It was an interesting strategy and one that makes sense, considering that Joel Anthony struggles to catch and score in the paint, even without a lot of defensive pressure.  So did it work?  It is hard to say, mainly because the on the fly nature of this adjustment lead to some confusion and negated whatever effectiveness the defense could have.  Looking at the numbers, Joel Anthony was a +2 when he was on the court during the third (he was also a +2 in the first half/+4 for the game), with a lot of baskets coming from failed rotations:

This is the first offensive set of the half for the Miami Heat, and the first time they are using their new defense.  You can see that there is a little confusion, as Carlos Boozer leaves Joel Anthony and forces LeBron James to make the catch farther out on the block.  As Boozer leaves Anthony open, Noah rotates over to Anthony, leaving Chris Bosh open.  James does a great job of spotting Bosh and hitting him for the open jumper.  You can say that Noah is protecting the rim, but the whole strategy is to leave Anthony open, so Noah’s rotation shouldn’t have happened.

On this play, Joakim Noah once again gets confused by the rotations.  Here, the ball goes to LeBron in the post, and Carlos Boozer leaves Joel Anthony to double down on him.  The problem is that Noah doubles down as well, and now LeBron has a triple team.  He kicks the ball out to Bosh, forcing Derrick Rose to rotate to him, leaving Bibby open for the three that he knocks down.

On this play, the Bulls’ adjustment actually works initially as the Heat try to run a pick and roll and Boozer leaves Anthony to rotate to Bosh rolling to the rim.  The result is LeBron James passing the ball to Anthony, exactly what the Bulls want.  Now, the rest of the Bulls team need to lock up on their man and take away all passing lanes from Anthony.  This doesn’t happen as Keith Bogans gets caught with his eye off of Dwyane Wade, who cuts backdoor and gets a handoff then makes a shot.  You want Anthony shooting or making a tough pass when he makes the catch.  Here, neither of those things happen as Bogans error allows Wade to bail Anthony out.

Even with the mistakes, you could see that this adjustment does make sense, because when run correctly, it can lead to stops:

Here, the Heat run a pick and roll with Chris Bosh setting a screen for Wade.  Wade goes away from the screen (something that he does a lot, and something Bosh is very good at playing off of).  As soon as this happens, Boozer leaves Anthony to take the pass to Bosh away.  Now, Wade is forced to throw a cross court skip pass to LeBron James.  James makes the catch with 10 seconds left on the clock, dribbles it out, and misses the jumper.

On this play, the Heat are trying to set up Chris Bosh on the block against Joakim Noah.  As Bosh comes across, Noah sells out for the pass, knowing that Carlos Boozer is basically playing a zone and has his back.  This is what allows Noah to get a hand on the basketball and knock it out of bounds.

Finally, here, the Heat are trying to run a double cross screen for LeBron James designed to get him the basketball on the block.  While Noah is fronting Bosh, Boozer totally ignores Anthony.  Because Boozer is zoning up on the block, LeBron James is now forced to catch the pass on the elbow instead of the block.  Then after James makes the catch, Boozer simply stays there, taking away the drive on the left hand side.  James is now forced to drive to the middle where there is help forcing him to kick the basketball out to Chris Bosh, who misses the jumper against the shot clock.

It will be interesting to see if the Bulls continue to execute this strategy whenever Joel Anthony on the court.  With a day off and practice time, they could work out the kinks (which in my opinion were all rotation/communication related), and turn this into an effective defense.  Why is this important?  Because if it creates stops, it forces the Heat’s to think about taking Anthony off the court.  Anthony (who usually plays the entire 1st quarter if not in foul trouble) coming off the court is not only important because you are taking a great defensive player off the court, but you are now playing Udonis Haslem more minutes.  With more minutes and only one off day in between games, fatigue could become a factor with him.  A nice adjustment here by coach Thibodeau.

One of the reasons why Paul George on Derrick Rose works to the Pacers’ advantage is George’s length.  This allowed George to sit back and get in position to defend the drive but still contest the jump shot:

Here, George helps on the penetration and then the ball is kicked out to Derrick Rose.  Instead of closing out hard on Rose to try and take away the shot and then having Rose blow by him, George is able to sit back a little further and still get a good contest on the three point shot.

