Bad PNR Defense

This possession started with Derrick Rose dribbling the ball up and had Lamar Odom come from the low block to set a screen for Rose.  Odom originally sets up the screen on Rose’s right.

With the screen taking place, Marc Gasol (Odom’s defender) shows really hard:

The purpose of Gasol’s hard show is to prevent Rose from getting in the paint (which is key when defending the pick and roll).  However, Gasol commits before Rose even chooses a direction, and that is way too early.  Reacting to Gasol’s hard hedge, Odom simply switches sides on the screen:

With Rose going to the opposite side Gasol was showing on, his is completely out of position and the lane is wide open, allowing for Rose to attack:

By the time Gasol recovers, it is too late and he can’t do anything to prevent the lay-up.  Here is the play on real time, focus on the initial PNR defense by Spain:

Placement of Team USA’s Shooters

The second factor that freed up the lane for Team USA is the way that Coach K placed their shooters.  Sure, the play that Team USA is running is just a pick and roll, but it is more complicated than that.  Kevin Durant and Chauncey Billups, who were USA’s best three point shooters during the game (Durant: 2/5 – Billups: 2/3), were positioned on the same side outside the three point line.  This effected Spain’s ability to help on Rose’s penetration.  Before we look at the video, let’s look at the design via FastDraw:

With Marc Gasol (x5) showing so hard, Rose decides to go to the opposite side.  As he starts his penetration, Spain’s defenders (x4 & x5) are right up on both Durant and Billups (in the red).  They should be in the paint more, ready to help and cut off any dribble-drive from Derrick Rose (the blue).

With the lane now clear, it is a race between Derrick Rose and Marc Gasol who tries to get over from his position where he was showing on the PNR.  Even with the basketball, Rose wins that race.

Again, here is the play live.  When watching it this time, focus on the defenders on the strong side and take notice of their hesitation to help Rubio on the dribble-drive (in fact, all Durant’s man can muster is a weak reach-in that doesn’t do him any good):

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As you can see, this lay-up by Rose isn’t on Rubio, and it isn’t really fair to place the blame on him for this play.  This isn’t to say Rubio is a good defender, far from it actually, but when you see a lay-up a pick and roll, it usually isn’t the fault of the defender covering the ball-handler.  In this case it was Marc Gasol’s for showing too hard initially, and the strong side help defenders who were hesitant to leave their men.

Bucks vs. Mavs

With 0.3 seconds left, the Bucks were holding onto a 2 point lead.  Here, there is just enough time for a catch and shoot, but more than likely the opposing team would be running a play right at the rim:

As the ball gets to the trigger man, J.R. Giddens gets a staggered double screen set for him from the two Dallas Mavericks’ bigs.  These screens are set so Giddens can curl around the screens and get freed up by at least one of the screens.

As this takes place, Dominique Jones flashes from the weak-side block to the ball side corner.  His defender, Dominic James, stays attached to his hip and follows him into the corner.  Now, we have talked about Jones lack of a jump shot, so there is no real reason to follow him into the corner.  James’ best bet would have been to let Jones run to the corner uncontested and stay in the paint to defend any lob.

With James running into the corner, the weak-side is completely left undefended by the Bucks.  Larry Sanders is covering a Mavs’ big man setting a screen.  He is right on his hip instead of being in help position, another mistake.

With the ball in the air, Sanders seems to see what is up, and he tries to recover to J.R. Giddens, who is cutting to the basket undefended.

Giddens makes the catch at the rim and hits the buzzer-beater, sending the game into overtime.  Here is the play in real time:

Bucks vs. Grizzlies

The next game, the Bucks were faced with yet another late game situation.  This time, there was .7 seconds left for the Grizzlies to try and win the game.  It’s funny, the Grizzlies come out in a similar set that the Mavs used a day earlier.  The one difference is that instead of the three ball-side players being in a straight line, you have two players bunched next to each other with another in the block.

As the basketball gets handed to the trigger man, both players (one big man and one guard) start towards the block at the same time.

