Upon closer examination, their was definitely some miscommunication here.  Considering the coach (Doc Rivers) and the players (Ray Allen, Paul Pierce, and Kevin Garnett), it is interesting to see the Celtics fail to execute.  It looks that Paul Pierce is waiting for a screen to come, but it never comes because Allen and Garnett run into each other a few times.  In the postgame, Rivers eluded to the mishap:

Doc Rivers: “We didn’t execute the play, I’ll just leave it at that. Ended up leaving Paul on the island. It’s a play we’ve run several times and we just didn’t execute it. [It] was supposed to be a pick-and-roll with a flare and none of it happened, which was unusual for us. But it happened.”

Rivers is right, we have seen this play before, and by design, it is supposed to end up with Pierce working towards the right elbow (his sweet spot) with plenty of space to make a decision:

On this particular play, Pierce immediately gets up top isolated.  After waiting a few seconds, Ray Allen comes off of a backscreen, flaring to the corner.

With Allen’s defender now chasing him to the corner, the man setting the screen (in this case Jeff Green) steps up to set another screen.  This time, it is a ball screen, setting up the pick and roll.

With Allen’s man chasing him to the corner and the pick and roll action, you are now clearing up that elbow location, ready for him to work the sweet spot.  In this particular instance, Pierce attacks the lane and misses a lay-up. However, when watching the play in real time, you understand what Boston is trying to set up:

Rivers likes to use Ray Allen as a decoy, knowing that the defense will never leave him.  We have seen this concept all of the time with the Celtics late in games, and here is another instance.  This is a great way to clear space, prevent help, and allow Pierce to get to his favorite spot on the court.

Lets look at last night’s play again:

So, what went wrong?  Well, a couple things.  First, Ray Allen is the first one to get the ball out of the side and after standing around and dribbling, he gets it to Paul Pierce.  This throws off the rhythm of the entire play in my opinion.  Everyone talked about James’ defense on the actual Pierce shot attempt, but the threat of him denying Pierce and getting a five second call is probably why Allen goes to meet the basketball.

After giving up the ball to Pierce, Allen flares to the corner expecting Garnett to pop out.  This is where things fall apart.  Garnett starts to pop out, but Ray Allen tries to return to the spot to restart the play.  Garnett sees this and he tries to restart the play, at this point, Pierce understands that he just needs to go, and he does that, driving to the left and missing the shot.

This is a rare instance of the Celtics’ failing to execute, and all of it goes back to LeBron James on Paul Pierce.  Not on the shot, but on the initial inbounds pass.

Even though there was some strange playcalling, the Miami Heat deserve a lot of credit for digging in and playing fantastic defense.  This defense involved strong help defense and a unique strategy to prevent Rajon Rondo’s dribble penetration.

Curious Playcalling

While Miami’s defense stole the show, Boston did contribute to their drought with some odd playcalling choices early in this stretch:

After Pierce’s two free throws, Glen Davis wound up taking the next two shots.  Now, the fact that he was taking wasn’t the problem.  The problem was that these weren’t typical Glen Davis shots where he was the third option on a set, got an offensive rebound, or was playing off of the Big three.  These were designed plays where Davis was the primary option.

The first play, Boston dumps the ball into Davis and clears out, running an ISO for him, and he eventually misses the shot.  The second play is an off ball screen ran for Davis, allowing him to cut to the block, get the ball, and go up with the shot that is blocked.

Strong Help Defense

In addition to the curious playcall, the second play where Glen Davis gets blocked at the rim was a good example of the Heat and their help defense.  Bosh is originally on Davis, but when the off ball screen gets set, instead of Bosh fighting through, Joel Anthony steps up and gets the block.

This wasn’t a fluke.  Miami’s help defense was strong all night and it shined during the final 7 minutes of the game against Boston:

On this play, Paul Pierce gets a ball screen and Joel Anthony is late with the hedge, allowing Pierce to split the screen.  However, instead of allowing Pierce get to the rim, Chris Bosh steps up and forces Pierce to give up the ball.  What makes this play is the rotation back after the help.  Because Bosh steps up, it looks like Jermaine O’Neal is open for the easy finish.  However, Anthony was always working, rotating back, and able to block the shot.

