In game two of their first round matchup, the Dallas Mavericks found themselves in another tight game against the Oklahoma City Thunder..  Early in the fourth quarter, Mavericks head coach Rick Carlisle went to a small line up of Jason Kidd, Jason Terry, Vince Carter, Shawn Marion, and Dirk Nowitzki.

With this lineup on the floor, the Mavs showed a play that starts with: Carter on the weak-side block, Marion and Nowitzki in a perpendicular double screen, Terry heading down the strong-side of the floor, and Kidd bringing up the ball:

The play begins with Carter coming across to set a cross screen for Terry:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ge4u77I0QY&w=420&h=243]

As Terry goes underneath Carter’s screen, Harden plays off Carter to deny a direct pass under the basket.  Off the cross screen, Terry heads directly to the perpendicular double screen.  Carter drifts to the corner and Marion ducks in the lane towards the strong-side block.  The Thunder play the double screen straight, with Russell Westbrook trailing and Serge Ibaka sticking with Nowitzki, allowing Terry to catch the pass off the double.  Terry chooses to enter the ball into Nowitzki and the two immediately engage in a pick and pop with Terry as the screener.  Westbrook hedges softly as Ibaka fights over the top of the screen, giving Dirk a small window to hit Terry on the pop.  With the entire left side of the floor clear, Terry quickly attacks the feet of the scrambling Westbrook and is able to draw the foul.

Later in the quarter, the Mavs go back to the same lineup and the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LS6_ufep8Z8&w=420&h=243]

Again we see Terry go underneath the cross screen set by Carter.  Marion ducks across and Carter drifts to the corner to form a weak-side “Triangle Away.” Harden plays off Carter to deny and Westbrook trails Terry who continues on to the double screen.  This time, Kendrick Perkins is on Nowitzki and he decides to step out to deny Terry penetration.  Terry gets the ball to Dirk, who also takes advantage of the cleared left side by driving to the basket.  Harden and Durant both go to help Perkins, leaving two Thunder defenders to guard three Mavericks shooters.  The ball is promptly swung to Terry who misses the wide open three.  However, Dirk uses some veteran savvy and ends the Mavs possession with free throws.

On the next possession, the Mavericks run the same play on the other side of the floor:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbjO_vOO1EA&w=420&h=243]

When Carter goes to set the cross screen, the Mavericks know Harden will play off Carter, so the Mavs make a subtle adjustment.  Terry doesn’t bother to go under Carter’s screen, instead Carter uses Terry to seal Harden on the block.  Harden plays solid defense, but Carter uses his size to back into the paint and is able to rise up over the contest to hit a tough banker.

Once again, the Mavericks go back to the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrFupHibT3I&w=420&h=243]

This time Terry goes under Carter’s cross screen.  Harden denies Carter in the post and Westbrook goes over the top of the screen to deny the direct pass to Terry under the basket.  Kidd attempts to lob the ball over Harden’s denial, but the pass sails on him and Durant is there to steal the ball (as he was playing Marion, who was preparing to duck across).

Unlike the NFL, the NBA season is too long for teams to truly hold onto trump cards.  Eventually, teams must show their hand.  As teams become more familiar with each other, in game adjustments become more crucial.  A coach’s experience making these adjustment not only shifts the outcome of games, but may help determine who is eventually crowned champion.

Joon Kim is the author of NBA Breakdown, and its subsidiaries, Spurs Motion Offense and The Triangle Offense — a tree of sites dedicated to basketball fundamentals.  You can follow Joon on Twitter: @JoonKim00.

Gone is Tyson Chandler, who has taken his talents to the Big Apple this season to try to do for Carmelo Anthony what he did for Dirk Nowitzki. Just to give you an idea of how good Chandler was for the Mavs last year, Chandler finished in the top 1% of overall defense. That is a stat that is sure to make any club much better. Dallas finished last year with a .928 Points-Per-Possession, good enough for eighth in the NBA, according to Synergy Sports. Now, I don’t need to break down all the ways in which Chandler was a major asset to the Mavs, Sebastian Pruiti already did so over on Grantland.com.