As the big man stops and sets a screen in the middle of the lane, the guard cuts to the corner off a screen being set.  At the same time, Sam Young takes a few steps to the corner and then quickly changes directions, flashing to the top of the key off of the screen that is being set in the middle of the lane.  His defender, DeMarcus Nelson bites hard on the flash to the corner and runs himself out of position.

Sam Young is now running to the top of the key with nobody near him.  Not only is this important because he will be able to get up an uncontested shot, but because he is so wide open he can turn into the ball before making the catch.  While this doesn’t sound like a big deal, it saves valuable tenths of a seconds in a late-game situation like this.  Another thing to look at is the man defending the inbounder, Deron Washington.  Washington is doing a good job being active and taking away the pass to the corner, but that isn’t where the ball is going, and he leaves the passing lane to Sam Young wide open.

Sam Young makes the catch, rises, and fires before the Bucks can get someone to close out on him.  Here is the play in real time:

I think that the Wizards have done a pretty good job of getting the ball to Thabeet where he can just catch and go up with it.  Everyone knows that Thabeet is raw, so if he can get the ball right at the basket, he can use his size advantage to finish at the rim:

On this play, the Wizards are working in transition, with Thabeet getting out in front of everyone.

The Wizards’ point guard does a great job of lobbing it in to Thabeet, allowing him to use his size to make the catch and finish at the rim.

This next play comes from a side out set, and it shows how determined the Wizards are to get the ball to Thabeet in positions where he can succeed.

Here, Thabeet sets a downscreen for the Wizards’ point guard, who comes off of the screen hard, looking for the ball.

As the point guard comes off the screen, Thabeet quickly turns and seals his man.

The beauty of this play was that it allowed Thabeet to get the ball in a one on one position in the post where no double team could come (the Defenders’ point guard needs to stay with his man, and there is a pick action on the other side that will prevent a double).

You almost wish that Thabeet’s man didn’t go for the steal because you would like to see him work one-on-one with his back to the basket, but Thabeet does a nice job of finishing at the rim strong.  This is all from the offensive side of the ball as I didn’t see too much from Thabeet on the defensive end, but he wasn’t on the court on the final play when the Wizards needed a stop.  I think that is pretty telling right there.

Mike Brown is a little at fault for LeBron’s poor fourth quarter.  Normally, coaches sit their starters towards the end of the third (with like 3 minutes left) and into the start of the fourth, usually getting them back in there with about 10 minutes left in the game.  The reason they sit them towards the end of the third is because you can steal a few minutes rest for your guy at the quarter break.  However, yesterday Mike Brown played the entire third quarter, and he then sat for the first 4 minutes in the fourth quarter, leaving him with only 8 minutes to work with.

LeBron actually entered the game with the Cavs leading by 2.  So I guess you can say that Mike Brown was justified in sitting LeBron for that long, and in a certain sense, that is right.  However, the longer LeBron sat, the longer it would take for LeBron to get into the flow of the game, and that is the issue here.  You can’t have your best player in a funk, during the most important part of the game (the fourth quarter).

Once we get into the game-action, this is all on LeBron.  There were a few reasons why he struggled in the final quarter yesterday.

Passive LeBron

LeBron is a great passer and totally trusts his teammates.  There isn’t anything wrong with that at all, especially with the way that he approaches it.  He gets his teammates involved early and tries to take over late.  For a player like LeBron, that is the perfect way to approach it, and this is another reason I would have liked to see LeBron get in the game a little sooner.  LeBron usually takes the first two to four minutes he enters the ballgame to try to get his teammates involved, and since he entered the game 2 minutes later then he usually does.  This leaves him with less time to get into attack mode.

Look at this possession.  It’s LeBron’s third of the fourth quarter (following a turnover and an assist to Shaq):

On this possession, LeBron gets it on the wing (on a very well designed play), and heads straight towards the rim.  Now, I have seen LeBron take that ball and put it in the hoop plenty of times from that spot, but this team he kicks it out to Mo Williams, who clanks a three pointer.