On this play, the Boston Celtics are looking to run Ray Allen off of a couple screens away from the basketball, sending Allen off of a staggered screen that lets him curl to the basketball.

As Allen makes the catch, Anthony (covering Kevin Garnett – the screener) shows with Dwyane Wade closing out on Allen as well.  Noticing his man leaving him, Kevin Garnett slips the screen and waits for the pass from Allen (Allen might be the best player in the league when it comes to this type of pass).  However, as soon as Allen makes the catch and Anthony leaves Garnett, LeBron James is rotating over to the middle of the paint.

So when Garnett makes the catch, LeBron James is right there ready to deny the shot, which is what he does, meeting Garnett in the air and getting the block.  Here is the play in real time:

If LeBron James is making the correct reads and willing to trust his teammate and leave his man, he is a dangerous help defender because he is so athletic.  He gets where he wants to go quickly and gets himself in position to get the block.

Defending Rajon Rondo

The final aspect of the Heat’s defense during this stretch (and for the entire game) was how the Heat chose to defend Rajon Rondo.  In one situation, the Heat went to a conventional strategy, in another, they went to with a unique gameplan that seems to be working out.

Pick And Rolls

Looking at the conventional strategy, the Heat were able to neutralize Rajon Rondo coming off of screens by simply going under screens and forcing Rondo to make a play on the outside.

Here, Rondo actually runs off of two ball screens and his defenders goes underneath each one, and eventually Rondo is forced to take a jumper, one that he misses.

On this play, when Rondo’s defender goes under the screen, he actually draws the offensive foul, getting in Kevin Garnett’s way and taking the shove that he gives.

On Dribble Penetration

While going under Rajon Rondo screens is a pretty common site when watching teams defend the Celtics, the way they handled Rondo’s dribble penetration when not in a pick and roll situation was a little more unique.  Instead of playing off of him or anything like that, they played him straight up and when Rondo attacked the lane, they helped.

What made this unique is who came and helped.  Instead of sending help from a certain spot (the weakside block), they had Joel Anthony leaving Kevin Garnett and dropping into the paint, basically funneling the action back to Garnett and giving up a Garnett jumper from the elbow/top of the key.

This is strange considering that Garnett was 10th in FG% among power forwards with at least 20 games played and 20+ minutes per game, shooting 47% during the regular season.  The Heat must have seen something in Garnett (maybe it was because he was 0-2 and looked uncomfortable from that spot in game one, or maybe it just looked like he was lagging in game two), made them comfortable leaving Garnett.  For what it’s worth, it is working so far as Garnett is 2-11 (18.2%) from 16-23 feet.

As Rondo sprints the basketball up the court, he gets an impromptu screen from Paul Pierce, freeing up a path allowing Rajon Rondo to get himself to the rim.  Instead of sending Chris Bosh from the weakside block to help, Joel Anthony leaves Garnett and sinks into the middle of the lane.

With Anthony in the paint, this allows Chris Bosh to stay in the passing lane and take away the kick out pass to Jeff Green.  Essentially what they are doing here is funneling the action back to Garnett.

When the pass gets made, Joel Anthony is deep in the paint so when the ball gets kicked out he goes ahead and closes out on him.

Anthony is mobile/athletic enough to at least bother Garnett with the closeout, even if he doesn’t get a strong closeout.  Here is the play in real time:

As you can see, the Heat are taking away just about everything here.  The drive to the rim is taken away by Anthony.  The pass to the corner is taking away with Bosh sitting in the lane.  The only option that Rajon Rondo has here is to kick the ball out to Garnett, who misses the jumper.

On this play, Mario Chalmers is pressing Rajon Rondo way up top in the backcourt, allowing Rondo to simply blow by him.  Again, Anthony leaves Garnett and provides the help, keeping Rondo out of the lane.  This is important because with the help coming from Anthony, it allows Dwyane Wade to stay with Ray Allen in the corner.  Here, he is face guarding him, not even worried about what is taking place behind him.  His only concern (as it should be) is Ray Allen on the outside.

