In the playoffs, teams become intimately familiar with each other.  From advanced scouts to video databases, teams come in extremely well prepared on personal, tendencies and situation specific sets.  It’s often argued whether or not coaches matter in the NBA, but there are two obvious aspects that a coach directly affects: play time allocation and tactical adjustments.

In game two of their first round matchup, the Dallas Mavericks found themselves in another tight game against the Oklahoma City Thunder..  Early in the fourth quarter, Mavericks head coach Rick Carlisle went to a small line up of Jason Kidd, Jason Terry, Vince Carter, Shawn Marion, and Dirk Nowitzki.

With this lineup on the floor, the Mavs showed a play that starts with: Carter on the weak-side block, Marion and Nowitzki in a perpendicular double screen, Terry heading down the strong-side of the floor, and Kidd bringing up the ball:

The play begins with Carter coming across to set a cross screen for Terry:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ge4u77I0QY&w=420&h=243]

As Terry goes underneath Carter’s screen, Harden plays off Carter to deny a direct pass under the basket.  Off the cross screen, Terry heads directly to the perpendicular double screen.  Carter drifts to the corner and Marion ducks in the lane towards the strong-side block.  The Thunder play the double screen straight, with Russell Westbrook trailing and Serge Ibaka sticking with Nowitzki, allowing Terry to catch the pass off the double.  Terry chooses to enter the ball into Nowitzki and the two immediately engage in a pick and pop with Terry as the screener.  Westbrook hedges softly as Ibaka fights over the top of the screen, giving Dirk a small window to hit Terry on the pop.  With the entire left side of the floor clear, Terry quickly attacks the feet of the scrambling Westbrook and is able to draw the foul.

Later in the quarter, the Mavs go back to the same lineup and the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LS6_ufep8Z8&w=420&h=243]

Again we see Terry go underneath the cross screen set by Carter.  Marion ducks across and Carter drifts to the corner to form a weak-side “Triangle Away.” Harden plays off Carter to deny and Westbrook trails Terry who continues on to the double screen.  This time, Kendrick Perkins is on Nowitzki and he decides to step out to deny Terry penetration.  Terry gets the ball to Dirk, who also takes advantage of the cleared left side by driving to the basket.  Harden and Durant both go to help Perkins, leaving two Thunder defenders to guard three Mavericks shooters.  The ball is promptly swung to Terry who misses the wide open three.  However, Dirk uses some veteran savvy and ends the Mavs possession with free throws.

On the next possession, the Mavericks run the same play on the other side of the floor:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbjO_vOO1EA&w=420&h=243]

When Carter goes to set the cross screen, the Mavericks know Harden will play off Carter, so the Mavs make a subtle adjustment.  Terry doesn’t bother to go under Carter’s screen, instead Carter uses Terry to seal Harden on the block.  Harden plays solid defense, but Carter uses his size to back into the paint and is able to rise up over the contest to hit a tough banker.

Once again, the Mavericks go back to the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrFupHibT3I&w=420&h=243]

This time Terry goes under Carter’s cross screen.  Harden denies Carter in the post and Westbrook goes over the top of the screen to deny the direct pass to Terry under the basket.  Kidd attempts to lob the ball over Harden’s denial, but the pass sails on him and Durant is there to steal the ball (as he was playing Marion, who was preparing to duck across).

Unlike the NFL, the NBA season is too long for teams to truly hold onto trump cards.  Eventually, teams must show their hand.  As teams become more familiar with each other, in game adjustments become more crucial.  A coach’s experience making these adjustment not only shifts the outcome of games, but may help determine who is eventually crowned champion.

Joon Kim is the author of NBA Breakdown, and its subsidiaries, Spurs Motion Offense and The Triangle Offense — a tree of sites dedicated to basketball fundamentals.  You can follow Joon on Twitter: @JoonKim00.