Content LeBron

LeBron took 5 shots in the fourth quarter.  Two of them were in the paint (a blocked lay-up and a made lay-up late) and three of them were from the outside.  The fact that LeBron tends to settle late is probably his biggest fault (in fact Kelly Dwyer did a great article on this subject today).

On this first shot, after two pick and pops, the Cavs finally get the ball into LeBron’s hands.  Now yes, there are about 6 seconds left on the shot clock so you can understand the jumper, but he stands there for 4 seconds with the ball in his hands, jab-stepping.  I think if LeBron attacks the basket right after the catch, he could have probably gotten a better look.  Also, this is LeBron’s first shot of the quarter, if I was a Cleveland fan, I would rather LeBron’s first shot after sitting out for a while be in the paint, instead of on the outside.

The second shot:

To LeBron’s credit, right before this possession, LeBron attacked the basket and was probably fouled by Dwight Howard.  They didn’t call it, and it was Cleveland’s ball coming out.  First, the inbounds play is pretty terrible.  LeBron starts at half court, and gets a half-assed screen, and he doesn’t get open.  The Cavs have to rush it in, the ball gets deflected, and it finally winds up in LeBron’s hands with like 10 seconds left.  He still has enough time to attack here, but instead, he just pounds the ball into the floor 6 times and pulls up for a three.  When LeBron is going to shoot a pull up three, you can almost tell.  He either starts a real high dribble, or he does this where he takes a ton of wasted dribbles.  Wasted dribbles are dribbles you don’t really need to take.  A LeBron James determined to get it to the basket doesn’t need 6 dribbles to get from the circle to the three point line.

Shot three:

Both of the first two shots come with the Cavs leading (almost making it worse), but with under 1 minute left, and the Cavs down 2, LeBron pulls another three pointer.  He inbounded the ball, got it right back, and pulled a 30 footer with 40 seconds left.  Now you are down 4 under 1 minute here, but you don’t necessarily need a three pointer.  If you get a two point shot off quick enough, you don’t even need to foul here.  This shot LeBron takes almost feels like he is rushing against the clock, when there is no need.  A better plan of attack here could have lead to a different ending for the game.

As the Cavs lined up, the play looked really familiar.  As a matter of fact, the play started the same was as the one from this past Sunday.

I don’t like tooting my horn (that’s a lie), but when I said the Cavs like to run this play late, little did I know that they were going to run it during their next game…against the same coach.  So back to last night:

There are some differences.  First, there aren’t 10 All-Stars on the court (there are 3/2 on the Nuggets), obviously.  This lead George Karl to do a few different things.  First, Karl has decided to put someone on the inbounder this time.  Why?  Well, in my opinion, with 1.9 seconds left a perfect pass is more valuable than when there is 7.7 seconds left (how much time was left in the All-Star game).  If Carmelo, the defender on the inbounder can force Anthony Parker in making a bad pass, the game is over (because if someone has to reach and catch an errant pass, the game is over before a shot can be attempted).  The second difference is who is covering LeBron.  At this point Kenyon Martin is covering LeBron while Arron Afflalo is covering Anderson Varejao.  This tells you that George Karl is anticipating a screen and that he is going to be switching it.

Mike Brown to his (dis) credit does something different than what Stan Van Gundy did.  He sends Boobie Gibson over the top of the three point line instead of down the baseline.  This doesn’t really make sense, because cutting this way doesn’t make him a threat at all in my opinion.  You also have Mo Williams in the corner.  We will get back to him.

LeBron pretends to set a screen for Mo Williams, even going as far as pretending to call him down the baseline.  Williams starts a cut, but for whatever reason, he doesn’t complete it and fades back into the corner.

After LeBron’s fake screen, he comes up the middle using a screen from Varejao.  However, the Nuggets switch it.  Why did Karl play this differently?  Well, in the All-Star game, you had Dwight Howard setting the screen for LeBron.  If you switch that, it leaves an opening for a lob pass to Dwight.  Karl comfortably switched last night, because they were not scared of a lob to Varejao.

