb, who uses them.

McCalebb uses the staggered ball screen and when that happens, the front screener, Kšyštof Lavrinovič rolls straight to the rim as the second screener, Shaun Stonerook, pops out towards the three point line.

You can tell that Bennet was not prepared for this set because they are trying to switch the screen, but don’t do it properly.  They switch onto McCalebb, but the miscommunication comes with how Bennet switches onto the screeners.  Lavrinovič’s man sticks with him as McCalebb’s original man switches onto him as well.

With two defenders on Lavrinovič, that leaves Stonerook wide open behind the three point line.  With a bigger man on him, McCalebb is able to attack the middle and as everyone sinks on him, he kicks the ball out to Stonerook at the top of the key.

Stonerook rises up and knocks down the open three point shot before anyone can close out on him, putting the game away for good.  Here is the play in real time:

The key factor in this play is the confusion that it causes for Bennet.  The result of this confusion was Stonerook wide open behind the three point line, allowing Montepaschi Siena to waste all 24 seconds on the shot clock and add three points onto their lead.

Plus, it was the staggered ball screen, and as we saw in the Finals, it’s a pretty sweet set that is extremely effective.

We pick up the play after Marco Carraretto inbounds the basketball near half court.  Once that happens, Rimantas Kaukėnas gets a staggered screen set for him, allowing him to get to the top of the key and make himself available for the pass.

Once Kaukėnas makes the catch, the two screeners rotate over and get in position to set a staggered pindown screen for Carraretto, the man who inbounded the basketball.

As Carraretto comes off of the screen he puts the defense, specifically Marko Šćekić, in a tough position.  Šćekić now has to decide whether he hedges out and denies the pass to Carraretto or sticks with his man, Kšyštof Lavrinovič.  After Carraretto uses his screen, Lavrinovič makes Šćekić’s decision even harder by popping out towards the baseline.

Šćekić bluffs at Carraretto but ultimately decides to stay with his man, allowing Carraretto to come off of the screen open, in a position to catch and shoot, knocking it down before the defense can close out.  Here is the play in real time:

This is a nice set here drawn up by Siena coach Simone Pianigiani and well executed by his players, especially Carraretto, who does an awesome job of setting up the staggered pindown well before using it.

On of the main reasons why trapping the pick and roll worked is because it kept the basketball on the perimeter.  On all of those clips, you see the ball handler getting trapped and the only option they really have is to kick the ball out to a man on the outside rather than trying to penetrate or hit the roll man.  The ball gets into the paint a grand total of 0 times on all of those plays.  The one time they try to hit the roll man, they go from Terry to Kidd to Ian Mahinmi instead of going straight to Mahinmi.  The result is a turnover.

Another thing that trapping the smaller Dallas ball handlers does is it throws the Mavericks’ timing off:

Here, Chris Bosh steps up to trap/hedge hard at Jason Terry.  Terry hits the roll man, but because of Bosh’s length, Terry is forced to jump and throw a lobbed pass.  This gives Dwyane Wade plenty of time to rotate over and get the huge block on Tyson Chandler.

The problem is when they didn’t trap the pick and roll, they allowed Dallas to score at a pretty good rate (18 points on remaining 15 pick and rolls, including 9 points on 6 staggered pick and rolls and 9 points on 9 pick and rolls that weren’t trapped).  The Heat’s trapping pick and roll defense really disappeared in the fourth quarter.  Out of the 9 straight pick and rolls (we are ignoring the two staggered screens because it is a unique situation), the Heat chose not to trap 7 of them (the two times they did, they got a missed three and a turnover).  When Miami failed to trap, Dallas was able to get to the paint:

When Miami chose not to trap the basketball, either the ball handler or the roll man were able to get into the paint and come away with a pretty good look.  Even on misses, it wasn’t Miami’s defense forcing the miss, it was simply Dallas missing lay-ups.  To me, it was interesting to see Miami in a situation where they needed to get a stop and they went away from what was doing just that.  Dallas wasn’t really doing anything differently with this pick and rolls, so it was strange to see such a dramatic change in their defensive strategy.