On this play, the Heat are actually able to force a turnover on this possession using their strategy to send help from Garnett’s man.  Again, the Heat are playing Rondo very high, allowing him to get a running start and attacking the lane.  Once he gets into the paint, he is met by Joel Anthony, who leaves Garnett.  It is worth repeating that with Anthony helping off of the paint, it allows the rest of the defense to stick with their men on the outside.  Here, with James not worried about helping, he is able to return to his man easily and get the steal on Rondo’s pass.

While this worked for the Heat in game two, it is going to be interesting to see if they do it in game three and if they do, will it work?  Garnett is shooting nearly 50% from 16-23 feet, so it is worth wondering if the Heat noticed Garnett’s early struggles (on mostly open jumpers) and just started leaving him or if the Heat see something in Garnett’s shot/health and that is why they are leaving him.  The tell will be if the Heat try this again early in game three and stick with it despite Garnett hitting a few open jumpers.

The play starts with LeBron James taking the basketball out and entering it to Mario Chalmers at the top of the key.  Once Chalmers gets the basketball, Dwyane Wade comes off of a screen away from the basketball at the opposite elbow to free himself up at the wing.

Once Wade gets the basketball, James Jones (who set the initial screen for Wade) and Joel Anthony dive to the middle of the paint to set up a double screen for LeBron James, who acts as if he is going to flash to the top of the key looking for the basketball.

Here, Spoelstra gives you a perfect example of how to use two stars.  Dwyane Wade has the basketball as the off ball action is taking place to try and set up LeBron James.  Look at the attention that James attracts.  Both Kevin Garnett and Glen Davis (those who are covering the men setting off ball screens), have their head turned to the basketball because they are worried about LeBron James.  This gives Wade the opportunity to take his man baseline.

With Glen Davis turning around and reacting late, he is unable to get in proper help position and he is forced to commit a foul as Wade makes the shot, securing a three point play.  Here is the play in real time:

Just a great set by Spoelstra here.  Whether or not James was truly a decoy or not (the play could have actually been drawn up for James), this puts so much pressure on the defense, and the result is mistakes (not watching the basketball) that ends up as points for Miami.

As soon as the ball goes to the trigger man, Rajon Rondo, Garnett goes from the elbow and sets a pindown screen for Paul Pierce.  Pierce comes off the screen way out by halfcourt, essentially taking himself out of play.

As soon as Rondo gets the inbounds pass, he dives to the rim, standing in the paint right underneath the basket as Garnett starts to go to work on the post.

Now this might be odd considering the lack of spacing on the court, but if you think about it, it does make perfect sense.  Rondo’s weakness is his jump shot, meaning that if the Knicks were going to double Garnett, it would be from him.  The only place where Rondo is a threat offensively is in the paint, so they stick him under the rim knowing that KG is going to be taking his hook shot against the smaller Jeffries.  With Rondo under the rim waiting for a dump pass if Garnett is double teamed, Toney Douglas decides to stick with him and not double.

In addition, Paul Pierce is far enough from the rim where a double from Bill Walker would take too much time.  If Walker would double, Pierce would just step up to the three point line and get the basketball, so Walker stays with him.

This means that Garnett was given the opportunity to take a few dribbles without the threat of a double team, get to his spot on the court, and take his hook shot.

Garnett gets it off clean, and with the height difference there is no chance that Jeffries is going to bother the shot (if you look, Jeffries is playing perfect, defense going up straight, extending his hand up high).  Here is the play in real time:

This is just a great decision and tactical move by Doc Rivers.  He knows his players’ weaknesses and how defense will try to attack them and he comes up with counters.  Sending Rondo quickly to the rim after making the inbounds pass is a counter, preventing a double team and letting Garnett go to work.

To start the play, the New York Knicks are in sort of a line set at the free throw line.  Once the ball goes to the trigger man, you have Carmelo Anthony standing still at the top of the key and the remaining three Knicks’ cutting off of him.  Roger Mason Jr. flashes out to half court.  Bill Walker flares out to the weakside and Jared Jeffries flashes to the basketball.

