On the defensive end, Kendrick Perkins is the anchor, allowing for the rest of the team to play against more favorable matchups.  Kevin Garnett on Andrew Bynum is rough, but Kevin Garnett on Pau Gasol (the matchup when Kendrick Perkins is in the game) is much more manageable.

Perkins is also one of the reasons why the Celtics are so good at defending the pick and roll:

Perkins hedges out real hard here, but the Celtics probably gameplan it this way to get it out of Kobe’s hands. The Lakers actually counter with a nice play, a quick pass to Gasol who then hits a rolling Bynum (trying to take advantage of Perkins’ hedge).  However, Perkins is able to get back, use his body, and force Bynum under the basket.  This is something that Kendrick Perkins does very well.

Here is another look at Perkins defending the pick and roll:

In addition to the pick and roll, Kendrick Perkins does a number of things here. He picks up Kobe as he drives through the lane, forcing him to kick it out. When he does, the shot goes up and Bynum gets the rebound. Perkins crowds him and forces him into a miss.

So with Perkins out, what does the Celtics’ defense look like?  Well, it means that Rasheed Wallace is going to most likely be starting, matched up against Andrew Bynum.  On the second play after Perkins gets injured you see the difference:

This time it’s Wallace defending the pick and roll, and he does a very poor job doing it.  Remember when Perkins cut off Kobe, making him pass it?  Well, Wallace can’t even contain Shannon Brown.  Wallace allows Brown to easily take the sideline and force rotation.  This means that nobody is able to help on Ron Artest’s penetration, and he knocks down the jumper.

Where the Celtics find themselves at a real disadvantage is when KG needs a rest now.  Instead of taking Garnett out and putting Perkins on Pau and sliding Wallace to Odom.  Glen Davis and Kendrick Perkins have to share the court at the same time.  This means that Big Baby has to cover Lamar Odom and Rasheed Wallace has to cover Pau Gasol.  Mismatches galore, and here is the result:

As the ball goes up in the air, Wallace kind of just watches it.  This allows for Gasol to push him under the basket and get the rebound.  Gasol then backs Wallace down and hits the turnaround jumper.  Do you think that Perkins would allow either the rebound or the basket to be made?  I don’t.

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In the end, Perkins being out really hurts the Celtics defense and prevents them from being able to do what they really want to on the defensive end.  This is why I think the Lakers will take game seven tonight.

Ignoring Rondo In The Halfcourt

The Lakers were able to stop Rajon Rondo in the halfcourt by basically ignoring him as his defender (Kobe Bryant for the most part) played about 10-15 feet off of him the entire game, whether he had the ball or not.  It was as if the Lakers were saying, “If Rajon Rondo beats us with jump shots, then so be it.”

The above play is a perfect example of the Lakers’ strategy working as planned.  Here, the Celtics run a screen and roll with Rajon Rondo coming off of a screen set by Kendrick Perkins.  The Lakers switch the screen, and Pau Gasol ends up being forced to cover Rondo.  This is usually a point guard’s dream, and the way a point guard normally attacks this is by pulling the ball out and then just blowing by the big man covering him.  In fact, Rajon Rondo does try to do this, but Pau Gasol doesn’t take a step in Rondo’s direction and he stays in the paint.  Rondo is basically left with only one option (the pass to the mismatch isn’t there because Gasol is clogging the passing lane), and that is to take an awkward jumper that he misses.

Off the ball, it is more of the same strategy:

The Celtics run a pick and roll with Kevin Garnett setting the screen and Paul Pierce as the ball handler.  The Lakers quickly trap the screen in the corner, so Paul Pierce kicks it out to Kevin Garnett, who he thinks is wide open.  However, once Pierce dribbles the ball into the corner, Kobe just leaves Rajon Rondo to play free safety and he is able to come up with the steal.

In Transition

While stopping Rajon Rondo in the halfcourt is key, the most important aspect of Rondo’s game that you want to contain is his transition game, and the Lakers were able to do that:

In this first play, as soon as Rajon Rondo gets his hand on the rebound the Lakers retreat.  You don’t see anyone trying to cut off the basketball or anything like that.  The four Lakers back on defense (Pau Gasol falls and takes a while to get back up) pack in the lane, and then when the pass is made Kobe doesn’t return to Rondo, he just stays in the lane.  This prevents Pierce from driving and it is ultimately what leads to the turnover.

The Lakers also switched up looks they gave Rondo when he got the rebound.

Here, Rondo grabs the board and two Laker defenders quickly trap him, forcing the ball out of his hands.  I don’t know about you, but if I am the Lakers, I take Nate Robinson running the fastbreak over Rondo any day.

