The Timeout Conundrum Continues
Just a short while ago, Beckley Mason shook the basketball world to the core (hyperbole alert) with his mind-blowing, end-of-game timeout research. The stats in that article (albeit containing a few variables) show that NBA coaches, perhaps hemmed in by the expectations of their profession, are overusing timeouts and playing with worse odds than a drunk tourist in Vegas at a blackjack table. Thankfully, the NBA saw a number of close finishes last night. Armed with this new data, a fresh perspective, and a gambling metaphor, it was interesting to watch these games unfold. Of particular interest was the conclusion of Golden State’s 106-104 win in Phoenix.
In a back and forth game, Golden State winds up with a two point lead and a fresh shot clock thanks to an offensive rebound by Dominic McGuire. With 38 seconds left, the Warrior’s still must try to score so Dorell Wright drives to the rim late only to have his pass tipped by the Sun’s Channing Frye toward fellow Sun, Marcin Gortat. Gortat immediately finds the ageless Steve Nash who begins to the move the ball upcourt. The setting is ripe for possibilities as the two-time MVP dribbles at a backpedaling Warrior’s defense, but all that excitement fades when Phoenix calls for a timeout after advancing past halfcourt.
The play itself has no real influence, but is worth viewing to see the subtle advantage the Suns may have had after the steal. Take a look:
While Phoenix didn’t have a primary break opportunity (or even a numerical edge), the video shows that the Warriors defense was still retreating in transition as the ball crossed the timeline. With Nash being, well, Nash, it seems like anytime he can work with an advantage, he should be allowed to do so. However, even the possibility of a timeout forces Nash to further restrain the break by looking back toward head coach, Alvin Gentry, to see if he does, in fact, want to take one.
It seems like a possible opportunity lost until Gentry conjures up some late-game magic with his whiteboard and black marker. He sets up a sideline out-of-bounds play that calls for Hill to inbound, then quickly downscreen for forward Jared Dudley. Dudley makes the play work by catching off the screening, ripping baseline and engaging Hill’s defender with dribble penetration. Hill uses this advantage to circle behind, attack the rim and, viola, tie game. Check it out:
So Gentry is a genius…right?
It certainly is debatable that allowing Nash to orchestrate on the fly after the Gortat steal would have produced a similar result, but there is one thing that Suns timeout caused that isn’t. Before the whistle stopped the action, the Warriors quintet on the floor was David Lee, Nate Robinson, Wright, Monta Ellis and Dominic McGuire. After the timeout, Golden State trotted out a much stauncher unit.
Gone were Robinson and Lee (two subpar defenders) and in their stead were Brandon Rush and Ekpe Udoh (two much more effective ones). Clever screening action or not, the Suns did themselves a major disservice. By stopping the play, Gentry allowed his counterpart, Mark Jackson, to employ a much tougher group to score on.
It brings up the hard truth about the empirical data just released; coaches often put themselves in a worse spot by applying “conventional wisdom”. Instead of letting Nash operate against a weaker, unsettled defense, Gentry made the Suns inbound against a stingier, set one. While the play design was solid and executed well, Gentry, like the intoxicated Vegas tourist, essentially hit on 17 and got a 4.
Jackson, however, also opened himself up for second-guessing by calling a timeout right after the Hill make with 11 seconds left in the game to draw up this:
A zipper cut to an isolation with Ellis isn’t exactly a form of tactical brilliance. In fact, it’s probably the same thing that would have occurred had the Warriors just inbounded Hill’s make and pushed up the ball up the floor right away. The flip side is that the timeout did allow Jackson to pull McGuire and Udoh for the more offensively inclined duo of Lee and Robinson. Rush, brought in during the earlier timeout as a defensive sub, stayed on the floor.
Did the changing of personnel offset the call of an isolation against a set Phoenix defense? Given that Hill was still able to force Ellis into an extremely challenging attempt, it doesn’t appear so. That’s also not even factoring that having Ellis surrounded by four Ray Allens may not matter when the pass-challenged guard has the ball during end of game scenario. So it begs the obvious question, if the plan is to let Ellis go all John Wayne on Phoenix in the clutch, why not let him do so against an unsettled defense?