The surprising turn of events has been that the Mavericks have been able to reproduce the success defensively this season that they showed last year, only minus Chandler. They are currently forth in the NBA in overall defense, coming in to today with a fantastic .859 PPP. Last season, back-up big men Ian Mahinmi played a small role on the team, accounting for only 12% of total minutes according to 82games.com. This year with Chandler gone, Mahinmi is now getting more minutes, his percentage playing time all the way up to 41%. So far, he has used his 6’11 frame to help contribute on his end to fill the shoes of Chandler.

Late in the game on Wednesday night, a game in which Rubio and the Timberwolves attacked the rim and got to the free throw line 33 times, they tried to again get to the paint create havoc. In this play, Mahinmi is going to hedge hard on Rubio, almost like a soft-double team, not worrying about the pick and pop from Pekovic.

Mahinmi is able to use his feet well and deter Rubio from thinking of a three-point attempt, then recovers to his man on the roll.

Finally, Mahinmi finishes the job with rolling onto his man, closing off any passing lane Rubio may have towards Pekovic, and contesting any shot that may come from Rubio. The play ends with a turnover as Rubio gets stuck underneath.

Brenden Haywood has also proved to be more than capable in the starting center role, starting every game so far this season. Haywood has always been known for his post-up defense, using his size and strength to keep opposing pivots as far away from the block as possible. A big reason why Dallas is second in the NBA in points in the paint defensively is because of him. 

Here, Haywood uses his strength to move Emeka Okafor off the block just enough that Okafor has to reach for the entry pass, causing Okafor to be off-balance. What Haywood is trying to do is stay body-to-body, letting his strength do the work and if need be, his length to go up and contest the shot or block it.

After letting Okafor try to back his way in deep, Haywood knows that if Okafor goes in either direction, he’s got him. He knows that each way Emeka turns, he’ll already have position on him and be able to make the shot a difficult one.

Haywood gets the block on Okafor that was set up by his being low, staying wide and using his length.

Most Dallas fans knew replacing Chandler wasn’t going to be easy. Until Wednesday night, the Mavs have made it seem so by holding opponents under 100 points for 15 consecutive games, a franchise record. Thanks to both Haywood and Mahinmi men, the Mavs are also currently ranked fourth in opponent FG%. With Dirk out of the line-up for the next week or so, the offense will have to pick up, but the defense is still the key if there is to be another ring ceremony.

Over the course of the entire season, Rick Carlisle did a fantastic job with the Dallas Mavericks.  However, he probably saved his best performance of the season for the NBA Finals.  Here is a look at the decisions that Carlisle made that lead the Mavericks to the NBA title:

Replacing Peja Stojakovic With Brian Cardinal

Going into the series, many people said that the Mavericks were going to have to make a change to their rotation if they wanted to come away with the win.  Sticking to his guns, Carlisle’s rotation in game one was the similar to his rotation during the first three rounds of the playoffs, with Carlisle bringing Peja Stojakovic on the floor when giving Dirk Nowitzki his usual first quarter break.  It didn’t work.

Stojakovic simply looked overmatched on both ends of the court.  On defense, there was nobody for him to match-up with, leaving him stuck on Chris Bosh at times and even LeBron James.  On the offensive end, Miami’s speed when rotating and closing out really bothered Stojakovic’s shot, and when he tried to put the basketball on the floor, it turned into a big mess.  In three games, Stojakovic played 31 minutes for a total +/- of -21.  Maybe the biggest example of Stojakovic’s negative impact is the following game three gameflow picture from the tremendous site PopcornMachine.net.  Whenever Stojakovic went into the ballgame, the Miami Heat went on a run.  It wasn’t a coincidence (click to enlarge):

With it becoming obvious that Stojakovic had to come out of the ballgame, there were calls for Corey Brewer, the logical replacement for Stojakovic.  However, instead of going with Brewer, Rick Carlisle turned to Brian Cardinal.  It sounds funny, and at times it looked even funnier (especially when Cardinal ran), but when you stop and think about it, it made sense.