On Sunday afternoon against the Heat, Rajon Rondo had his way with the Miami Heat defense en route to his fifth triple-double of the season. It was hard not to notice him as he did it either. Multiple Celtic possessions featured Rondo galloping into the paint unmolested, a trend that helped a rather pedestrian Boston offense suddenly look invincible despite the absence of Ray Allen.

Most have pointed to Erik Spoelstra’s decision to go over the top of any Rondo pick and rolls as the primary culprit. But in the NBA, it is important to remember two very important keys. First; pick and roll defense is always based off who is involved and in what area of the floor. The second is that on the NBA level, whatever the coverage is, a team is always going to be giving something up.

That second part is particularly important to note when looking at the pick and roll action involving Rondo and Paul Pierce. The standard line of thinking with that duo, when the screen is set in the middle of the floor, is stay attached (or jam) with Pierce’s defender and have Rondo’s defender go under. In theory, that coverage should leave the only thing open a Rondo shot. And if we go by Key #2, a Rondo jumper from 15+ feet seems like an okay thing to give up.

However, because Rondo is so explosive at turning the corner on the ball screen, the on-ball defender, who must go under at an angle to cut off any deep penetration near the rim, finds himself at a severe disadvantage. This forces the hedging defender (assigned to Pierce) to stay with Rondo longer than he would like.

All Pierce has to do is simply screen and pop back behind the three-point line and waits for the pass. On the catch, Pierce simply reads the closeout. In the following edit, Pierce not only picks and pops for 3, but is also able to counter into a shot-fake attack and get to the rim. Take a look.

The scary part is that’s not the only negative result teams can experience from this stay-attached-and-go-under coverage. Much like Dallas does with Dirk, Pierce can cleverly (and illegally) bull rush or move into the defender going underneath and force a switch. Naturally, a pinch post isolation match-up between Pierce and a small guard is hardly a good result for a defense off this action.

Pierce misses the shot in the clip, but the bottom line is he was able to engineer a switch onto a 5’9” guard at the nail. In theory the “stay-attached and go-under” coverage seems like the right ploy because it should force Rondo to be the scoring option. In practice, teams end up with Pierce getting all the great looks.

As they did prep work for the Boston match-up, Spoelstra and his staff must have decided the key to defending this action was to keep the ball out of Pierce’s hands. The way to do that was to switch up the coverage to a “show and over” scheme.

The coverage is just like it sounds, the player guarding the screener shows hard, forcing the ball handler to re-direct towards halfcourt while the on-ball defender goes over the top of the screen. By going over the screening Pierce, the on-ball defender took the option of being dragged into a switch off the table. Hedging hard allowed the Pierce’s defender a much better chance at not being forced into a long a closeout. So what does a coverage like that give up? Take a look at the following clip.

Of the three clips, the ideal result was the Rondo floater. Assuming the on-ball defender doesn’t make a heroic effort at getting back in front while going over the top of the screen, a mid-range Rondo shot is what that coverage is conceding to give up. Given the hierarchy of efficient basketball shots, a floater from Rondo seems to be a better option than an open Pierce 3-point shot or attack on the rim.

While the other results make it seem like the coverage was a complete and abject failure, it actually hides the fact that it accomplished one key goal: it kept Pierce from getting the ball. And for those still skeptical, the coverage does actually work. Check it out.

In the last clip, the Nuggets execute incredibly well and completely stop the play. That was what Miami was hoping to get out of the scheme except they were quicker rotations and better awareness from help defenders away from accomplishing that.

Greg Popovich has made an amazing career of using the regular season in a way that better prepares his teams for the post season. Spoelstra’s decision is in that same vein. Should Miami go to war with Boston in a playoff series this spring, the Heat are now better prepared to stop them. In the end, Spoelstra essentially tried something new in a relatively meaningless game and it failed (rather miserably). It doesn’t mean, however, that it wasn’t worth trying.