George’s length also allowed him to defend at the rim without committing fouls.  This is important when it comes to Rose as he has been getting to the line quite a bit recently.  In fact, according to StatsCube, Rose is going to the line 7.8 times less per 36 minutes with Paul George on the court (in the playoffs):

On this play, Rose looks to penetrate and create contact.  Normally you would see a defender jumping with Rose to try and contest this attempt, but with George’s height he doesn’t need to jump and this prevents George from fouling.

In addition to being able to protect against Rose’s drives, George’s length allowed the Pacers to hedge on the Bulls’ pick and rolls, have George go under the screen, and still contest the shot effectively.  This became their defensive strategy for the pick and roll throughout the game:

George’s length allows him to go under screens and still get good contests (in the first clip). Being able to go under screens is important because it allows the defense to “load up” against Rose’s drives. In the second clip, George goes under the screen and is able to meet Rose as he drives, contesting the shot (verses going over the screen and chasing Rose as he penetrates).

On this hedge, you see Rose not even look to penetrate as going under the screen keeps him out of the lane. Rose then tries to kick the basketball out to the wing and the ball gets stolen.

It wasn’t all good for George though as Rose and the Bulls were able to take advantage of him a bit.  The first problem that George had was that he was biting on Rose’s pump-fakes, getting caught in the air and making things easy for Rose:

Maybe I could understand biting on the first pump fake (even though he has the length to be able to stand there with his hands up and he doesn’t need to jump), but jumping on Rose’s pump fake behind the three point line is a rookie mistake that can’t happen. Rose is able to take advantage, get in the lane, and draw the foul.

In addition, the Bulls started moving Rose around without the basketball, and when that happened (specifically when Rose was using screens away from the basketball) George had trouble sticking with Rose:

Here, you see Rose inbounding the basketball and then coming off of screens, curling to the rim. George is trying to trail him, but he loops around the screen too much, giving Rose the lane and letting him make the catch and draw the foul.

Again here, you see George getting a little loose when trailing Rose around screens. He doesn’t stay attached to his hip, and this allows him to get free, get the basketball, and attack the rim.

At the start of the fourth quarter, the Bulls had Rose on the court with George on the bench.  The Pacers went with Brandon Rush covering Rose, but they also switched up their pick and roll defense, trapping Rose every time he came off of a screen.  It was a very effective strategy:

Here, Rose comes off of the screen along the sideline and looks like he wants to attack the rim. The Pacers trap him and force him to take a few dribbles backwards. Eventually, Rose gets called for the carry on this possession.

On this play, you have another hard hedge from the Pacers, and Jeff Foster does a great job of defending with his hands up, getting the deflection, and forcing the turnover.

However, after getting a few stops by trapping hard on screens, the Pacers stopped doing that and started switching screens.  Don’t know if this was a player’s decision or if it was Vogel’s decision (I am leaning towards the latter since it happen with both Rush and George on the court), but it ended up with Danny Granger on Rose, and that is just a mismatch:

On both of these screens, Rose’s initial defender doesn’t even try to fight over (or go under) the ballscreen.  The switch takes place, and much like Chris Paul against the Lakers, Rose is able to take advantage.

The last big defensive decision that the Pacers made on Rose was the double team with 1:15 left in the game.  I took a closer look at this earlier today, but here is another look:

In theory, the double team is a good idea I guess, but I am not sure why the Pacers even needed to do it.  As you can see, George did a very good job on Rose and the only reason he was scoring down the stretch of game 2 was because the defense was switching screens.  I understand wanting to get it out of Rose’s hands, but I would have rather have had George defend Rose one-on-one.  At least that way, you wouldn’t give up the three.

All things considered, I think Paul George did a solid job on Derrick Rose.  Rose went off during stretches, but he is a great player and that is going to happen.  George’s biggest problem was biting on pump fakes and trailing Rose around screens, but when he was defending Rose on the basketball, he was fine.

I was really surprised to see Vogel change his defensive strategy late (going from the hard double to switch), because the trapping was working so well.  Either way, I think the Pacers did enough on the defensive end, their biggest problem is scoring late in games.  They really struggle there.

Here, Dwight Howard makes the catch on the block, and there is no help initially as the Hawks stick with their men on the outside.  However, once Howard commits to his post move, you see Hawks’ defenders digging in.  These defenders are digging in only after you see Howard commit to his move because that means he can’t kick the basketball out to a three point shooter.  Sure, this means the defender digging in probably won’t get their hands on the ball, but they are willing to live with that.  In this case, the result is a make, but that doesn’t matter since the only goal is to prevent a kick out pass.