When you look at the overall numbers, 26 points on 32 pick and roll possessions (0.81 PPP) is a pretty solid defensive night, especially after giving up 49 points on a similar amount of possessions during the previous game.  However, if you break it down further (by when they trapped and when they didn’t trap), you realize that they could have done some things differently when defending the pick and roll.

The play starts with Chris Bosh coming up and setting a screen for Dwyane Wade, with Wade actually using the screen.  Off the ball, LeBron James sits in the corner, being covered by Jason Kidd.

After a hesitation move and a wicked crossover, Wade beats Shawn Marion and attacks the rim, drawing help.  Both Jason Kidd and Tyson Chandler steps up to Wade to prevent him from getting to the rim.  As soon as Kidd leaves James, James does exactly what he is supposed to, cutting off of Kidd’s back.

Wade jumps in the air and spots James cutting to the rim along the baseline.  As he makes the pass, Tyson Chandler continues his rotation, trying to beat James to the rim.

Now, this is where the rulebook comes into play.  You know those hash marks along the baseline that look a bit out of place (It’s hard to spot on this particular court, but it is where I drew the yellow line)?  That is actually a very important line of reference for the refs called the Lower Defensive Box (here is it explained by NBA.com):

The restricted area (RA) is the area within the arched line on the court located below the rim. Its purpose is to stop secondary defenders from taking a position under the basket in an attempt to draw the offensive foul when a player is driving to the basket. If an offensive player drives past his primary defender on the way to the basket and a secondary defender comes over, he must establish a legal position outside the RA to draw an offensive foul. If the drive starts inside the Lower Defensive Box (LDB – this is the area from the bottom tip of the free throw circle to the endline between the two 3’ posted-up marks), the secondary defender is legally allowed to be positioned inside the LDB.

According to the rulebook, if a player starts his drive (or makes the catch) inside the lower defensive box (so inside the yellow line), the restricted area is negated and a player can take a charge inside of it.  As you can obviously see, James doesn’t establish possession until he is inside of this line.  So at this point, Tyson Chandler doesn’t need to get his feet outside of the restricted area, he simply needs to be set.

Chandler gets set as James lowers his shoulder and bulls through him.  Crawford blows the whistle and calls the offensive foul, correctly.  Here is the play in real time (with a slow motion play immediately after).

Watching in slow motion, you can see that Chandler gets set, keeps his feet down, and takes the contact right in the chest, exactly what you need to do to draw the offensive foul.  With the fact that his feet doesn’t have to come out of the restricted area, it is definitely a charge in my opinion.

Now, I should note that Jeff Van Gundy (who has been fantastic all Finals long, even when he seems to go off the rails) did a terrific job not only recognizes this call, but explaining it clearly to everyone watching.  Solid piece of announcing there that deserves credit.

The play starts with the Heat players on the court starting out in bunches of twos.  Mario Chalmers and Dwyane Wade are standing on the strong side block while LeBron James and Chris Bosh stand on the strong side elbow.  As the ball goes to the trigger man Mike Miller, Wade turns around and curls off of a Chris Bosh screen going away from the basketball.

As Wade continues to flare out away from the basketball coming off of Chris Bosh’s screen, LeBron James comes off of a Mario Chalmers screen towards the corner.

The Mavericks do a good job of switching and keeping James from getting open in the corner, but in my opinion James was just a decoy here.  As Chalmers clears out, Dwyane Wade doubles back and comes off of another screen set by Chris Bosh.  What makes this play so effective is the action of sending LeBron James to the corner forces Tyson Chandler to turn his body in an attempt to take that pass to the corner away (Mike Miller also does a great job by faking Chandler in that direction).

Look at all of the space that Spoelstra’s playcall created.  Mike Miller has a clear passing lane to make the pass to Wade and nobody is going to be able to step up to Wade coming off the screen.  As Wade curls off of Bosh’s screen, he is a little farther out than he wants to be, and this forces him to curl in a little bit more than curl straight towards Mike Miller.