Jeffries gets the basketball and gets it right back to Toney Douglas.  After this happens, Jeffries heads over and sets the pindown for Carmelo Anthony.

Anthony uses the screen to pop out to the wing and get the basketball.  After Jeffries sets the screen, he flashes to the paint.

Before Anthony can even turn towards the basket, Glen Davis leaves his man (Jeffries) and goes to double Anthony on the outside.  Jeffries sees his man and curls off of his cut to the strong side block.

With Jeffries flashing to the rim, Kevin Garnett is forced to leave his man (Bill Walker) to try and to cut off Jeffries.  Garnett actually gets a late break on this rotation.

That late break by Garnett means that Jeffries catches the basketball with Garnett on his back, meaning he is between Garnett and the rim.  This means that if Jeffries even looks at the rim he’ll realize that he would be able to get a shot attempt up at the rim (maybe force a foul with Garnett jumping over his back).  Instead he turns to the middle of the court, where Bill Walker is flashing to the rim.

Jeffries tries to throw the pass to Walker, who in Jeffries’ defense is open, but Garnett’s arms are too long and his body was naturally in position to defend the pass attempt, that he is able to get his hand on the ball and knock it loose.  Eventually, the Celtics are able to hop on the loose ball and get a timeout.  Here is the play in real time:

Carmelo Anthony makes the perfect play here.  The double team comes quickly and Anthony doesn’t really have any option but to make the pass to Jeffries who is wide open.  Jeffries was in perfect position to get an easy lay-up, catching the basketball on the block with the defender on his back.  He needs to go up with the shot there, draw the contact, and at least get a foul called. Kevin Garnett was late recognizing his need to rotate over to Jeffries and he had to be punished for it.  Instead, he over thinks it and tries to hit the man of the rotating defender (Bill Walker), and that is actually playing into Garnett’s hands, passing in the direction where he is coming from.  This allows him to get his hand on the basketball and force the turnover.

We pick up the action with 37.8 seconds left with the Celtics trailing by three points.  You don’t need a three point shot in this situation, you just need a quick look to maintain the 2-for-1 so you can get the basketball back.  Rivers understands this and instead of going for the all-or-nothing three, he set up a play to get a quick two:

The play starts with Kevin Garnett setting a pindown screen for Paul Pierce.  Pierce uses the screen to flash to the top of the key area, looking for the basketball.

Once Pierce uses his screen, Garnett also flashes to the top of the key as if he is the one who is going to get the basketball.

Garnett’s shooting ability forces the defense (in this case Ronny Turiaf) to step up and try and take away this pass.  As this happens, Garnett cuts backdoor with Ray Allen sneaking behind Turiaf to set the screen.

The beauty of this play is who Rivers has setting the backscreen.  It’s Ray Allen.  Nobody in their right mind is going leave Allen because he is always a threat to pop for an open jumper.

This means that there is nobody around Garnett at the rim as he waits for the lob pass from Rajon Rondo to come to him.

With nobody contesting, Garnett is able to rise up, make the catch, and finish with very little time coming off of the clock.  Here is the play in real time:

Just a great play call.  Rivers has three different decoys here (Pierce, Garnett’s jump shot, and Ray Allen) and Garnett sells it very well by clapping.  The result is an easy dunk.  If you have a good memory, you would recognize this play since it was featured on this site before.  However, instead of a two, the result was a turnover:

This was the only time that I have seen the Celtics run this. It was as if Rivers saw that it would work and put it in his pocket for when he needed it. He needed it tonight, and this time, the result was 2 points in 0.5 seconds.

After an offensive foul by Carmelo Anthony the Boston Celtics found themselves with the basketball on the side and with 21.0 seconds left.  This is when Doc Rivers went to an old standby:

We pick up the action with Paul Pierce dribbling the basketball at the top of the key.  After inbounding it, Ray Allen comes and sets a ballscreen for Pierce.

With Pierce coming off of the screen, Toney Douglas is forced to hedge.  As this happens, Allen pops off of his screen, but it isn’t a straight pop.  He uses a screen from Garnett to get to the wing on his pop.