Peja was a direct replacement for Dirk Nowitzki, going in during the middle of the first and third quarter, when Nowitzki got his normal break.  The result was that the Mavericks would go smallish and spread the court with a lineup of Kidd or Barea/Terry/Stojakovic/Marion/Chandler.  So instead of continuing to go small and replacing Stojakovic with Brewer, Carlisle went with a power forward.  Because it was a straight PF for PF substitution, Cardinal had a match-up on the defensive end, playing a big and hanging around the paint, ready to take a charge.  On the offensive end, Cardinal is enough of a shooting threat where the defense had to respect him, and he knocked down a few key threes when he was on the court.  The result was Cardinal posting a +/- of +6 in 30 minutes, a 27 point difference between him and Stojakovic.  Again, going back to PopcornMachine and looking at the gameflow for game 6, you can see the impact:

At the time, this looked like an interesting, yet gutsy, move by Carlisle.  In hindsight, it made a ton of sense, and Carlisle was able to see that ahead of time.

Taking Dirk Nowitzki Out Of Some Pick And Rolls

The pick and pop with Nowitzki setting the screen was Dallas’ go to play during the entire postseason (and most of the Finals as well).  However, towards the middle of the series, the Heat were starting to get into a rhythm defensively and they were having success stopping these pick and pops.  In fact, in game four (Dirk’s flu game), the Mavericks ran 9 pick and rolls with Nowitzki as the screener, and the result was just two points.  Instead of continuing to go with a play that wasn’t working, Carlisle simply took Dirk Nowitzki out of the pick and roll, using Dallas’ second big (mostly Tyson Chandler) as the screener.  Miami wasn’t prepared for this at all:

With Nowitzki not involved with the pick and roll, it screwed up Miami’s rotations as they now had to worry about two different things.  The pick and roll taking place and Dirk Nowitzki standing on the weakside.  Rotations came later than usual, sometimes not coming at all.  Also, it took Joel Anthony out of his role as a trapper (something he is very good at) and replaced him with Chris Bosh (something he isn’t that good at).

The result?  10 pick and rolls without Dirk Nowitzki in game four for 16 points.

Use Of The Zone

When I wrote my Finals preview here, I thought the Mavericks’ zone was going to play a huge role.  I thought that Dallas was going to play the zone at an even higher rate than they did during the regular season (10.7% of Dallas’ defensive possessions were zone) and I thought they were going to repeat, if not, exceed their success during the regular season, where they held opponents to 0.881 PPP on zone possessions during the regular season (especially considering that Miami struggled against the zone, scoring just 0.951 during the regular season against it.

I was wrong.  The Mavericks played zone on just 8.3% of their possessions (more than the 5% they averaged during the rest of the postseason, but less than their regular season rate), and they were bad at it.  On 44 zone possessions, the Heat scored 53 points for a whopping 1.20 points per possession.

Despite these numbers, the zone was a factor in two wins for the Mavericks (game 4 and game 6), and that was all due to timing, when the zone was first “sprung” on the Heat.  In game 4, Dallas played just 3 zone possessions, but it came in the 4th quarter, and it seemed to confuse the Heat and keep them on the outside.  Even when they scored, it came on a three point shot from Mike Miller, which you can argue is exactly what Dallas wanted.  They were able to get stops using the zone down first five points, then three, allowing themselves to get back in the game.

In game six, the Heat were on pace for 40 points in the first quarter, scoring 20 points in the first 5:41, before Carlisle went to the zone.  In 8 first quarter possessions after that, Heat scored just 7 points, finishing with 27 (also allowing Dallas to go from down 9 to up 5).  Did they play the zone a little too much considering Miami’s success?  Probably, but the zone’s success in this series was all about timing, and that is all Rick Carlisle.

Staggered Pick And Roll

Rick Carlisle first used this play against Miami late in game two, in large part sparking their comeback, and it gave the Heat fits every single time Dallas went to it during the rest of the series.  What made this play so successful is that it really took away Miami’s aggressiveness on the pick and roll.  Miami likes to use the big defending the screener to trap the ball handler (or at least provide some pressure).  When the staggered ball screen took place, it caused the Heat to pause, as they were unsure who should step up and who should rotate back.  In addition, it created a mess of bodies at the top of the key, clearing the backside for a roll where there was routinely one defender trying to defend two Mavericks.