Adjustments

While the Lakers executed their defensive strategy on Rajon Rondo to perfection, I think some of the blame for his bad game falls squarely on his shoulders.  Rajon Rondo was far too passive for most of this game.  I say most because for the first few minutes, Rajon Rondo looked like he was going to play a major role in helping the Celtics win the championship.

Rajon Rondo really needs to make Kobe pay for floating around and not recovering quickly when he catches the ball.  Here, Rondo makes the catch and he doesn’t hesitate as he attacks the hoop strong before Kobe can get back to him and this allows for Rajon to get close enough to hit the floater.

In addition to that, Rondo needs to start moving and cutting when the basketball isn’t in his hands.  When he is standing around that makes it so much easier for Kobe Bryant to leave him, because he knows all Rajon Rondo is doing is just standing there.  Remember that play where Kobe leaves Rondo and gets the steal?  Well, let’s take a look at that again real quick:

With Kobe leaving Rajon Rondo to go play free safety and everyone else matched up with there man, a lane opens for Rajon Rondo to cut through opens up right in front of the basket.  Even more importantly, the cut would have been right in front of Pierce’s face, making it an easy pass.  In game seven, any time Kobe turns his head and leaves Rajon Rondo, he needs to cut right off of his back.  If he makes the catch he will either get a lay-up or force rotations to free up his teammates.  Even if he doesn’t get the ball, cutting like this will force Kobe to think twice before leaving Rondo.

Rondo’s lack of aggression also hurt him in transition:

The mistake Rajon Rondo makes here is he passes the ball entirely too early, and that kills the entire fast break.  What do I mean by passing too early?  Well, the Celtics have a three on two fast break with everyone else trailing them, and Rajon Rondo has the ball in his hands going full speed.  That should be a basket right?

But look at where Rondo stops his dribble.  He is close to 35-40 feet away from the basket.  He doesn’t force one of the two Lakers defenders to make a decision of who to cover, as he essentially makes the decision for them.  Rondo needs to keep his dribble alive and attack until a defender stops him THEN pass it, and if no defender steps up it’s an easy lay-in.

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Two adjustments for Rajon Rondo.  Be more aggressive and cut off of Kobe’s back when he leaves him.  They might sound like small little things, but they are very important to the Celtics’ success in game seven.  I am not saying that this will win them the game, but it will keep things close and then who knows what happens?

When you are dealing with a superstar like Kobe you always here of two defensive strategies.  You can double him and force the ball out of his hands and let his teammates beat you, or you can let Kobe get his but not let anyone else go off.  The Boston Celtics decided to go with the latter and it worked for them.  Think about it, during Kobe’s spectacular run, did you see a double team?  No.  In fact, the Celtics didn’t overreact and completely change their defensive strategy:

This is Kobe’s first basket of the third, and it is a pretty good look at the Celtics’ defensive strategy.  Kobe gets the ball in the corner and starts to back Ray Allen down as no double comes (Paul Pierce fakes a double and stays with his man). Kevin Garnett eventually brings a double, but only when it is apparent that Kobe is going to take a shot. They force Kobe Bryant into a tough shot, but he is able to knock it down.

Maybe the only difference in the Celtics’ defensive strategy during this run was against the screen and roll.  Here, Perkins extends his hedge, but Kobe Bryant is still able to knock down the jumper.  That being said, this extension of the pick and roll also played a part in keeping Bryant from distributing the basketball.  Instead of quickly hedging and getting back (which would allow Bryant to get in the lane, force rotation, and dish it to an open man), Perkins extends the hedge and that keeps Bryant on the perimeter.

The above video is after Kobe already scored 10 straight points for the Lakers.  However, when Kobe posts up at the high post to get the ball, there is no deny or overplaying.  The Celtics are basically saying if Kobe is going to get the ball and hit a tough shot so be it.  It is interesting to watch Rondo on the above play, when Kobe makes the catch Rondo is close enough to bring a double however he stays with Derek Fisher.

In their defense, Celtics are basically admitting that Kobe Bryant is going to score no matter what.  Even if the Celtics send a double team, he is going to get his points and maybe more importantly he will be able to find his teammates.  So Doc Rivers had his guys stay home with only one defender on Kobe, that way they can defend the guys who need the open spaces to score (Doc Rivers said something to this effect during a timeout in the third).

As Kevin Garnett gets the ball to inbound it, Rajon Rondo and Paul Pierce switch places.  They don’t set a screen, they just switch.  It looks like the first option was Rondo curling towards the basketball (trying to get it to him in a dead sprint so he can just run it across half court) and Paul Pierce was the second option curling out towards the halfcourt line.