Douglas’ show now puts him in a natural trail position, and against a player like Allen that isn’t the position you want to be in.  Garnett sneaks in and gets the screen on Douglas.

Allen makes the catch wide open.  With Garnett setting the screen, Turiaf is forced to step up and help on Allen.

He doesn’t get there quick enough, and Allen is given enough room to pull up and knock it down to give Boston a two point lead.  Here is the play in real time.

This is a play that the Celtics like to run once a game in crunch time (not really, but that is what it seems like), and it almost always seems to result in an open three for Ray Allen.

This wasn’t the only good coaching decision that Rivers made here.  Initially, he wanted Rajon Rondo inbounding the basketball (I think they were going to run the same play, but wanted Allen to come from the corner), but Rondo struggled and was forced into a timeout and a kickball:

After that kickball, Doc Rivers went to Allen and the made three pointer was the result.  These weren’t plays that Rivers drew up in the huddle (we have seen them run in the past before), but Rivers knew exactly what to call in the situation and in my opinion he was the Celtics’ MVP for Game 1.

Here is what we looked at for the upcoming Celtics-Knicks series:

• Offensive Breakdown
• Defensive Breakdown

Check in tomorrow when we start looking at the Western Conference.

• Defensive Efficiency: 97.7 (2nd)
• Opp. TS%: 51.6% (3rd)
• Opp. Assist Rate: 18.07 (1st)
• Opp. Turnover Rate: 14.83 (3rd)
• Defensive Rebound Rate: 74.97 (8th)
• Block Rate: 4.4 (27th)
• Opp. Free Throw Rate: 31.2 (22nd)
• Opp. Three Point Rate: 20.7 (22nd)

Boston Celtics – Strengths

Pick And Roll Defense

Much like the Chicago Bulls, the Boston Celtics are one of the best teams when it comes to defending the pick and roll (both in terms of the ball handler and the roll man).  That shouldn’t be a surprising considering that the man who installed the Celtics’ pick and roll defense is now the Bulls’ head coach.  The Celtics are in the top 5 of PPP allowed in both pick and roll categories, and like the Bulls it is due to their “swarming” of the basketball (again, this is pulled from my SBNation.com pick and roll defense post):

Here, Elton Brand sets a screen for Jrue Holiday, and Holiday uses it taking the ball to the middle of the court.  As he comes off of his screen, Holiday is met by Jermaine O’Neal who steps up as Rajon Rondo goes over the screen.

You now have two defenders on Holiday, meaning that Brand (the screener) needs to be picked up.  Kevin Garnett steps up towards Brand, making sure he doesn’t get the pass.  Garnett stepping up means that his man, Spencer Hawes, is now open.  Ray Allen steps up and takes that pass away.  The Celtics are now giving up the corner pass, but they know that this a difficult pass to make, and if it does get completed, it is such a long pass that the defense can rotate back to it.

In this particular situation, Holiday goes for the lay-up, but because O’Neal stepped up to defend him he is able to contest the attempt and force the miss.  Here is the play in real time:

As you rewatch the play, you notice that every single Celtic defender is on a string.  They all go through their rotations without hesitating or even looking back to see if the rotations are made.  This is the beauty of the Celtics’ defense.  They all trust each other so much, and that trust is what allows them to rotation sharply and make it so hard for the offense.

On this pick-and-roll, the Timberwolves try to execute a quick roll, where Michael Beasley doesn’t really set a good screen, but quickly rolls to the rim.  Even on a pick-and-roll like this, the Celtics’ rotations shine.  It looks like Beasley is going to get a wide open lay-up, but Glen Davis rotates over, steps up, and takes the charge.

This is another example of the Celtics’ communication on the defensive end.  Here, Danny Granger comes off of a screen set by Jeff Foster, and the defense commits two defenders to Granger.  Initially, Rondo is the defender who steps up and rotates over to Foster, but as Foster continues to the rim and Rondo’s man slides to the top of the key, Rondo needs to leave Foster.  Almost instantly, Ray Allen slides in and picks up Foster.  Rondo doesn’t even look at Allen; he knows that Allen knows that he needs to pick Foster up and there is zero hesitation.