However, instead of passing to the space where he thinks Dwyane Wade will be, he passes the basketball to where Dwyane Wade is, leaving the ball a little bit behind him.  Still, this should be a simple catch, but Dwyane Wade takes his eyes off of the basketball a little bit before he should (looking to find his spot on the court).  To his credit, Wade refused to throw Miller under the bus and said it was a good pass and it was on him for bobbling it.

As the basketball heads towards the backcourt line, Dwyane Wade makes a tremendous play, to save the ball, prevent a backcourt violation, and get it to Mike Miller.  Miller is forced to take a contested shot that goes begging.  Here is the play in real time:

This is a great playcall by coach Spoelstra, and I am a little disappointed to see Wade bobble the catch because you always want to see a great play like this result in at least a shot attempt.  One of the reasons why this play is tremendous is because he put his player in the best position to score.  Coming off of a screen to his right, Dwyane Wade has an eFG% of 50%.  Sure most of these come off of midrange jumpers, but he was putting Wade in a comfortable position.

If you have questioned Speolstra’s playcalling in the past, you should probably stop doing that because he has proven time and time again that he can get a open look out of the timeout.  After the play, I called it a “Pop-style” play, as it uses one of Pop’s favorite actions, of having a player go off of a screen one way and then have him double back using a screen from the same screener:

Just a tremendous action that is really hard to stop, especially when you are using LeBron James as a decoy, creating all of this open space.  A shame we couldn’t see a shot attempt come from it.

Now, we have seen the Miami Heat double Dirk Nowitzki all series long, and just about every time, Nowitzki made the right play (whether it was to shoot or pass).  However, this time, Nowitzki makes the wrong play, trying to throw a pass at the last second, but Nowitzki waits so long that Shawn Marion was already crashing the boards as the pass was made, leading to Nowitzki throwing it out of bounds.

So why did this double team work?  It is all about timing.  We already looked at one great play Dwyane Wade made defensively, and in my opinion, this is another one.  As Nowitzki makes the catch, Shawn Marion is heading over to the strong side corner, allowing Wade to be in help position, but he doesn’t double on Nowitzki’s first hard dribble to the right, or when Nowitzki spins.  Wade commits to the double team the second that Nowitzki takes his hard dribble with his left hand.

Wade’s athleticism is what allows him to cover enough ground and to rise up to actually bother Nowitzki’s shot attempt and when Nowitzki sees that Wade is going to block it, he tries to pass the basketball.  Nowitzki is at his best passing out of double teams when he knows what he is doing from the start.  When he knows that there is a double team coming on his spin move and he can get the pass off as he is rising up.  In this case, Nowitzki is trying to pass the ball as he is landing instead of as he is rising up.  In my opinion, this is proof that Nowitzki’s first decision is to shoot here and Wade’s well-timed double is what forced Nowitzki into a pass. Earlier in the game (towards the end of the first half), Nowitzki made a terrific pass out of the double team):

The difference between this situation and the turnover late in the fourth quarter? The double is coming before Nowitzki even makes the catch and because of that, Nowitzki is prepared and willing to make the pass. Nowitzki isn’t jumping to shoot, he is jumping to pass (he makes the pass on his way up). The pass was his first option. In the turnover, this wasn’t the case, as I mentioned above, the well-timed double forces Dirk into doing something he doesn’t want to do.

Wade’s play is a terrific example of what watching tape does for you.  Wade knows that Nowitzki is going to spin to his left and take a hard dribble before rising up, and he used that knowledge to time his double team, forcing the turnover and allowing Miami to secure the win.

The play starts with Peja Stojakovic coming off of two separate screens along the baseline, one from Dirk Nowitzki and one from Tyson Chandler.  Stojakovic uses these screens as if he is flaring out towards the corner.

Instead of heading to the corner, Stojakovic curls around Chandler’s screen and starts heading back towards where he came from.  As this is taking place, Jason Terry sets a pindown screen for Nowitzki in the middle of the lane.  Nowitzki uses it and gets to the weakside elbow.