Afflalo executes the switch on his end perfectly.  He gets right in the middle of the foul line, between the basketball and his man (LeBron).  This is going to force LeBron to venture way outside the three point line to catch the basketball.

LeBron finally gets around Afflalo, and now he is running away from the basket to make himself available.  Anthony Parker is holding onto the basketball because it is obvious that LeBron is the only option here.  For some absurd reason, Mike Brown sends his two best shooters away from the ball and put them in no position to make the catch.  The release valve on this play is Anderson Varejao running to the corner…really?  At the very least, you could have had Mo Williams sprint across the baseline into the corner.  At least the Nuggets would have to pay attention to him.

With Carmelo defending the inbound pass, LeBron has to go out even farther to get into Anthony Parker’s line of sight.  LeBron makes the catch 40-45 feet away from the basket.  LeBron then slips as he makes the catch, struggles to keep his balance and then takes two dribbles.

After those two dribbles, LeBron takes a long-three with a hand in his face.  He is about 30-35 feet away from the basket at this point.  Here it is in real time (and again in slow motion):

The Quick Three

The Grizzlies come out of a timeout down by 5.  Now they have two options they can either go for the 2 or go for the 3.  The key though is that they need to get a shot at the rim quickly (we will get to that in a minute).  Mayo sets the downscreen for Zach Randolph in attempt to free him up at the top of the key.

Randolph gets a few feet of separation, and Rudy Gay quickly gets the ball into his hands.  This is important, because some plays that I have broken down on here in the past shows that inbounders can hold onto the ball for a little too long, and that can mess up the flow of the entire play.  Here though, Randolph gets him the ball in a position to operate.

Randolph makes the catch and puts the ball on the floor.  As he does this, Mayo is coming over the top for a dribble-handoff.  I love this call.  This gives Randolph options.  He can either hand it off if he feels like Mayo is going to be open or he could fake the handoff and get a lane at the basket.  Either way, this allows for something to happen quickly.

Randolph makes the hand-off and then gets a piece of Mayo’s defender, freeing him up a bit.  Bargnani is late recognizing the pick, and he doesn’t get a closeout quick enough.

This allows Mayo to set up for a wide open three.  He knocks it down.

This play ran 5 seconds off the clock.  Going quick was so key here, because now that they scored there is still 32 seconds left.  This allows them to play defense and try to get a stop without having to foul.  Going quick and setting up a 2 for 1 late is so important to me that I would almost rather see my team take a poor quick shot instead of working it around and getting a good shot with less than 24 seconds left.  That is how important it is.

The Stop

After making the basket, Toronto doesn’t call a timeout, they inbound it and Memphis decides to put some pressure on the ball.

The pressure works, and now there are seven seconds on the shot clock, and the Raptors haven’t even started their offense.  Calderon still has his back to the basket, there is no way you can get a good shot starting the offense with 7 seconds left.

Calderon dribbles off of a Bosh screen, but again being passive, he picks up the ball 5 feet behind the three point line.  He can’t do anything from there, so he swings the ball to Bargnani.

Randolph closes hard on Bargnani, who does a great job of penetrating.  The problem is that with only 3 seconds left on the shot clock, there is no way he is going to get all they way to the rim, or even have the time to penetrate and kick.

Bargnani ends up taking a rushed jumper at the elbow.  I know Wright is wide open in the corner, but you can’t make that pass.  Think about it, if he does, it will take a second for the ball to travel to the corner, and it will force him into a rushed three.  Not really a better option (actually a worse one because threes result in longer rebounds).

The Break

Coming off Bargnani’s missed jumper, Mike Conley grabs the rebound with 7.4 seconds left.  The Grizzlies don’t call a timeout, they quickly go.  Look at Rudy Gay, as soon as he Conley secure the rebound, he takes off.  This is going to be very important later.