Isolation Defense

The Boston Celtics are really good at just about everything, but I think their isolation defense will be important in this series, considering that their opponents run a lot of effective isolation sets.  Much like their pick and roll defense, the fact that they trust each other and are able to help really effectively allows them to get a lot of stops they wouldn’t normally get:

Here Andray Blatche gets the basketball and it looks like he is going to make a quick move.  Ray Allen quickly dives into the paint to help out Garnett, but retreats back to his man when he realizes the help initially isn’t needed. However, once Allen retreats Blatche drives baseline. With Allen being too far away to help, Nenad Krstic helps out and challenges the shot, forcing the miss.

It is this kind of play on a string that could really give the Knicks problems (especially if the other 4 players continue to stand around and not cut off of the basketball).

Boston Celtics – Weaknesses

Too Many Fouls

To be completely honest, it is hard to find a weakness in this Boston Celtic defense, but if there is one it is that they foul a little bit too much. The Celtics are 22nd in the league when it comes to Opponent Free Throw Rate as they send their opponents to the line more than the league average. To me, the logical explanation is that since they are a physical team, they end up picking more than their fair share of fouls. That’s fine, but against a team like the Knicks who have a few streaky shooters on their team (Landry Fields, Shawne Williams, Toney Douglas, Chauncey Billups, Carmelo), you don’t want to keep sending them to the line, bailing them out, and letting them get in rhythm at the foul line. That can only lead to trouble.

New York Knicks – The Numbers*

• Defensive Efficiency: 107.1 (22nd)
• Opp. TS%: 55.6% (23rd)
• Opp. Assist Rate: 18.68 (3rd)
• Opp. Turnover Rate: 13.91 (9th)
• Defensive Rebound Rate: 71.88 (24th)
• Block Rate: 5.8 (7th)
• Opp. Free Throw Rate: 31.9 (23rd)
• Opp. Three Point Rate: 21.2 (20th)

New York Knicks – Strengths

Block Shots

Compared to the Celtics’ defense, the Knicks are a little lacking on this side of the basketball, but there is one thing that they do better than most teams on defense, block shots.  The Knicks are 7th in Block Rate, which is interesting considering they play Amar’e Stoudemire at the 5.  That being said, Stoudemire leads the Knicks with 149 blocks.  This is because Stoudemire is very quick to react when dribble penetration takes place.  While the rest of the Knicks are very poor at help defense, Stoudemire stands out by being able to quickly realize when help is needed:

Here, the dribble penetration takes place and Amar’e Stoudemire quickly recognizes that he needs to help.  He covers a lot of ground, jumps up, and blocks the shot.

New York Knicks – Weaknesses

Poor Help Defense Outside of Amar’e

While Amare Stoudemire’s help on straight drives to the rim is solid, the rest of the Knicks’ help defense leaves much to be desired.  The Knicks’ are a poor team when it comes to help defense and the numbers really show that.  In my opinion, the two play types where a lack of help defense is really apparent is on isolation drives and drive and kicks to shooters spotting up.  These are the Knicks’ two worst defensive categories.  The Knicks are giving up 42.9% shooting in spot up situations and 41.8% shooting in isolation situations.  To me, this all comes down to poor help defense.

When it comes to spot-up situations Stoudemire actually seems to be at fault the most.  While he is effective when helping on dribble penetration, he has the tendency to over help on ball cuts and get lazy when challenging shooters on the outside.  In spot up situations Stoudemire gives up 47.9% shooting:

Here, Stoudemire gets caught helping on a dive cut to the rim, even though it isn’t necessary at all, considering the situation.  The defender who is playing the man cutting doesn’t even need help as he is in front of his man and there is no chance the pass will be completed.  Stoudemire still helps and gets caught out of position when the ball goes to his man on the wing.  Open, his man is able to knock it down.

Earlier, we talked about how the Celtics are a poor spot up team, but the numbers are skewed by Glen Davis and his poor shooting.  Kevin Garnett is a solid spot up shooter, and if Amar’e Stoudemire gives these kind of looks to him, the Knicks could be in a lot of trouble.