This is where the Lakers make their interesting decision.  They decide to switch the play with Ron Artest picking up Rondo and Derek Fisher picking up Paul Pierce.  Now this switch is pretty understandable as the Lakers don’t want to get caught in a trailing position on either one of the Celtics players.  The strange decision comes from Ron Artest here.  He decides to flat out deny Rajon Rondo.  As I said earlier, I think the Celtics were trying to get the ball to Rondo on a sprint, but with that taken away by the switch, you have Rondo going backwards.  Since the Celtics only have 4 seconds to get it across half court, doesn’t it seem like that is where you want to direct the basketball to?

Because Rondo is denied, Kevin Garnett has to go to his second option, Paul Pierce.  Since Derek Fisher is covering Pierce because of the switch, Garnett decides to float the ball over Fisher’s head.

With the ball in the air, Rasheed Wallace now enters the screen.  Fisher had initially put him on the Celtics’ own free throw line to keep things from being too crowded in the backcourt.  He adds to the strangeness of the play by kind of floating towards the basketball, but then sort of backing off as Pierce makes the catch.

What Wallace’s floating does is free up the entire backside for Rajon Rondo who has the edge in speed against the man covering him (Ron Artest).

Pierce makes the pass and Rajon Rondo makes the tough catch.  Rondo is able to finish at the rim and effectively clinch the game for the Celtics.  Here is the play in real time.  The thing to look for is Ron Artest and how his deny of Rondo puts him in a tough position (where he has to chase Rondo down).

So how has Glen Davis been able to finish at the rim this series?

No Wasted Motions

When you are smaller than the defenders who are playing against you, you can’t wait for them.  What I mean by that is if you have a step on them (or have them out of position), you can’t wait for them to recover, you need to attack.  No extra dribbles or meaningless pumpfakes:

Lamar Odom (Glen Davis’ defender) needs to hedge out on the screen, and that frees up Davis for the roll.  Paul Pierce hits him and Davis makes the catch and goes straight up with it before the help defense can make it over.  If Davis takes a dribble or makes a pump fake there, he loses his advantage and the defense would be able to alter the shot.  However, by going quickly, Davis catches the defense off guard and is able to finish with the And 1.

Using His Body

Glen Davis doesn’t have your prototypical scoring power forward body, but his body is part of the reason why he is able to finish at the hoop so effectively (especially against bigger players).  First, let’s go back to the Jazz-Lakers to see how it isn’t done:

Carlos Boozer is bigger, stronger, and more athletic than Glen Davis but because he lead with the basketball all series he was struggling to score around the rim, getting blocked a ton.  This is wrong, and Glen Davis did the exact opposite:

As Davis makes the catch on this dive to the post, Pau Gasol has his hands on him, trying to push him away from the basket.  At this point, Pau has the advantage on this play, he is in between Glen Davis and the basket plus he is bigger.

Glen Davis surveys the situation and decides that he needs a dribble this time.  As Big Baby puts the ball on the floor, he loads up ready to throw his body into Pau Gasol.  Gasol seems to feel that the contact is coming, and he braces himself.

Davis makes the contact, and now at this point he has the advantage in this situation.  Pau Gasol is off balance, and he is now almost under the basket.

Look what we have here now.  Glen Davis, the nonathletic and smaller player rises over Pau Gasol to finish at the rim.  Gasol was off balance and knocked on his heels, and this is what keeps Gasol from even jumping off the floor.  Here is the play in real time:

Another example is the first play we looked at where Glen Davis didn’t dribble:

After rising up without a dribble, Glen Davis just throws his body into two different Laker defenders.

The one who is bothered the most by the contact is Andrew Bynum.  He went from keeping his hands straight up in a position that could alter the shot to not even looking at the basket with his hands down, allowing for Davis to finish at the rim.

A very good example of this came midway through the 3rd quarter.  After a Derek Fisher jumper, the Celtics came down and the refs made a very quick three second call.  Everyone was outraged.  The fans, people on Twitter, and the ESPN announce team.  All of them pointed towards the shot clock and how only 4 seconds ran off of it.  Taking a closer look though, you see this was the correct call:

Kendrick Perkins gathers the ball after Derek Fisher hits a jumper.  On a made basket, the game clock continues to run as the shot-clock holds still until a player gathers possession.

Which is what Rajon Rondo does, as he makes the catch right around his own free throw line extended.  Notice where the game clock is at, 8:45.

Rondo crosses into the frontcourt and and two seconds have run off the game clock, as it now reads 8:43.  However, only one second ran off the shot clock.  It seems like whoever operating it delayed a bit before turning it on.  One of the main points of outrage over this call was the fact that it was made with 20 seconds remaining on the shot clock.  Seeing that it was starting a second late makes sense when you think about it.