Conley does the smart thing and keeps the ball in the middle of the court.  This allows him to have a passing lane on both sides.  This is a problem for the two defenders back for the Raptors.

Conley does another smart thing in keeping his dribble until a defender meets him.  When Calderon comes up to stop Conley’s attack, it opens up a lane for Zach Randolph.

Conley makes the pass and Randolph finishes at the rim.  This ties the game, and after the Raptors miss a buzzer beater, the Grizzlies take the momentum and end up running away with the game in overtime.

Lamar Odom pulls down a rebound and brings it up court.  This is a pretty common sight if you are a Lakers’ fan.  Odom is a terrific rebounder, but he also has the ball handling ability to bring the ball up the court as well.

What is different is when it gets to the halfcourt.  Instead of getting the ball into Kobe’s hands, Odom holds onto it and and Pau comes over to set the screen for him.  Now this isn’t a “true Pick & Roll,” it is just designed to try and get Gasol in a good post position.

As you can see, Odom doesn’t really try to penetrate off the pick, he just gives it a second, and gets the ball inside to Gasol.  Now look where he catches it.  Since the Warriors have nobody to bang with him inside he will be able to take his time and getting into scoring position.

Remember where he caught it?  Well, look where he is now.  Right in the block, and he pulls off a very nice spin move and finishes with the lay-in.

Now I am not saying that they don’t go into Gasol late when Kobe is in the game, they do, but it always seems to be a second or third option (and not that I blame Kobe, who is a great scorer).  Without Kobe in the game, it is obvious that the Lakers are actively looking to get the ball to Pau late, and against the Warriors (a team with no real big man), that makes sense.

The play is designed for LeBron to come up the middle and off of a Dwight Howard screen.  As this happens, Dywane Wade and Paul Pierce switch.  The purpose of this is to prevent their defenders from helping on LeBron’s drive after he makes the catch.

The first thing you notice from a Western All-Star perspective is how they defend this.  Carmelo Anthony uses his body and just puts himself in between LeBron and Dwight Howard.  This prevents LeBron from getting off the screen cleanly, and that is what keeps him from getting open.  Kevin Durant is the second thing you notice.  He isn’t even worried about defending the inbounder.  His one  job is to double anyone who gets in his area (my guess is that George Karl knew that either LeBron or Wade were going to come off a screen).

So as LeBron comes off on the opposite side of the Dwight Howard screen (if he went the other way around the screen he would of had a cushion for a lob to get the ball, but because because Carmelo bodied him up he couldn’t go that way) and Kevin Durant doubles him.

LeBron now has no way to get the ball, so Dwight Howard has to come meet the basketball.  Here that is a problem, because Dwight Howard is an All-Star, but when you are playing the Cavs, that is either Shaq, Varejao, or Big Z.  I think that teams would rather have any of those three make the catch instead of LeBron.

Why is this a good way to defend LeBron moving forward?  Well, this is a type of play the Cavs like to run (see his shot against the Magic in the playoffs).  Their goal is to get LeBron the ball up top and let him work (It makes sense, he is only the best basketball player on the planet).  If you can keep him from catching the ball and funnel it to one of their big guys, you win the possession.

Now what can the Cavs do to counter this (the guy defending the inbounder doubling)?  Well, the Cavs’ best counter would be to have a shooter (Boobie Gibson/Mo Williams) inbound the ball.  That forces the defense to gamble.  The defense would then have to decide whether to let LeBron catch it or let Mo Williams get off an open shot.

Spurs’ Pick & Roll

I know what you are thinking.  A pick and roll?  How is that good play calling?  Well, let’s take a closer look to see how good it is:

Tony Parker gets the pick, not from Tim Duncan, but from Antonio McDyess.  Tim Duncan, as you can see is setting up on the low block.  The purpose of this play is to isolate Duncan’s defender, Pau Gasol.

To achieve this isolation, Tony Parker needs to get by the hedge.  Look how he does it.  Tony Parker is already a small point guard, but he gets even smaller, getting under Odom’s arm and past his hedge.