—

*All numbers come from the fantastic website Hoopdata.com

• Pace: 92.2 (2nd)
• Offensive Efficiency: 104.4 (16th)
• True Shooting Percentage: 56.2% (5th)
• Assist Rate: 23.56 (1st)
• Turnover Rate: 14.35 (26th)
• Offensive Rebound Rate: 21.10 (30th)
• Free Throw Rate: 30.4 (10th)
• Three Point Rate: 18.2 (26th)

Boston Celtics – Strengths

Using Screens Away From The Basketball

The Celtics are 4th in the NBA in terms of points per possession when their players come off of screens, and obviously this has a lot to do with Ray Allen and his shooting ability.  You can’t talk about shooters who can come off screens and knock shots down without mentioning Ray Allen.  Allen might be one of the best shooters in the history of the NBA, and he is also one of the best when it comes to working off of screens.  Part of what makes Allen so successful is his ability to set up his defender before he even comes off of the screen.

Watch what Allen does here even before he uses the screen.  He starts on the baseline and starts as if he is going to come off of a pindown on the block.  He stops, starts to head in the opposite direction, but then he jab steps, and goes back in the original direction.  This creates enough space for Allen to come off the screen, square up, and knock down the mid-range jumper.  In addition to being able to work before coming off of screens, he can read the defense, see how they are playing him, and just react off of it:

Here, Allen comes off of the pindown set for him, looking to curl off of the screen and meet the basketball.  However, before he can, his defender (Jordan Crawford), shoots the gap and tries to anticipate the pass thrown to him.  Instead of continuing his route to the basketball, Allen reads the defense, breaks off of it, and heads to the corner where he is wide open.  Allen gets the pass and knocks down the open three.

Cutting Off Of The Basketball

One of the things that makes the Boston Celtics so hard to defend is that you have so much talent on the court at the same time, that if you focus too much on the basketball, you are going to get beat off of the ball.  The Celtics’ are the best “cutting” team in the league, scoring 1.32 points every possession that a cutter gets the basketball.  For the Celtics, the biggest threat to cut to the rim are the bigs. Defenses tend to start ball watching on the outside (where you have Rondo, Pierce, and Allen), that the bigs are able to cut right to the rim and usually end up wide open.  Each of the three Celtics’ bigs (Glen Davis – 67.4% shooting on cuts, Kevin Garnett 70.6% shooting on cuts, and Shaq 79% shooting on cuts) have a PPP of over 1.3 when they cut to the rim:

Here, the Celtics are running a pick and roll with Paul Pierce as the ball handler and Kevin Garnett as the screener.  Pierce is able to use the screen to try and penetrate, forcing JaVale McGee to help.  McGee’s man, Glen Davis cuts right to the rim when this happens, making himself available for the pass.  Davis gets the pass and is able to finish easily.

Where the Celtics’ bigs seem to benefit the most is when they set pindown screens for Ray Allen.  Allen is a fantastic shooter, but he is also one of the best passers coming off of pindown screens.  You have to hedge out on Allen, and when that happens, that opens up the lane.  That is exactly what happens here.  As Allen comes off of the pindown screen, Chris Bosh sprints at him.  This leaves Kevin Garnett wide open for the easy finish.

Again, here is another play where the threat of Ray Allen opens up a cutting opportunity. The only difference is instead of Allen making the pass, the pass comes from up top, made by the point guard.

Boston Celtics – Weaknesses

Spot-Ups

It is weird to think that a team with Paul Pierce, Ray Allen, and Kevin Garnett can be considered a bad spot up shooting team, but the numbers show that they are.  According to Synergy, the the Celtics are 27th in the NBA in terms of points per possession (.912 PPP) and 23rd in the league in terms of FG% (38.8%).  The biggest reason why the Celtics are so poor spotting up statistically is because of Glen Davis.  Davis is a very poor shooter when he is catching and shooting on the outside, but that hasn’t stopped him from attempting the second most catch and shoot jumpers, only behind Kevin Garnett.  On those shots, Davis is shooting 33.6%.  Davis is much more effective cutting to the rim (like we have seen above), and putting his head down and attacking the rim.