Here is where the three second count starts.  Kevin Garnett has his foot over the paint, which is by rule what needs to happen for the count to start.  Here is the rule from the NBA website:

a. An offensive player shall not remain for more than three seconds in that part of his free throw lane between the endline and extended 4′ (imaginary) off the court and the farther edge of the free throw line while the ball is in control of his team.

Kevin Garnett has a very good seal going, and instead of making the initial pass, he pump fakes.  This is why the three second call gets made.  Garnett has to hold his seal longer, which means he has to stay in the paint longer, making him susceptible for the three second call.

The pass is finally made, but with the ball in the air, the whistle gets blown and the three second call is made.  The clock shows that 3 seconds did in fact come off the clock from the time KG started in the lane.  Is it a quick trigger?  Sure, but by the letter of the rule, it is the right call.  Here it is in real time.

In the above video, the first thing that you should note is how far away from the basket Ray Allen is when he makes the initial catch.  There is no way you can initiate an effective offensive set that far away from the basket.  Next, you have both Ray Allen and Tony Allen cutting to the same place (ball side corner), eventually forcing Ray Allen to break off his cut and head to the top of the key.  After holding onto the basketball for about 10 seconds, the ball ends up in Kevin Garnett’s hands.  Allen makes the catch on the post, but he is blocked.  Why?  Well, let’s take a look at a second angle that gives us a better idea.

Because Tony Allen is just standing in the corner not being a threat, Ron Artest is able to drop down to the block and help defend Kendrick Perkins.  Since Artest is on Perkins, Pau Gasol is able to range over on the pass and alter the Ray Allen shot.

In the above play, Rajon Rondo tries to push the basketball up the court.  With nothing there initially, he decides to enter the ball to Kevin Garnett.  Garnett makes the catch and he waits for the Celtics to clear his side of the court.  Instead of sending a cutter off of Garnett or provide a passing lane in case of a double team, the Celtics simply bunch up on the opposite side.  So when the double team comes, Garnett has nothing to do but try and make the best of it.  He gets the ball knocked away, finally gets control, but then has it blocked.

Again above, Rajon Rondo wants to push the ball but the Lakers are back on defense.  Rondo decides to hold things up, but then all of a sudden he attacks.  He catches Fisher off guard and he seems to have a lane.  However, there is a mix up as Tony Allen cuts right in the path of Rondo, sending his man (Kobe Bryant) into perfect position for help defense.  Instead of getting a lay-in or a drive to the basket, the Celtics end up settling for a Tony Allen jumper.

In the above video, the Celtics run their very familiar “scrum screen” play.  Rondo comes off free, and he has Big Baby rolling with him, but that is the only movement from the Celtics.  Because Tony Allen is just standing in the corner (maybe he could have popped out to the wing to at least force Kobe to pay attention to him), Kobe is by default in proper help position.  This allows Rondo’s man (Jordan Farmar) to help out, and he eventually draws the charge on Big Baby.

So why is all this stagnant offense so bad for the Celtics?  Because by the when they eventually get a good cut or set run, they aren’t going to be prepared to take advantage of it:

See what happened?  As Henry Abbott already showed us, Rondo missed a wide open Paul Pierce on a cut.  Instead of making the pass, Rondo puts his hand up as if to say “let’s slow it down.”  That isn’t the mentality you want Rajon Rondo to have if you are Boston.  In fact, Rondo makes this gesture a couple times in a few of the videos above, and I think that is a part of the problem with the Celtics’ defense.  They weren’t getting out effectively in transition, and their half court offense really seemed to struggle.

That was just one of the Lakers’ poor possession in the fourth.  However, with about 5:30 minutes left and a four point lead, the Lakers came across a play that started working well for them, and that was the “1-2″ Screen & Roll.  The “1-2″ Screen & Roll is simply your point guard (or the “1″) comes off of a screen set by the shooting guard (or the “2″).

After the inbounds play, the ball gets swung around to Derek Fisher on the top of the key.  Kobe Bryant, who was ISO’d up on the opposite block, now comes up to set a screen for Fisher.

As we get to the point of contact for the screen, the Celtics have a few options.  They could switch the screen, but that leaves Rajon Rondo covering Kobe Bryant, and that is a mismatch.  You could double team the man coming off of the screen, but that leaves Kobe open.  Finally, you could have Rondo fight over the top and have Ray Allen hedge.   That is what the Celtics choose to do here.