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Last night against the Dallas Mavericks, the Minnesota Timberwolves found themselves down five points with 56 seconds left in the game with possession.  If the Timberwolves were able to get a basket here, it would be a one possession game they would be able to put pressure on the Mavericks with the hope of getting a stop.  Instead, the Timberwolves didn’t run much of a play and it resulted in a turnover:

This play starts with a double pindown screen to get the ball in Wayne Ellington’s hands.  However, after that there is nothing else happening.  You have the remaining three players standing around the perimeter and Anthony Randolph standing at the high post.  Eventually the ball gets to Jonny Flynn in the corner, and Flynn attacks the rim and makes a terrible decision to kick the ball out, leading to a turnover.

My problem here is this, what are the Timberwolves running?  It isn’t a straight isolation because Anthony Randolph is standing at the top of the key.  Was the ball supposed to go to Randolph?  Was there supposed to be a drive and kick?  We don’t know, and I think it is safe to say that the players don’t know either, and that is a problem.

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As you may notice, I haven’t been posting here at NBAPlaybook the past couple of days (don’t worry, I will recap the weekend’s events at some point).  The reason why is because I am at MIT Sloan Sports Analytic Conference here in Boston.  It is a two day event, and one of my favorite panels of day one was the last one of the day looking at how coaches make decisions.  Do they use their gut, or do they use data?

Bringing this back to basketball, both R.C. Buford and Del Harris (who were both a part of this panel), were in agreement when it came to making decisions based on preparation and data vs. gut feeling. For Buford, he tends to shy away from gut decisions because it makes it harder to take a step back and analyze those decisions after the fact. If you get the decision wrong, you don’t know why, but maybe more importantly, if you get it correct, you don’t know how to duplicate it.

Head on over to TrueHoop to check out the rest

The New Jersey Nets shocked the NBA world by trading Devin Harris/Derrick Favors and some draft picks for point guard Deron Williams on Wednesday.  This is a great trade for New Jersey, considering they rank just 28th in the NBA in terms of offensive efficiency, scoring 99.4 points per 100 possessions.  Without changing anything, the Nets are already a better team offensively, but if coach Avery Johnson wants to take full advantage of Deron Williams and his skills, there are a few things that he can do.

Keep Current Pace

The Nets’ pace is the first clash of styles between Williams and coach Johnson.  Even back with Dallas, Avery Johnson preferred a slower pace, and he has brought that to New Jersey, as they currently have a pace of 91.8 possessions per game, good for 4th slowest in the NBA.  Deron Williams, on the other hand, is a guy who wants to get out and run, trying to score in transition.

So what pace should the Nets play at now?  In my opinion, the Nets need to stay closer to their current pace rather than turning Nets’ games into track meets.  The reason why is because Deron Williams is a worse player in transition when compared to the half court.  In the half court, Williams posts a PPP (points per possession) of 0.95, which ranks him better than 76% of NBA players (108th).  In transition, Williams posts a PPP of 1.12 good for just 191st in the NBA.

Williams struggles in transition because he tends to force the issue, trying to create transition opportunities when they aren’t there:

Here Williams gets the basketball and he starts to push it against the defense.  All five defenders are back, Williams is unable to get a lane, gets caught in the air, and ends up turning it over.

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With Jerry Sloan stepping down, there are a lot of reports that Sloan decided to step down after growing tired of butting heads with Deron.  The two have reportedly but heads all season, with things really getting heated on Wednesday.  Again, according to reports, a lot of the stuff between Williams and Sloan was due to different mindsets when it came to the issue of halfcourt offense vs. transition offense.  I don’t think I need to tell you who was in favor of what, but here is an interesting excerpt from Jack McCallum’s great piece on Sloan from yesterday:

And there are reports that his talented point guard, Deron Williams, was growing upset with the Sloan half-court system, believing that more transition offense (and a few different players) was the way for the Jazz to climb out of their doldrums.

After looking at the numbers and watching through the tape you can see why both Williams and Sloan feel the way that they do, and video evidence suggests that this (whether or not to run more) is why their relationship deteriorated.

Why Williams Wants To Run?