Here is yet another example.  Dwight gets the basketball and the Hawks dig in as Howard starts his move.  However on the kick out, the defense quickly returns to their man.  This gives up terrible post position on the repost, but it also prevents the three point shot.

If the Hawks found themselves in a position where they couldn’t dig in late, they opted to not do it at all, choosing to stick with their men on the outside.

Sure, you are putting your defender on an island (and this is really tough for guys like Etan Thomas), but as long as the Hawks weren’t giving up three point shots, they were happy.

The Hawks were determined to stick to the game plan, and that is what they did.  Not doubling and sending late digs (which were so late it was like they weren’t even there) allowed Howard to go off, but when the Magic aren’t hitting threes, they aren’t as effective.  The Hawks know that, and they were committed to allowing Dwight to go off as long as the three point shooters didn’t get anything going.  It will be interesting to see if the Magic can counter by running a few more plays for their three point shooters (for example throwing it into Dwight and setting a screen away from the ball for a shooter, then having him kick it out.  A play like that doesn’t require a double to get an open look), or if they will continue to dump it into Howard and let him work one on one.

The good thing for the Sixers is that they quickly identify the zone and get into their zone offense (this doesn’t happen most of the time).  In fact, they do a good job of getting the ball in the middle of the court by screening the top of the zone.  However, once Turner gets the ball to the middle, he makes the wrong decision:

The whole point of getting the basketball into the middle is because it forces the defense to collapse on you (which is what happens) so you can kick it out.  Here, Turner has Andres Nocioni and Lou Williams open on the outside, but instead he tries to take the runner that gets blocked.

Here is another example.  The Sixers actually put together a nice zone offense, getting the basketball to the middle again.  However, once again, instead of kicking it out for the open jumper, Thaddeus Young drives into three defenders and misses the shot.

After two failures, the Sixers start to get away from what they were doing well (up until the finish).  The ball started to stick and it stopped moving side to side quickly:

Here, the Sixers are passing, then holding, passing, then holding.  This allows the defense to rotate and get set after each pass (instead of quickly rotating and getting out of position because of sharp passing).  Even on a skip pass (which gets the ball moving from side to side), the Sixers hold the ball and take away the advantage of the pass.  Eventually the ball gets to the middle, but because there was a hold before the pass the defense is in position to force the turnover.

Over the course of the game, the Sixers saw the Heat play zone defense 10 times, they scored just 6 points.  After those first two initial possessions, the ball was sticking around the perimeter and they just couldn’t get a good look.  The Heat’s zone wasn’t really doing anything special, it could have been beaten, the Sixers just couldn’t do it (in fact, if they make the correct decision on their first two possessions, they might have even shot the Heat out of the zone).

I don’t expect the Heat to start the game in their zone defense, but it is something they can keep in their pocket if the Sixers get hot once again, because they haven’t proved they could make the correct decision against the zone all season.

On the first two threes, Odom was working off of a dribble handoff, and both times, the defense went under the man handing the ball off to Odom (basically turning him into a screener), giving up the three:

This is coming right out of a baseline inbounds set and Odom quickly gets the ball into Andrew Bynum and comes onto the court behind the three point line.  If the defense was worried about closing out on Odom, Shawn Marion shoot right out at him along the baseline.  Instead, Marion goes underneath Bynum as if he is more worried about an Odom drive.

Because he goes underneath, Marion is unable to get a good closeout on Odom, giving up the open look for three.  Here is the play in real time:

The Mavericks really seemed willing to give up threes to the Lakers in an effort to try and keep the Lakers out of the paint.  In this case, instead of playing up on him and maybe giving up the drive, they go under the handoff and give up the three.

After seeing the Mavericks go under the first dribble handoff, the Lakers come out and start the fourth quarter with another handoff.  Steve Blake brings the basketball down and enters it to Bynum at the elbow.  After making the pass Blake heads straight and gets in position to set a pindown screen.  Once Bynum makes the catch, Odom cuts off of him to receive the handoff.  Instead of trailing him and getting up on him, Dirk Nowitzki, Odom’s man, tries to go underneath all of the action taking place.