By my count (and I admit, I could have missed a few of these), the Mavericks ran 12 staggered ball screens for a huge 22 points.  In a series where there were a bunch of games decided by 2 and 3 points, those 22 points are huge.

Adjusting The Offense Without Dirk Nowitzki

After the first three games, the Dallas Mavericks were playing terrible with Dirk Nowitzki off of the court, posting a +/- of -37 in the 20 minutes Nowitzki was on the bench.  After their loss in game three, the media were quick to point out that Nowitzki would have to sit even less (he sat 8 minutes in game 1 and 6 in game two and three).  Instead of doing that (Nowitzki sat 9 minutes in game 4 and 6, 8 minutes in game 5), Carlisle simply made changes to the Mavericks offense with Nowitzki on the bench.

Instead of running through their normal stuff, the Mavericks went to running simple pick and rolls anytime Nowitzki was on the bench.  Both Jason Terry and J.J. Barea would get more ball screens, allowing them to use their shooting ability and speed to create opportunities for themselves and others.  The result?  The Mavericks were +5 in the 26 minutes Nowitzki sat on the bench in games 4 through 6.  Sure, Barea, Terry, and Cardinal played better during the final three games, but part of that was Carlisle putting them in a position to play better.

After a Chris Bosh jumper midway through the first quarter, the Heat stretched their lead to nine, scoring 20 points in the first 5:41 of the game, and putting them on pace to score about 40 points.  Despite the Heat (and especially LeBron James) hitting jumper after jumper, the Dallas Mavericks went zone on the next possession, and played it for the remainder of the quarter.  The Heat scored just 7 points the rest of the quarter.

Possession 1 – LeBron James’ missed lay-up

Maybe the most surprising aspect of Dallas’ zone in the first quarter is that Miami didn’t look lost when first attacking the zone.  Instead of standing on the perimeter and failing to recognize the zone, Miami was ready for it and attacked it properly their first possession.  LeBron James gets under the basket and flashes towards the middle, gets the ball, pump fakes, and attacks the rim.  However, because of the zone defense, there is a second level of defense, and that is Tyson Chandler.  Chandler does a fantastic job of jumping straight up, avoiding contact, and contesting the shot, forcing a miss.

Possession 2 – Bosh Fouled (2 points/2 points total)

Taking the ball out of the side, Miami quickly attacks the mismatch that Dallas’ zone provides, getting the ball to Chris Bosh on the block as he is defending by Dirk Nowitzki.  After making the catch Bosh himself goes quickly before the zone can rotate over and challenge the shot, drawing the foul.

Possession 3 – LeBron James Missed Three

Despite the Heat attacking the zone properly, coach Carlisle decided to stick with the zone and it finally paid off on their third possession.  The Heat finally started playing into Dallas’ hands, with two quick passes around the perimeter and a LeBron James pass at the end of it.  Miami’s zone offense is to work the ball around and have their bigs (Haslem and Bosh) flash to the middle.  When Miami takes quick shots like this, they don’t work their offense and let the zone off the hook.

Possession 4 – Dwyane Wade Turnover

This is another possession where the Heat are taking the ball to the side and quickly try to get the ball to the opposite block where they think they have a mismatch. This time, LeBron James enters the ball directly to Wade on the block. However, instead of going quick (like Bosh did on the second possession), Wade hesitates. Finally, he is forced to try and thread the needle to Udonis Haslem. However, because of Wade’s hesitation, the zone has rotated over and they are able to force the turnover.

Possession 5 – Udonis Haslem Lay-up (2 points/4 points total)

After a few possessions where the Heat failed to attack the zone properly, they go back to doing it the right way.  James makes the catch on the wing as the defense closes out on him.  Instead of settling for a shot, James catches, drives, and kicks to Dwyane Wade.  Instead of Wade settling for a shot, Wade attacks and dishes it to Udonis Haslem diving through the middle.