Ray Allen shows and immediately gets back to Kobe, expecting to have Rondo fight over the top of the screen and getting back to Fisher.  However, Rondo gets caught up on this particular screen, and now Paul Pierce has to make it all the way across the court (because there is really good floor spacing) to try and close out on Fisher’s shot attempt.

Pierce doesn’t get there in time and Fisher is able to knock down the jumper.  Here is the play in real time, notice how quickly Allen hedges and gets back because he is worried about leaving Kobe open.

Here it is again:

In the play above, the Celtics are more prepared for it and do a decent job defending the screen and roll. However, what the play does successfully is that it gives Derek Fisher a step on Rajon Rondo. That is something he couldn’t do 1 on 1, but with the screen he is able to get around Rondo and get the little runner to fall.

Now, the Lakers only got 4 points from this set, but it seemed to get the team back into the flow of things. You didn’t see too many bad possessions after this, and the Lakers were able to pull away, getting the win and the series lead.

I briefly mentioned this before the series started, but Derek Fisher’s off the ball defense doesn’t work when covering a shooter who can run off screens, like Ray Allen.   Like I said before, Fisher does a lot of stuff when getting screened that works in pick and roll situations.  He punishes the screener, he hooks his body around them, and he gets very animated sometimes drawing the foul.  All that stuff works, because he has a defender hedging on the ball handler. However, off the ball, that stuff doesn’t work, because there is rarely someone hedging out.

On this play here, Ray Allen has two options.  He can come off of a Big Baby screen, or he can fake going off that screen, go baseline, and come off a screen set on the baseline.  He chooses the latter option.

As Ray Allen starts his fake, Derek Fisher flails as if Big Baby punched him in the spine (he didn’t).  This is part of Fisher’s defensive game on screens.  He is a savvy vet, and he does draw his fair share of calls by doing this.  However, doing this off the ball puts him at such a disadvantage.

This is because, by the time that Fisher starts recovers, Ray Allen has already created a lot of separation.  This separation is key because it is what allows him to catch and shoot coming off of curl screens.

As Allen sprints to the corner, he gets another screen from Kendrick Perkins.  Fisher needs to follow him along the baseline and chase him off of the three point line.  Andrew Bynum actually does a nice job of getting into Perkins’ body and creating the space for Fisher to do this.

Instead of doing that though, Fisher decides to run full speed into Kendrick Perkins’chest.  I think he was doing this to either draw the offensive foul or punish the screener, but either way, it didn’t work.  Bynum is caught off guard by Fisher’s play and he is late with the help.  Allen knocks down the three, here it is in real time:

So how do you cover Ray Allen when he is working off the ball?  Here is a pretty good example of it:

On the above possession, Kobe works hard to avoid contact on the Celtics’ screens so he can get to Ray Allen quicker and prevent the pass from getting to him.  Now, if I had to nit-pick, I would rather have Kobe stay attached to Allen through the screens rather than shooting the gaps, because it can back-fire (it lead to a three pointer later in the quarter).

It is obvious the Lakers don’t want to keep Kobe on Ray Allen the entire game for whatever reason, but when Derek Fisher is covering Allen he is going to need to change his approach of getting through screens.

“I think after Ray’s two threes, I don’t think we quit at all, but I think what happens is your confidence and what really happens more than that is you don’t sustain your game,” Magic coach Stan Van Gundy said. “You start doing things, trying to get it back in a hurry … instead of sticking with your game and going possession by possession.”

Let’s look at the two threes that ended Orlando’s season.

Three Pointer #1

Now, Rashard Lewis is the one at fault here.  He gets stuck covering Ray Allen as the Magic switch the first screen on the right side.  The ball gets swung around and there is a pick and roll at the opposite side, with Ray Allen standing at the top of the key. It is initially well defended, but off the ball there is some problems:

There is no reason for Rashard Lewis to be at the foul line and help when he is responsible for one of the best shooters in the history of the NBA.  That is too much space, and Ray Allen knocks it down.

Three Pointer #2

As Rondo brings the basketball up he looks to get it to Paul Pierce.  Matt Barnes goes for the steal but misses.  This sets off Orlando’s help rotation.

Rashard Lewis needs to come up and defend Paul Pierce to make sure he doesn’t shoot it.  Vince Carter needs to slide off of Ray Allen to help on Kevin Garnett on the block.  Carter does a good job of waiting until the ball is passed to go and help.

Garnett gets the ball and is well defended.  Rashard Lewis now needs to “help the helper”, meaning he needs to help out on Vince Carter’s man (which is shown by the dashed arrow), Ray Allen.  Instead, he returns to Garnett, leaving Ray Allen open.

Garnett makes the pass and Allen knocks down the three pointer.  Here is the video in real time.