Dirk gets caught underneath, and this gives a ton of space up to Lamar Odom.  After already knocking down one three, Odom has the confidence to take another, and he knocks this one dow as well.  Here is the play in real time:

You can see there is no real urgency to get out on Odom and contest the shot from the Mavericks as a whole.  Not only does Nowitzki try to go underneath all of the action, but Brandon Haywood doesn’t even show or closeout once he sees Odom pulling up for the shot.

On the next possession, the Lakers went to a pick and roll with Odom as the ball handler.  Again, the Mavericks seemed to be unworried about Odom pulling up as they switched the screen.

Here, Odom gets the basketball and comes off of a screen set by Andrew Bynum.  Instead of fighting over the screen, the Mavericks switch it, forcing Haywood to pick up Odom.

It isn’t a hard switch either.  Haywood is playing off of Odom, who just hit two straight three point shots.  With Odom’s height, this is enough space for him to pull up.

And when he does, Haywood is unable to get a hand in Odom’s face, allowing him to knock down his third straight three pointer.  Here is the play in real time:

Again, the Mavericks weren’t even worried about Odom shooting a three.  Usually on a switch like this a big would step up and force a drive to the middle (where the help defense is) if they wanted to prevent a shooter from getting a shot off.  Instead, Haywood plays way off of Odom, practically begging him to shoot, and Odom does.

These three plays were big because it seemed to turn a close game into a blowout, and even though Dallas made a run to get the game back to the 10-12 range, it felt that these three threes really ended any chance Dallas had at coming back.

Here, the Suns run a pick and roll with Marcin Gortat setting the screen and Steve Nash coming off of it.  Gortat rolls straight to the rim, forcing Jason Kidd to sink in the paint, which he correctly does.  Nash makes the correct pass, sending it to Kidd’s man in the corner.  Despite proper rotation initially, this is where the mistake is made.  Kidd closes out on Dudley way too hard, allowing Dudley to drive by him, forcing more help and leading to an easy basket.

On this play, Gortat is able to get an easy bucket from a very nice Steve Nash pass.  While Tyson Chandler immediately turns and yells at Rodrigue Beaubois, it wasn’t his mistake that lead to the easy basket.  Dirk Nowitzki needs be ready to sink in and help on the roll man, instead he has his back turned to the basket face guarding Channing Frye.  The rotation was off, and it lead to an easy basket.

Here, after the offensive rebound the Suns kick the ball out and get into their pick and roll set on the wing.  Chandler steps up to stop the basketball and the get the ball at Nash’s hands.  Jason Kidd rotates over too slowly and he whiffs at his steal attempt, giving up the easy dunk.

After the first quarter, it was obvious that Rick Carlisle that the rotations were off and he made adjustments, because after that first quarter the Mavericks shut down the Suns’ pick and roll.  In 27 pick and roll possessions for the remainder of the game, the Suns scored just 16 points (0.59 PPP).  Again, it all came down to the Mavericks’ rotations:

Here, Nash comes off of the Gortat screen with Gortat rolling straight to the rim off of it.  Nash leaves his feet, looking for Gortat, but at the last second Jason Kidd steps in the passing lane.  This forces Nash to try and pass it to a different Sun, Josh Childress, but this pass is deflected (by Shawn Marion who also rotated over, picking up Kidd’s man) and stolen.

This pick and roll stop is a perfect example of team defense forcing a difficult shot.  As Nash comes off of the screen, you have Chandler hedging and Dirk Nowitzki sinking off of his man.  The help from both defenders is key in preventing Nash from getting all of the way to the rim.  You also have Jason Kidd in position to stop any pass over the top to Gortat.  This means there is only one option for Nash here, and he is forced to take an off balance jumper that he misses.

Finally here, the Suns run a pick and roll with Nash coming off of it and attacking towards the baseline.  As Nash comes off of the screen, Chandler hedges, giving Gortat a free roll to the rim.  Jason Terry sinks from the opposite corner to the middle of the paint discouraging any pass to Gortat by being in position to steal the pass as soon as it is made.  This forces Nash to keep his dribble alive along the baseline, and with Chandler trailing him he attempts a tough reverse lay-up that he misses.