Possession 6 – LeBron James Missed Three

All season, the Heat’s offense has been bi-polar.  They do something right, then they just stop.  After doing a great job of attacking on a hard closeout and starting a series of rotations that results in a lay-up, LeBron James finds himself in the same situation, catching a pass as the defense rotates towards him.  Instead of driving though, LeBron James settles for the three point shot, a shot that he ends up missing.

Possession 7 – Juwan Howard Turnover

In addition to flashing the middle, Miami also likes to use their bigs to screen the top of the zone.  The reason why it’s effective is because they usually have a popping threat get right into the middle of the zone, threatening the defense.  However, on this particular possession, the Heat are using Juwan Howard as the man popping to the foul line.  The Mavericks are content to let Howard catch the ball in the middle, and he obliges, taking too many steps before putting the ball on the floor.

Possession 8 – Eddie House Three (3 points/7 points total)

On this possession, the Mavericks sit in the zone as Miami holds the basketball looking for the last shot.  One pass to Eddie House and he knocks down a contested three point shot.  Not great offense that is bailed out by House knocking down a tough three point shot.

After scoring 20 points in the first six minutes in the first quarter, the Miami Heat scored just 7 points in the final six, allowing the Mavericks to go from being down 9 to being up 5.  Rick Carlisle deserves a lot of credit for going zone when the Heat were knocking down shots.  However, these shots were coming off of the dribble (like a few LeBron hit), or off of dribble penetration leading to kickouts and open jump shots.  Carlisle put his defense in a position to take away this dribble penetration and get stops.  Even more, after Miami’s first two possessions where they attacked the zone properly, Carlisle didn’t have a knee-jerk reaction and take it away.  He knew Miami’s tendency of attacking then not attacking, and he stuck with the zone for the remainder of the quarter.

Finally, one thing that you didn’t see on Miami’s misses?  Offensive rebounds.  The Mavericks were determined in grabbing every rebound out of the zone, going out of the way to get a body on someone and get the basketball (this wasn’t always the case during Dallas’ zone).

Did the Mavericks go with the zone too long in the second quarter?  Yes (the Heat scored 10 points on the Heat’s remaining 7 possessions), but the zone did play a huge factor in this win.  Not because it stopped Miami every time they ran it, not because the Heat looked dumbfounded when the Mavericks first threw it out there, but because it slowed the game down and allowed Dallas to work their way back in the game in the first quarter when it looked like Miami was going to run away with things.

“Don’t leave your feet unless you know what you are doing with the basketball.”

Your coach was right about that, you never want to jump without knowing what you are going to do with the basketball because it forces you into rushing decisions because you need to let go of the ball before you hit the ground.  Rec league and high school players aren’t the only ones breaking this “rule,” as we saw in the finals, NBA players have a tendency to trust their athletic ability and leave their feet plenty of time:

According to Synergy, there were 156 turnovers committed by both teams.  25, or 16%, of them were a direct result of a player leaving his feet, trying to throw a jump pass.  Yeah, you probably shouldn’t do it.

On of the main reasons why trapping the pick and roll worked is because it kept the basketball on the perimeter.  On all of those clips, you see the ball handler getting trapped and the only option they really have is to kick the ball out to a man on the outside rather than trying to penetrate or hit the roll man.  The ball gets into the paint a grand total of 0 times on all of those plays.  The one time they try to hit the roll man, they go from Terry to Kidd to Ian Mahinmi instead of going straight to Mahinmi.  The result is a turnover.

Another thing that trapping the smaller Dallas ball handlers does is it throws the Mavericks’ timing off:

Here, Chris Bosh steps up to trap/hedge hard at Jason Terry.  Terry hits the roll man, but because of Bosh’s length, Terry is forced to jump and throw a lobbed pass.  This gives Dwyane Wade plenty of time to rotate over and get the huge block on Tyson Chandler.