After setting his pindown screen, Jason Terry comes off of a screen in the corner.  The design of the play was having a shooter (Peja Stojakovic) clearing out to the weakside forcing Dwyane Wade to follow him out there.  That would clear the corner for Jason Terry, as LeBron James was too occupied hedging on Dirk to stay attached on Terry’s hip.

The one problem is that Dwyane Wade does a fantastic job of reading the play.  Instead of chasing Stojakovic to the opposite side of the court, Wade calls out a switch and just sprints to the corner, going over the screen.

Chandler shifts (and sets a moving screen) to try and get a screen on Wade, but the job is already done.  With Wade going over the top, he basically takes the pass to Terry away.  Before LeBron James returns to Stojakovic he is open for a split second, but Chalmers is doing such a great job pressuring the ball, there is no way Kidd can make that pass.  This forces Nowitzki, acting as the safety valve to step up and make himself available for the pass.

Nowitzki makes the catch out by the three point line, takes one dribble and tries to execute his patented spin move into a fade away jumper.

Haslem slips while trying to stay with Nowitzki, and that results in Nowitzki pump faking, trying to draw Haslem off balance.  However, Haslem does a fantastic job of not biting or jumping on the pump fake and simply keeping his hands up.  Nowitzki gets the shot off, but that is about as good as you can defend Nowitzki in this situation.  Here is the play in real time, with a slow motion clip right after:

A couple things here.  First, the Dallas Mavericks were going for the win in my opinion.  It looks like Terry was the first option here, with Carlisle looking to set him up for the three in the corner.  Also, the Mavericks looked a little rushed here.  Maybe it was the fact they knew they had no timeouts left and they had to get the ball in, but they just looked as if they just wanted to get the ball in, and it cost Dallas in terms of execution (I don’t think there is one strong screen set here).

While Dallas didn’t run the play to perfection, you can’t just blame them.  Miami had a role in this stop as there are two great individual plays  here.  First, Wade’s recognition and switch is fantastic (the slow motion really allows you to see the switch).  Second, Haslem does a great job of simply holding his ground, getting big, and not biting on any fakes, allowing him to contest the shot to the best of his ability.

The play starts with Dwyane Wade dribbling out the clock a bit at the top of the key as LeBron James gets a pindown screen set for him by Mario Chalmers.

The pindown screen set for James by Chalmers leads right into a James/Wade pick and roll.  The Mavericks decide to trap this PNR with Jason Kidd going over the top of the screen and Shawn Marion leaving James to be the second defender.  Not willing to leave LeBron James open at the top of the key, Tyson Chandler comes from the weakside to meet James as he rolled to the foul line after setting his screen for Wade.

What Dwyane Wade and LeBron James on the same side of the court does is it draws all of the attention of the defense.  As you can see here, there were four Maverick defenders on the side with Wade and James, leaving Dirk Nowitzki on his own to defend the remaining two Heat players (Haslem and Bosh).

Instead of just standing and watching LeBron James, the Heat decide to run action on the weakside of the court with Udonis Haslem setting a screen on Nowitzki, allowing Chris Bosh to step backwards into an open area.

LeBron James takes on the double team and makes a great pass to Bosh in the corner.  Haslem sets a very strong screen, resulting in Chris Bosh making the catch wide open, allowing him to square up and knock it down, giving Miami the lead.  Here is the play in real time:

This play right here is why the Miami Heat are so dangerous when they decide they want to play team basketball.  Here, you have Dwyane Wade and LeBron James drawing the attention of the defense and when that happens it allows Haslem to sneak in there and set a screen for Chris Bosh on the weak side.  Great call by Spoelstra, understanding that Dallas would load up against these two and using weakside action to result in an open shot (After a tremendous pass by LeBron James).

As Jason Terry brings the basketball along the wing, Dirk Nowitzki and Tyson Chandler get in position and set a staggered ball screen for Terry (with Nowitzki as the front screener and Chandler as the second screener).