The first quarter of this game is a perfect example of what Steve Nash coming off of screens can do to the defense.  If the rotations aren’t perfect, they will pick you apart with it, and that is exactly what happened.  Credit the Mavericks coaching staff for getting them to rotate properly for the rest of the game, stifling the Suns’ pick and roll offense.

A lot of this had to do with the defense being played on him by Quentin Richardson.  Instead of letting Anthony beat him up (something he does to most players who try to defend him), Richardson was very physical with Anthony, but in a smart way so he wouldn’t pick up too many fouls.  In addition to being physical, Richardson also played very high up on Anthony, knowing that if he gets beat, he has Dwight Howard behind him to clean up his mess.  This strategy was very effective:

On this play, the Knicks are trying to set up a play where they ISO Carmelo Anthony at the elbow.  However, Richardson does a very good job of leaning his body on Anthony, pushing him out a little farther than he would like.  In addition, he is playing him on the high side so he can make a play on the basketball (which he does initially).

Anthony finally gains possession out by the three point line with his back to the basket (when he wanted the ball on the elbow).  Out of position, Anthony still tries to make a move from the elbow, spinning and missing a shot.  During Anthony’s spin, Richardson throws his body into him, creating contact and throwing off Anthony’s shot.

Here, the Knicks try to work Anthony with the basketball on two separate occasions and both times, Richardson was able to force a pass.  This play is where you really see the Dwight Howard effect, as Richardson is playing Anthony 30 feet away from the basket, knowing that if he gets beat, he has Howard behind him.  Also, Richardson again creates contact with his body a few times on this play (including when Anthony is forced to pass the second time).

Now here, the Knicks try to work Anthony off of the basketball, but again he is stopped by good defense from Richardson.  The Knicks run a pick and roll with Carmelo Anthony at the top of the key.  The goal is to force Richardson to help on the roll (which does happen) and then get the ball to Anthony and let him take advantage.  Anthony gets the basketball as planned, but he ends up turning it over.  This is because Richardson closes out nicely, gets his body into Anthony, and forces him into a tough pass.

On each of these plays, you see Richardson creating contact and being physical with Anthony by hitting him first before Anthony can hit him.  So why isn’t a foul called?  It is all in the way that Richardson is creating the contact.  He isn’t creating contact with his hands or his arms, he is using his body to hit Anthony while he keeps his hands straight up.  Referees don’t usually call fouls on body to body contact, and this is another example of that.  Richardson was smart when he decided not to push Anthony with his arms, but with his body, and that was a large part of Anthony’s struggles last night.

So why don’t you see teams/players play Anthony like this more?  Because when you play up on him, Anthony has the offensive ability to get around his man usually.  The difference when playing the Magic is Dwight Howard behind Richardson, waiting to back him up.  Richardson knows he can play Anthony with his body like he did, because he knows Howard is there if he gets beat.  Most teams in the league don’t have a guy like Howard in the paint, so they aren’t willing to gamble by play up on Anthony.

How was McDyess able to get this position?  It was all because of the defensive strategy the Lakers were using to defend off-ball screens:

The Spurs were looking to get the ball into Tim Duncan, but on the weakside, they had Manu Ginobili coming off of a double screen set by Richard Jefferson and Antonio McDyess.

Instead of switching screens (making them susceptible to a slipped screen to the rim), the Lakers had the defenders of the screeners take one step back, allowing Ron Artest (who was covering Ginobili) to basically shoot the gap and get through the screens easily.

The strategy works, and Artest is able to get through the screens easily, but what it did was create space between the Lakers’ defenders and the Spurs’ screeners.  Here, there is space created between Odom and McDyess.

This minute Artest clears through the space created, McDyess takes a step into Odom and eats up all of that space created.

This is what lets him get on the inside of Odom as Duncan squares up to take his shot.  McDyess is now on the inside where Odom should be.

As the ball comes off of the rim, all McDyess has to do is time it well enough to get a hand on the ball and tip it in.  Here is the play in real time:

On this play, Lamar Odom is caught flat-footed as Ron Artest uses the space he creates to get through the screen.  The minute Artest gets through, McDyess’ quick step eats up all of that space, allowing him to gain inside position.  On this play, that inside position is what leads to the game winning play.