The Utah Jazz actually lead the league in points per possession in transition with a PPP of 1.231 on 63.1% shooting (also first in the league in transition).  However, despite the positive numbers, the Jazz don’t run all that much, with only 13.1% of their total possessions labeled as “transition” by Synergy Sports Technology, which is only the 11th most in the NBA.

So if you are Deron Williams and you are seeing your team putting up solid number both in terms of scoring and in terms of shooting percentage, you are probably going to wonder why the team doesn’t run more than it does.  Also, you are going to believe that if you run more that you can keep the efficiency levels the same.

Why Sloan Doesn’t Want To Run?

Now, Sloan has always been a guy who ran a half court offense, so some of this has to do with him not wanting to change his system (and rightfully so, if you ask me).  However, in addition to that, there are numbers that suggest running might not be the best thing for this Jazz team.  First, the Jazz turn the ball over a lot in transition, posting a team turnover percentage of 13.0% when in transition, which is just 24th in the NBA.  So while the Jazz are posting a high shooting percentage, Sloan probably thinks his team can be more efficient in the halfcourt where they turn the ball over much less (12.3% of halfcourt possessions – 7th lowest TO%), giving them more possessions.

Another reason why Sloan may not want to run is because Deron Williams isn’t a very good point guard in transition.  Williams is posting a PPP of 1.16 when in transition which is 164th in the NBA.  This is due mostly to turnovers as Williams is turning the ball over on 15.5% of his individual transition possessions which is good for a ranking of 246th.

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Last night against the Indiana Pacers, the Golden State Warriors had a 1 point lead with 0.6 seconds left after a Monta Ellis jumper. The Pacers obviously wanted to try and get a lob to tie the game, but the Warriors did a good job of protecting the rim:

Here, Brandon Rush makes a backcut to the rim, but Monta Ellis does a good job of standing between Rush and the rim. He is able to get in that position because he isn’t really worried about a three point shot. The Warriors also switch the Hansboro screen for Danny Granger, meaning that Granger’s cut to the rim is well defended. The Pacers can’t get anyone open and are forced to call a timeout.

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After a missed jumper, the Indiana Pacers gained control of the basketball up by 4 points with 42 seconds left on the clock.  There was some confusion between coach Doug Collins and PG Jrue Holiday.  The result is what John Schuhmann called a candidate for the dumbest foul of the year.  It’s hard to argue with him.

Let’s look at the actual foul itself first.  It’s a pretty dumb decision in that if you are going to take the intentional foul, it should be as early in the clock as possible.  Holiday allowed 16 seconds to burn off the clock before taking the foul.  At that point, you might as well play straight defense and hope to get the basketball back off of a missed shot.

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When we last left Kurt Rambis, he was running an ISO set for Michael Beasley down three points, only after he displayed his questionable clock management skills.  Last night against the San Antonio Spurs, Coach Rambis found himself in a similar situation, trailing by three points with 40 second left in the game.  With Michael Beasley out due to injury, Rambis was unable to run an ISO for him and was forced to draw something else up:

The Timberwolves set up in a box set and Luke Ridnour starts from the block and splits Darko Milicic and Kevin Love, who are setting screens for him to come to the basketball.

As Ridnour starts to dribble out the clock, he gets two screens set for him, one on each side (with Milicic and Love setting those screens).

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In an interesting move, Spurs’ coach Gregg Popovich pulled his best players, essentially waving the white flag, with just about three minutes left and the Spurs down 10 points.  Sure, the Spurs have the Celtics tonight in the second game of a back to back, and he probably wanted to rest the starters, but I think this move had more to do with Popovich being upset at his guys, and if you watch the three defensive possessions before coach Popovice pulls his starters, you will understand why.

Possession 1: A Failed Zone

After Tim Duncan made a hook shot to cut the Knicks’ lead to five points, they retreat back into their zone:

The zone doesn’t surprise the Knicks at all, and they calmly get the ball to the middle of the court, and then swing it quickly around the perimeter and get an open three pointer out of it.

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