The problem is when they didn’t trap the pick and roll, they allowed Dallas to score at a pretty good rate (18 points on remaining 15 pick and rolls, including 9 points on 6 staggered pick and rolls and 9 points on 9 pick and rolls that weren’t trapped).  The Heat’s trapping pick and roll defense really disappeared in the fourth quarter.  Out of the 9 straight pick and rolls (we are ignoring the two staggered screens because it is a unique situation), the Heat chose not to trap 7 of them (the two times they did, they got a missed three and a turnover).  When Miami failed to trap, Dallas was able to get to the paint:

When Miami chose not to trap the basketball, either the ball handler or the roll man were able to get into the paint and come away with a pretty good look.  Even on misses, it wasn’t Miami’s defense forcing the miss, it was simply Dallas missing lay-ups.  To me, it was interesting to see Miami in a situation where they needed to get a stop and they went away from what was doing just that.  Dallas wasn’t really doing anything differently with this pick and rolls, so it was strange to see such a dramatic change in their defensive strategy.

When you look at the overall numbers, 26 points on 32 pick and roll possessions (0.81 PPP) is a pretty solid defensive night, especially after giving up 49 points on a similar amount of possessions during the previous game.  However, if you break it down further (by when they trapped and when they didn’t trap), you realize that they could have done some things differently when defending the pick and roll.

Going into game 5 knowing that he needed Brian Cardinal to steal minutes on the court, he came up with a way to make his staggered ball screen effective with Nowitzki on the bench.  The adjustment was effective, leading to 7 points on the 3 possessions where Brian Cardinal was involved in the staggered ball screen:

Jason Terry brings the basketball down the court along the sideline as Brian Cardinal and Tyson Chandler get in position to set the staggered ball screen.  Once both bigs are set, Terry comes back towards the middle of the court, using the ball screens.

With Chandler as the second screener, his man (Udonis Haslem) is the one who comes out and attempts to trap Jason Terry.  This is where Dallas’ adjustment takes place.  Instead of having a big slipping the screen or setting a pindown (both designed to get Dirk Nowitzki open), Chandler simply rolls to the rim hard.

Another way Dallas was able to counter Miami’s trap of the ball handler coming off of staggered ball screens is Terry quickly kicking the ball to Jason Kidd on the wing.  Any pass to out of this set would be coming from Jason Kidd.  With Chandler rolling hard to the rim and being a threat to make the catch from Jason Kidd, Mike Miller leaves Cardinal to defend Chandler’s roll.  The problem is that after hedging, Udonis Haslem returns to Chandler as well.

The result is Brian Cardinal spotting up on the wing, behind the three point line.  Jason Kidd does a good job of spotting Cardinal and hits him with the pass.

Cardinal makes the catch and pulls the three before Mike Miller can return to him to contest the shot.  Here is the play in real time.

The thing to take away from this play is how Tyson Chandler’s hard roll to the rim drew the attention of both Mike Miller and Udonis Haslem.  The Heat’s bigs were so worried about stopping the lob to Chandler, that they ended up leaving Brian Cardinal wide open.

Because the set worked so well, Dallas decided to run the same exact play the next time they had possession of the basketball:

The Heat defend this play pretty well initially (though they are helped by Jason Terry who doesn’t even use the screens well) as Mike Miller slides down and helps on Chandler rolling to the rim with Haslem hedging.  Once Terry makes the pass to Kidd, Haslem returns to Chandler as Miller returns to Cardinal.  It looks like Miami has all of their bases covered, but with Haslem so concerned with getting back to Chandler, he completely ignores his help responsibility.  By the time Haslem realizes that he needs to help on Terry’s drive to the rim, it is too late, and Chandler is able to knock down the floater.

Again, this all comes from Tyson Chandler’s hard roll to the rim.  The defense is so worried about leaving Chandler open at the rim, that returning their basically takes away any chance they have at helping on dribble penetration.

The next time Brian Cardinal entered the game late in the third quarter, the Mavericks decided to go to the same play that they had success twice before:

Jason Terry again brings up the ball along the sideline as Brian Cardinal and Tyson Chandler get in position to set their ball screens.  Once again, Terry leaves towards the middle of the court a bit early (leaving plenty of space between himself and the screeners), forcing Tyson Chandler to step way out in an effort to try and get a body on Terry’s man.