On this play, Davis sets an off ball screen and flares out to the corner, getting the basketball.  Instead of driving baseline and finishing at the rim (something he is very good at), he settles for the jumper (something that he is not good at).

If Davis continues to waste possessions taking jumpers, there is a chance he brings down the efficiency of the Celtics’ offense, and playing against the Knicks, a teams that can score in bunches, they can’t waste any possessions.

New York Knicks – The Numbers*

• Pace: 97.8 (3rd)
• Offensive Efficiency: 108.2 (7th)
• True Shooting Percentage: 56.0% (6th)
• Assist Rate: 19.60 (21st)
• Turnover Rate: 12.64 (5th)
• Offensive Rebound Rate: 24.43 (24th)
• Free Throw Rate: 30.4 (11th)
• Three Point Rate: 29.8 (2nd)

New York Knicks – Strengths

Isolation

Even though many (including myself) may think the New York Knicks tend to rely on isolations way too much, there is no denying that they have players who can score effectively out of isolation.  Both Carmelo Anthony and Amar’e Stoudemire are in the top half of the league in terms of PPP on isolation sets.

When Carmelo Anthony isolates, he likes to get the ball on the right side of the court, doing so 45.0% of the time.  When he gets the ball he is going to do one of two things, either take a jumper without dribbling (does this 50% of the time) or drive to the left (does this 33% of the time).  In both situations, Anthony is very effective, posting a PPP of over 1.

Here, Anthony makes the catch on the wing and faces up on his man.  With his dribble still live, he feels his man has stepped up too far to him and just beats him off of the dribble with the left hand.  What makes Anthony so hard to guard is that he almost explodes out of these situations.  He isn’t the quickest player in the league, but he has one of the quickest first steps, and that allows him to get his defender on his hip.  Once that happens, it is all over for the defense.

Something that the Knicks give Anthony the freedom to do is actually bring the basketball up and take it to a spot on the court where he can isolate his man.  When Anthony does this, he is taking the basketball to the right wing.  I have noticed that when Anthony does bring the basketball up like this, he almost always takes a jumper without penetrating (compared to when he makes the catch on the wing, he likes to drive left):

On all of these plays, Carmelo Anthony is bringing the basketball up and dribbles into his own isolation set.  With Anthony already dribbling the basketball up, the defender tends to play back on his heels a little bit.  Anthony uses that to his advantage, and when the defense plays back, Anthony is able to pull up for the jumper.

When Amar’e Stoudemire isolates, he likes to get the ball at the top of the key (45.8% of the top, Stoudemire isolates at the top of the key).  What makes him so hard to defend is that he can, and will, do one of three actions.  That is drive left, right, or shoot it.  He does all three actions evenly (drives left 31.3%, right 36.7%, and shoots it 32% of the time), and all three successfully so the defense can’t sit one action or force him to a weakness:

These three videos is exactly what makes Stoudemire so dangerous when isolated at the top of the key.  He can do everything well, so he just reads the defense and takes what they give him.  If they play him right, he drives left and vice versa.  If they back up on him, he pulls the jumper.  There isn’t a set way to stop Stoudemire on the top of the key, because you can’t force him to a weakness.

New York Knicks – Weaknesses

Cuts

The Knicks’ biggest strength also leads to the Knicks’ biggest weakness, and that is cutting off of the basketball.  When either Carmelo Anthony or Amar’e Stoudemire get the basketball in isolation situations, their teammates tend to stand there and watch the action.  This is what has lead to the Knicks only using the cut as part of their offense 6% of the time.  With a team that has two players who can isolate their man like Anthony and Stoudemire, you would expect that cut number to be higher.

This is because defenses tend to load up against a guy when he isolates.  As we have seen with the Celtics’ offense, when teams load up, cutting lanes are open.  When teams stand around and watch the basketball, they make things easier for the defense than it should be.

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*All numbers come from the fantastic website Hoopdata.com