What this staggered screen for Jason Terry is that it negates the Heat’s hard trap/hedge on the ball handler, especially on this first position, where the Heat seemed to look a little confused.  Initially, Chris Bosh (who was defending Tyson Chandler) steps out to prevent Terry from getting to the rim.

As Terry works his way around the staggered screen, the Heat’s confusion becomes a little bit more obvious as you have both Udonis Haslem and Bosh playing off of their men, not sure who should be hedging on the screen, who should be staying with Nowitzki, or who should be defending Chandler on a potential roll to the rim.  As this is happening, Terry dribbles the basketball over to Jason Kidd, who gets a dribble handoff from Terry.  All of this confusion and action allows Chandler to come off of his initial ball screen and set a pindown screen on Haslem for Nowitzki.

Nowitzki uses Chandler’s pindown and flares out towards the corner as Kidd reads Nowitzki’s cut and makes the pass over the defense.

This is where Miami’s confused shows up yet again.  Instead of one defender closing out on Nowitzki and one sticking with Chandler rolling to the rim, both Haslem and Bosh sprint out towards Nowitzki to keep him from getting the shot up.  The problem is that it leaves Tyson Chandler uncovered as he cuts to the rim.  To keep Chandler from getting wide open, LeBron James has to hang around the foul line, sink in, and stay near Chandler.

All of that confusion, extra helping, and over rotation leaves Jason Kidd open at the top of the key, with no defender within 5 to 10 feet of him.

Nowitzki does a fantastic job of passing out of the double team and hitting Kidd for the wide open three that he knocks down.  Here is the play in real time:

The fact that the Mavericks’ “sprung” this offensive play on the Heat definitely lead to most of the confusion and over rotation.  I haven’t seen the Mavericks run this play at all in this series (and maybe not even during the entire playoffs, though I can’t say that with certainty).  Coach Carlisle made a great decision to go with this set because it negated the Heat’s tremendous pick and roll defense where they blitz the ball handler.

The staggered ball screen worked so well for Dallas that they tried it again.  With Miami being more prepared for it, they tried to attack it a different way defensively:

As Terry brings the basketball up along the sideline, he starts to use the staggered screen, again set by Nowitzki and Chandler.  However, instead of letting Terry use the screen, the Heat decide to trap Terry before he comes off of the screen with LeBron James (Terry’s initial defender) and Chris Bosh (Dirk Nowtizki’s defender).  Dirk reads the trap and slips the screen, popping out to the corner.

With Nowitzki slipping the first screen as the Heat trapped Terry, you now have a similar situation to the pick and pop play towards the corner that Dallas ran so often in game one.  Now, normally the Heat want to shade towards Nowitzki with either the man from the corner or a big on the block.  However, staggered pick and roll, the Mavericks are occupying a lot of bodys that would normally be in the paint at the top of the key (you have the Heat’s two bigs and LeBron James at the top of the key).  Dwyane Wade is now your last line of defense, basically playing a two on one situation.  Wade wants to head over before the pass to Nowizki is made, but he simply can’t because it would leave Shawn Marion open.

Once Nowitzki makes the catch, Wade commits to running out at Nowitzki as Chalmers drops down to Marion.  Now, you have a situation where two Heat defenders are trying to defend three Mavericks.

Because Wade had to wait until Nowitzki made the catch before committing on the closeout, he was unable to make it in time allowing Nowitzki to get a clean shot off, one that he makes.  Here is the play in real time:

Nowitzki does a fantastic job here of reading the Heat’s trap and slipping the screen as soon as the Heat commit to trapping Terry.  As soon as Nowitzki slips the screen, the Heat are on their heels, scrambling and trying to closeout.  They were unable to do so on this possession.

With the play continuing to be successful, it is no surprise that the Mavericks went right back to it the next possession:

This is the one stop that Miami got against the Mavericks’ stagger ball screen set, and in my opinion it was because of poor execution on Dallas’ end.  Nowitzki again slips the screen and he is once again open (putting the defense in a tough position), but Terry decides not to force the pass.  The result is Dallas scrambling on the offensive end, and eventually Nowitzki gets blocked and the Heat gain possession.