Going simply by the results, this game appeared to be managed well down the stretch. All the timeouts produced points (except for the Sun’s final one to set up a desperation 3) and the Warriors escaped with a win by, in coach-speak, putting the ball in the hands of their best player. A closer look, however, seems to reveal that the two head coaches, in this instance at least, may have just been beneficiaries of good fortune. Perhaps they should book a trip to Vegas.
Draft Pick Scouting Report: #11 Klay Thompson
For the past two offseasons, we have been looking at players coming to the NBA after playing at least as season overseas. With the lockout, we are going to have plenty of time on our hands. With that being said, I plan on doing scouting reports for each of the 30 first round picks from this past draft.
Past Editions: Kyrie Irving (#1) | Derrick Williams (#2) | Tristan Thompson (#4) | Jonas Valanciunas (#5) | Jan Vesely (#6)| Bismack Biyombo (#7) | Brandon Knight (#8) | Kemba Walker (#9) | Jimmer Fredette (#10)
There is no question that Jimmer Fredette was in that group of elite shooters among the players available in the 2011 draft. Right along with him was Klay Thompson, who the Golden State Warriors drafted one spot behind him.
Strengths
Shooting
There is no question that Thompson’s biggest strength is his shooting ability. Thompson has a very smooth, yet quick, repeatable shooting stroke with a release point that is higher than most. Thompson feasted on the perimeter last year with Washington State, knocking down 40.3% of all the jump shots he took (64.3% of all shots he took last year), while posting a PPP 1.094 on those shots (placing him among the top 15% of all NCAA players last year).
The area where Thompson is most impressive is in catch and shoot situations. This past season, Thompson shot 50% in catch and shoot situations where he was considered “unguarded” by Synergy sports, posting an eFG% of 71.4%:
Thompson’s shooting form is very repeatable and very easy. Anytime he is open in a catch and shoot situation, it is a pretty good bet that he is going to be able to knock down the shot. What helps him get open is his ability to work off of the basketball and use screens. Despite not being the most athletic guy, Thompson is smart enough and good enough to get a little bit of separation working off of the ball and at his height (6’7″) and with his high release, that little bit of separation is all he needs to be able to get a shot off:
Golden State Seals The Win With A Heady Defensive Play Off A Poor Lakers’ Play
In the fourth quarter of their game against the Golden State Warriors, the Los Angeles Lakers turned a large deficit into a winable game. With 1:39 left in the game, the Lakers had the ball on the baseline, looking to cut into the Warriors nine point lead. The Golden State Warriors were able to make a great defensive stand on a curious SLOB ran by the Lakers, that essentially sealed the win:
As the trigger man Matt Barnes gets the basketball, Kobe Bryant uses a screen set by Andrew Bynum on the block, comes off of it, and gets to the corner of the court where he gets the basketball.
Once Bryant gets the basketball, the Warriors are smart enough to send two defenders at him, David Lee and Dorell Wright, getting the trap set.
Golden State Pump-Fake Their Way To Five Late Points
When you think of Dwight Howard on the defensive end, you think of those fear inducing blocks that send the ball back where it came from. While these blocks do a lot of good on the defensive end, preventing baskets and maybe even dissuading players from taking shots, Howard selling out for blocks can lead to trouble for the Orlando Magic on the defensive end. We saw two separate examples of this problem in the final minute of the overtime period in their game against the Golden State Warriors, giving up five points and helping the Warriors get the win:
Here, the ball eventually works its way to David Lee at the elbow. Lee makes the catch and executes a perfect pump fake, getting Howard to leave his feet. Once Howard leaves his feet, Lee takes one penetrating dribble towards the basket. This penetrating dribble forces Quentin Richardson to sink in and help. As soon as Richardson dives in to help, Lee kicks it out to Dorell Wright who knocks down the three. Richardson actually does a good job of helping and recovering, but he just can’t close out quickly enough.