Once Terry gets towards the middle of the court, Tyson Chandler again rolls hard, diving to the rim.  Because he had to step out to try and screen Terry’s man, Brian Cardinal finds himself in a position where he can set a backscreen for Chandler.  Making a very heads up play, Cardinal sets the backscreen on Chandler’s defender, Chris Bosh.

Cardinal’s screen stands Bosh up and it allows Chandler to lose him on his way to the rim.  As this happens, Terry gets the ball to Jason Kidd on the wing.  That pass to Kidd puts Haslem in a tough position, forcing him to slide over in help position.  This causes him to lose sight of Cardinal, which means he doesn’t see the screen on Bosh getting set.  This allows Chandler to get all of the way to the rim unguarded.

Jason Kidd makes a great pass, pump faking the shot and then threading the needle, hitting Chandler as he stands under the rim.  Chandler makes the catch and finishes with the strong dunk.  Here is the play in real time:

The backscreen wasn’t a designed aspect of the play, but Cardinal makes a great heads up play, recognizing the opportunity to get a screen set and setting a strong screen.

Rick Carlisle knew that he needed to get points when Dirk Nowitkzi is on the bench, and one way he was able to put his team in a position to score when Nowitzki was on the bench was by running a lot of pick and rolls in general.  Carlisle does a great job here of finding an effective way to make the defense respect the staggered screen action by sending Tyson Chandler to the rim hard, forcing the defense to react to that.  The defenses reaction opened up a number of different things including an open three, driving lanes, and of course Chandler himself.

The play starts with Chris Bosh coming up and setting a screen for Dwyane Wade, with Wade actually using the screen.  Off the ball, LeBron James sits in the corner, being covered by Jason Kidd.

After a hesitation move and a wicked crossover, Wade beats Shawn Marion and attacks the rim, drawing help.  Both Jason Kidd and Tyson Chandler steps up to Wade to prevent him from getting to the rim.  As soon as Kidd leaves James, James does exactly what he is supposed to, cutting off of Kidd’s back.

Wade jumps in the air and spots James cutting to the rim along the baseline.  As he makes the pass, Tyson Chandler continues his rotation, trying to beat James to the rim.

Now, this is where the rulebook comes into play.  You know those hash marks along the baseline that look a bit out of place (It’s hard to spot on this particular court, but it is where I drew the yellow line)?  That is actually a very important line of reference for the refs called the Lower Defensive Box (here is it explained by NBA.com):

The restricted area (RA) is the area within the arched line on the court located below the rim. Its purpose is to stop secondary defenders from taking a position under the basket in an attempt to draw the offensive foul when a player is driving to the basket. If an offensive player drives past his primary defender on the way to the basket and a secondary defender comes over, he must establish a legal position outside the RA to draw an offensive foul. If the drive starts inside the Lower Defensive Box (LDB – this is the area from the bottom tip of the free throw circle to the endline between the two 3’ posted-up marks), the secondary defender is legally allowed to be positioned inside the LDB.

According to the rulebook, if a player starts his drive (or makes the catch) inside the lower defensive box (so inside the yellow line), the restricted area is negated and a player can take a charge inside of it.  As you can obviously see, James doesn’t establish possession until he is inside of this line.  So at this point, Tyson Chandler doesn’t need to get his feet outside of the restricted area, he simply needs to be set.

Chandler gets set as James lowers his shoulder and bulls through him.  Crawford blows the whistle and calls the offensive foul, correctly.  Here is the play in real time (with a slow motion play immediately after).

Watching in slow motion, you can see that Chandler gets set, keeps his feet down, and takes the contact right in the chest, exactly what you need to do to draw the offensive foul.  With the fact that his feet doesn’t have to come out of the restricted area, it is definitely a charge in my opinion.

Now, I should note that Jeff Van Gundy (who has been fantastic all Finals long, even when he seems to go off the rails) did a terrific job not only recognizes this call, but explaining it clearly to everyone watching.  Solid piece of announcing there that deserves credit.