This now achieves the Spurs’ goal.  The Spurs now have Pau Gasol trying to defend two people.  He has to make a decision, either let Tony Parker get to the basket.  Or help, and leave Tim Duncan.  It is a lose-lose situation.

Gasol helps, and Parker is able to spot Duncan open in the lane.

Duncan makes the catch and finishes strong at the hoop.  Here is the play in real time:

Shannon Brown’s Lob

Here is Phil Jackson’s contribution to the Xs and Os fest.  This is the Lakers’ first possession at the start of the half, and this was definitely drawn up in the locker room:

Derrick Fisher passes the ball to the wing, and starts to cut backdoor, off of a Pau Gasol screen.  Or at least that is what it looks like.

Fisher breaks off his backdoor cut, and releases to the three point line.  This action makes it look like the Lakers are trying to run a quick-hitter for a three pointer.  The Spurs are buying into this defensively.  George Hill is focusing on Fisher, and this allows for Brown to start his backdoor cut for the lob unnoticed.

As Fisher continues his release, Tony Parker follows him out to the three point line.  Tim Duncan also relaxes his help responsibilities because he thinks there is no longer a cut coming.  Or at least that is what he thinks.

Brown takes off for the lob and makes the catch, and finishes with the dunk.  This was a great play design, and a slight breakdown by the Spurs (George Hill obviously didn’t let Tim Duncan know that the cut was coming) allowed for the Lakers to start the half with a ton of momentum, as well as getting the crowd into it.

Yeah, the title was an excuse just to post that video. Anyway, after Nazr Mohammed’s bucket with 1:38 left cut the lead to 1, the Bobcats were looking to get a stop to get a chance to win the game:

Kobe was only 2-12 with 5 points this game, so the Lakers come down, and they look to go straight to the block with Pau before Kobe even gets a touch.

After the entry pass is made, Ron Artest cuts off of Gasol towards the baseline.  A lot of teams do this, and the reason is that this is done is to prevent the double team.  The most common double team comes from the entry pass, but if the person making the entry cuts, there is no time to get the double.

After Artest and the rest of the Lakers clear out, Gasol starts to make his move.  Nazr Mohammed actually does a pretty good job of making him start his dribble from the mid-post, but unless the Bobcats send a double-team, it won’t matter because Gasol is strong enough just to back Mohammed down to a scoring area.  So who is going to double?  You can’t come over the top, because Flip can’t leave Kobe.  The next best bet is Raymond Felton leaving Jordan Farmer and doubling him.

That doesn’t happen though, so Gasol is able to get himself to the block, and he finishes with a hook.

After this, Lamar Odom gets a tip in and Nazr Mohammed makes two foul shots. The Bobcats then force Kobe into a missed three point shot, so with 9 seconds left the Bobcats have the ball with a chance to tie the game.

This is a well designed play the Bobcats are going to try to run, but it is poorly executed in my opinion.  You have Flip Murry come off a double screen.

After that Boris Diaw comes off of a Nazr Mohammed screen.  The problem is that he goes a tad bit too early, and that starts to clog everything up right there.  The final part of this play is Raymond Felton coming off another Nazr Mohammed screen.

Now Felton doesn’t curl this screen enough, and he kind of fades to the half court.  This allows Jordan Farmar to recover and make up the space that the screen got Felton.

Steven Jackson pump fakes towards Felton, and now he seems to be in trouble.  He kind of just focuses in on Felton, when he could have hit is release valve, Nazr Mohammed.  He could have gotten the ball to him, and then went and got it.  At that point, that is better than forcing the ball to someone else.

Instead, he holds onto the ball for another second.  Now you have two guys (Raymond Felton and Nazr Mohammed) running to the basketball.  When you have guys running to the ball on an inbounds situation, you are in trouble (especially when it is two guys).  You have so many bodies in such a tight space, it is hard to complete the pass.

And that is exactly what happens here.  Farmar gets his hands on the pass to Felton, and the ball bounces around and finally lands in Gasol’s hand.  Game over.