Undeterred, the Mavericks set up their staggered ball screen the next half court possession that they got, this time with the game tied and with about 38 seconds left.

To start the play, Kidd quickly brings the basketball up and gets it into the hands of Jason Terry before clearing out.  With Terry and Chandler trailing the play, they get in position to set their staggered screen.  Maybe it was because the Mavericks got into the set quickly, but the Heat decided not to trap Terry early, instead defending this set like they did the first time, with Bosh hedging out, preventing dribble penetration to the middle.

Terry starts towards Jason Kidd, but quickly changes direction, and looks back towards the weakside, where Tyson Chandler is getting in position to set a pindown screen for Dirk Nowitzki.  Nowitzki does a good job of using the screen, backing up behind the three point line.

Udonis Haslem (Nowitzki’s defender), runs right into Tyson Chandler, who does a terrific job of holding his ground on the screen.  With Bosh hedging out towards the middle to prevent Terry driving off of the staggered screen, he was out of position to help on Nowitzki coming off of the screen.  Nowitzki catches, gathers, and knocks down the three point shot.  Here is the play in real time:

If you notice one difference between the final staggered ball screen and the first staggered ball screen, Jason Terry doesn’t bring the basketball to Jason Kidd on the strong side.  The reason why he didn’t?  Because Tyson Chandler knew he could get the screen set and free up Nowitzki (quote from John Schuhmann’s fantastic post on the Mavericks’ comeback):

“I told the guards, ‘Whoever comes off me and Dirk’s screen, before you look to the strong side, look back to the weak side, because I think I can get him open for a good look,’” Chandler said afterward. “And right then, the next play, I was able to get that pick. And I was just holding it, because I knew, I saw Bosh in front of me and I was picking Haslem, so I figured [Nowitzki] would be somewhere behind me getting a good look.”

That’s fantastic recognition by Chandler here, and a great job by Terry to listen to what Chandler was saying.

—

In my opinion, this staggered ball screen is a play may have won Dallas the series (it definitely helped them win game two, putting themselves in a position to win the series).  Rick Carlisle saw his team getting forced into turnover after turnover as his point guards were getting blitzed in pick and roll situations.  To come up with a solution like this more or less on the fly, it is a great piece of coaching.  As you can see, this staggered ball screen really prevented Miami from getting an effective trap on the ball handler, and when they tried, all of the action and bodies behind the three point line put the Heat at a disadvantage down low (when Nowitzki slipped the screen).

I don’t know if this play is going to work the rest of the series (you know that Spoelstra and his staff are going to rewatch these four possession to try and come up with a way to stop it), but I do expect Dallas to run it once or twice in the fourth quarter of game three, just to see if Miami can stop it or not.

The play starts with LeBron James as the trigger man, getting the basketball on the side.  Once he does get it, Miami’s two shooters, Mike Miller and Mario Chalmers criss cross, cutting off of Chris Bosh and heading towards corners of the opposite side they started on.

After Miller and Chalmers cut off of Bosh, Bosh turns around and gets in position to set a downscreen for Dwyane Wade.  Wade comes from under the rim and uses the screen.  This is where the defensive mistake takes place.  Instead of following his man, Jason Terry steps out in front of Dwyane Wade, hoping to cut off his path to the basketball.

In his post game media session Terry said that he knew the basketball was going to Dwyane and he wanted to give Jason Kidd (who was covering Wade) time to recover as he went around the screen.  The only problem is that Terry did it while leaving his man wide open in the opposite corner.

LeBron James shows tremendous vision, spotting Chalmers and hitting him with a quick pass.  Sometime in late game situations players get too focused about where the play is going and get tunnel vision, only looking for the first option and forcing the basketball in there.  LeBron James did a great job of keeping his eyes open and looking at everything.  He noticed that Jason Terry doesn’t chase Chalmers to the corner and hits him with the pass.  Here is the play in real time:

Good job here by Chalmers staying ready, expecting the ball, and knocking down the shot when it comes to him.  However, I don’t know if he would be that wide open if Terry in fact follows him to the corner.