However, in game four, James went from being an aggressive force coming off of ball screens to being an extremely passive player, and that really hurt his game (the numbers show that).  According to  Synergy Sports Technology, LeBron James was the ball handler for 12 ball screens, scoring just 6 points (for a PPP of 0.5).  James’ production was cut in half due to his passive play.

One of the biggest problems that I had with LeBron James and his pick and roll play is that he was often dribbling away from the rim when coming off of screens.  Dribbling backwards and not looking to attack.  With the defense not worried about James attacking, it made their rotations everywhere else much easier:

When James’ first dribble coming off of the screen isn’t an attacking dribble, but rather one that takes him away from the basket, it immediately puts himself and his teammates at a disadvantage.  With James not attacking with the dribble coming off screens, the defense doesn’t have to worry about his penetration, allowing them to rotate to the roll man at the front of the rim.  So even when James makes a nice pass to a teammate rolling to the rim, there are a few Mavericks at the rim waiting to contest the shot and force a miss.

In addition, with James not attacking and not turning the corner, when he wants to make a pass to a man slipping the screen or popping out, it is an extremely tough pass.  On the possession where James gets caught in the air and called for a travel, he wants to hit Udonis Haslem (who popped along the sideline) with a pass, but because his body is turned away from him, he is forced to try and try a pass where he jumps, turns in the air, and lets it go.  Ultimately, this leads to a turnover.  If James first dribble coming off of the screen is towards the rim, his body would be squared up, and it would be a much easier pass.

Finally, even when James wants to be aggressive, the fact that his first dribble is a passive one really puts him at a disadvantage.  During both of these plays above, James makes the decision that he wants to try and turn the corner.  However, instead of attacking the defense with his first dribble coming off of the screen, he dribbles out, giving the defense time to recover.  On the first possession, he is able to flop his way out of trouble, but on the second, he is forced into a jumper that he misses.

In addition to a lack of an attack dribble, James also made a few curious decisions coming off of ball screens.  During these situations, James came off the screen strong, putting himself in a position where he could come away with points (or at least attempt an aggressive move), however at the last second he would pass it, giving up the advantage he had:

On all three of these plays, LeBron James has a chance (and puts himself in a position) to make an aggressive decision, but at the last minutes bails the defense out. First, he turns the corner, but once he reaches the elbow, he decides to give up the ball to Chris Bosh, even though there is nobody stepping up to him. Then, he decides he wants to try and split the defenders on the pick and roll (which is something he likes to do), but halfway through, it is as if he changes his mind, deciding to throw a pass in the air that leads to a turnover. Finally, instead of attacking the double team that comes as he goes away from the screen, forcing the defense to commit then making the pass, he decides to pass without even attempting to attack the double team. This allows the Mavericks defense to rotate back and contest Mike Miller’s corner three.

Maybe the most frustrating thing about LeBron James (and his pick and roll play during game 4 in particular) is the fact that when he was aggressive, things went well for him and his teammates:

On this particular play, James decides he wants to split the ball screen. This time, James commits to the move and gets all the way to the front of the rim. This forces the defense to step up, and it allows him to hit Dwyane Wade, who is cutting to the rim on the back of Dallas’ rotations.

All it takes is one attacking move out of the pick and roll, and the defense is forces to respect James as a threat when coming off of ball screens:

The first ball screen that James gets after he made his aggressive move gets the defenses attention. Here, Shawn Marion (who is defending Wade) loses sight of his man and steps up to James because he knows he needs to make sure James doesn’t attack coming off of the screen. This allows James to hit Wade for the alley-oop.

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Those two plays show you not only how dangerous James can be when coming off of screens, but why he has been effective using ball screens all post season long. For whatever reason in game 4, he just stopped attacking coming off of ballscreens. This wasn’t even him being a facilitator, either. Being a facilitator means hitting teammates and putting them in a position to score, and James wasn’t doing that. His passing was a result of not wanting to attack (especially in pick and roll situations). I have seen/heard/read at lot of different things the Heat can do to allow James to be more aggressive (hell, I even wrote some things). Work him off the ball more, put the ball in his hands more, either way, this is all on James. We saw him sit back and watch without the ball and simply be passive with the ball. James needs to be more aggressive overall, no matter the situation.