Poor Help Dooms The Thunder
Trailing the Golden State Warriors by two points with around 40 seconds left, the Oklahoma City Thunder found themselves in a position where they needed to get a stop if they wanted a chance to tie/win the game. After a pick and roll (and a switch by the defense), there was a drive to the lane. A poor decision to help on this drive allowed a basket and cost the Thunder the game.
After Steph Curry dribbles the shot clock down to 10 seconds, he uses a screen set by Dorell Wright. Because of the situation and Thunder not wanting either Curry or Wright to get a wide open three, the Thunder switch the pick, which in my opinion is the right move here.
Because of the switch, Kevin Durant is now forced to try and defend Steph Cury one on one as Curry maintains his dribble.
The Clipboard Awards: January 30th – Heat, Lakers, Warriors
A team’s performance after a timeout may be the best way to judge a coach’s Xs & Os knowledge, and his ability to draw up plays. That is why I am introducing The Clipboard Awards* today. The Clipboard Awards is a competition where I choose the top three post-timeout plays each night, adding up the scores over the course of the season.
Play #3 (1 point)- Keith Smart/Golden State Warriors
In this set coming out of a timeout in the fourth quarter, Keith Smart drew up a nice play to get Lou Amundson an easy opportunity in the paint:
As Acie Law brings the basketball up, Ekpe Udoh comes from the low block and flashes to the elbow, getting the pass from Law.
Once Udoh gets the pass, Law comes cutting off of him as if he is receiving a dribble handoff. As that happens, we have a double backscreen getting set on the weakside. The backscreens are being set for Lou Amundson, who makes a cut coming off them along the baseline.
Warriors Get A Much Needed Three From A Baseline Set
Trailing by four points with 26.0 seconds left and the ball on the baseline, the Golden State Warriors knew they were going to have to foul on the next Kings’ possession. Because of this, they were looking to get a quick three pointer to hopefully cut the Kings’ lead to just one point. With the ball getting inbounded for the baseline, the Warriors were able to get Monta Ellis open behind the three point line, using Steph Curry as a decoy:
The play starts with David Lee setting a screen for Steph Curry. Curry takes that screen and uses it to get to the ball-side corner.
Immediately after Curry uses Lee’s screen, Lee gets in position to set a screen for Monta Ellis. Lee’s screen isn’t the only screen being set as Vladimir Radmanovic gets over to set a second screen. As this happens, Curry goes from the corner and cuts along to the baseline.
The Warriors Protect Against A Late Lob
Last night against the Indiana Pacers, the Golden State Warriors had a 1 point lead with 0.6 seconds left after a Monta Ellis jumper. The Pacers obviously wanted to try and get a lob to tie the game, but the Warriors did a good job of protecting the rim:
Here, Brandon Rush makes a backcut to the rim, but Monta Ellis does a good job of standing between Rush and the rim. He is able to get in that position because he isn’t really worried about a three point shot. The Warriors also switch the Hansboro screen for Danny Granger, meaning that Granger’s cut to the rim is well defended. The Pacers can’t get anyone open and are forced to call a timeout.
Over At The Basketball Jones: Savvy/Shabby: ‘Reke vs. Lee
The guys over at The Basketball Jones have been kind enough to add me as a weekly contributor, so each week I will be looking at the smartest play and the dumbest play in the NBA. Tried this a while ago, just never got around to keeping it updated, but I am going to be doing this weekly at The Jones. It’s going to be called, Savvy/Shabby, and this week, I took a look at a great play made by Tyreke Evans, and a poor one made by David Lee:
This week, we are going to take a look at a heads-up play that Tyreke Evans made, leading up to his incredible buzzer beater. On the other end of the spectrum, David Lee made a boneheaded play against the Miami Heat, allowing them to hit the game-clinching three with about four minutes left.
Savvy: Tyreke Evans’ Trap
After the Kings went for the quick two when trailing by three points, Sacramento found themselves down by one point with 22.2 seconds left. Since there are under 24 seconds left, the Kings either have to force a turnover or foul to get the basketball back. Sacramento decided that they wanted to try and get a quick steal, and if they were unable to get it, they would foul. This is where Tyreke Evans made one of the smartest plays that I have seen this year.
As always, head on over and check it out!