With guys like Russell Westbrook on the Thunder, you just knew that they were going for the lob.  The Hornets, countered with man to man defense, but they played man to man in a way that was designed to prevent the lob:

As the play starts, you notice that the Hornets are using a big to defend the paint, in this case DJ Mbenga.  This isn’t something that I am a fan of, but if a team is going to do it, they should do it with a backup big.  This allows the Hornets to keep Emeka Okafor on the court in case the Thunder try a lob to their center.  As the trigger man gets the basketball, Russell Westbrook starts to the elbow.

Now, the Hornets are unsure of what the Thunder are going to do here.  Westbrook may be setting a screen for Durant, or he may be trying to set up his defender for the lob.  Either way both Willie Green and David West do a very good job of staying inside of their man, getting in between their respective men and the rim.  As it turns out, Westbrook was trying to set up his mad for a lob.

Willie Green doesn’t bite though.  There is no way that pass is going to get made, and that is before considering the back-up big in the inbounder’s face.  Also, notice David West.  He was preparing himself to defend any backdoor cut by Durant, playing the Thunder inside out, willing to let Durant go out behind the three point line as protecting the paint is his main responsibility.

Nothing comes of the lob attempt, and the Thunder end up getting all bunched up behind the three point line.  The result is a turnover.  Here is the play in real time:

The Hornets made sure that they protected the rim first, playing inside-out.  Like I said earlier, I am not a fan of man to man defense in these situations, but if you are going to play it, this is how it should be done.

At first, the Celtics attacked this defense by entering the ball into the post, drawing the double team, and having Rajon Rondo cut directly into the paint.  The first time the Celtics had Rondo cut into the lane, it worked like a charm:

In the above clip, Garnett gets the ball in the post and Fields doubles. Rondo cuts to the lane, gets the pass, and forces Amar’e to step up and show at him. Rondo is able to hit Semih Erden for the wide open lay-in.

It looked like the Celtics were going to have a lot success attacking the Knicks defense this way, however that isn’t what happened. The play above was the only score that the Celtics were able to score when Rondo cut into the lane. In 6 possessions, the Celtics only scored 2 points (0.33 PPP) on 1-2 shooting with four turnovers.

Part of the reason for the turnovers and lack of success when attacking the Knicks’ defense this way is because Semih Erden is on the court. Rondo and Erden had a tough time getting on the same page this game:

Here, Rondo gets the ball in the lane and lays a pass off for Erden as if he is expecting him to spot up for the corner jumper. Instead, Erden cuts to the basket early and the pass bounces out of bounds.

Again, the Rondo to Erden connection is a little off, causing Erden to miss the easy lay-in.

This lack of success early really seemed to bother Rondo, and you could tell by watching his decision making. A couple times, Rondo would cut off of the double, be wide open under the basket, but would refuse to take the shot:

A confident Rondo takes both of these looks. Instead, he looks for another option to pass it back to, leading to turnovers both times.

After the second time Rondo turns down the shot, Doc Rivers calls a timeout, and coming out of that timeout the Celtics come up with a different strategy to attack the Knicks’ defense. Instead of entering the ball into the post and forcing the double team, the Celtics decided to clear out one side of the court and run a pick and roll with Rondo and Garnett. The Celtics used this strategy from the middle of the second quarter on and it was much more successful. In the 10 possessions where the Celtics attacked the defense with a screen they scored 14 points (1.40 PPP) on 7-8 shooting with just two turnovers.

What these screens did was it allowed Rondo to get himself to the rim in a position where he could finish (especially because the Knicks’ didn’t want to switch this screen), and if the defense stepped up, Rondo could make an easy pass to a teammate.

After getting burnt by not switching the screens, the Knicks finally decided they had to switch the screens. Although they got two stops once they started switching these screens (not shown KG got blocked once and Rondo over shot KG on a post up), they still got burned:

In both of these clips, it is pretty obvious that Fields is unable to defend Garnett in the post, and that leads to two easy buckets for the Celtics (a open jumper in the paint for Rondo and an easy post up for Garnett).

—

Just in this one little aspect of a great game (how the Knicks defended Rajon Rondo), you had so many adjustments and battles of wit. First, Coach D’Antoni adjusting his defense from the first game. The Celtics tried one method of attack, it didn’t work, but in a timeout Coach Rivers came up with something that worked and they carried it into the second half. Coach D’Antoni tried to counter again by switching screens, but it wasn’t that effective. To me, this is the kind of stuff that makes basketball so much fun to watch at the NBA-level.