The Hornets shot a putrid 28.9% against the defensively challenged Suns on Friday night and finished the game with an 86.7 offensive efficiency. That’s bottom of the league poor. They did it by missing from everywhere, even at the rim, where they managed to shoot only 48%.

One of those misses came off a well-designed set that caught the Suns sleeping and gave Marco Belinelli an open lane for a layup. Here is a video of the play:

Even though the play ends in an ugly miss, there is still good action in the set itself. At the start, Hornest forward Al-Farouq Aminu sets a cross-screen on the Sun’s Marcin Gortat. Gortat’s man, Emeka Okafor cuts across the paint to establish deep post position. As Okafur moves toward the block, Belinelli sprints around a Carl Landry screen and curls toward the basket.

Hakim Warrick, not exactly a defensive savant, doesn’t pick Belinelli up as he comes off the screen while Jared Dudley, Belinelli’s defender, gets caught up in it allowing Okafor to feed him with a well-timed bounce pass near the rim.

Belinelli doesn’t meet any opposition until he’s one jump from the basket and even then Grant Hill moves to avoid the foul. Here is the play again:

If the Hornets want to avoid being in the West’s bottom rung, they need to avoid missing opportunities like this.

The play starts with the trigger man getting the basketball, and when he does, Kobe Bryant curls around screens set by both bigs (Andrew Bynum and Pau Gasol) at the top of the key.

As Bryant starts to come around the screen, Emeka Okafor, the man defending the outside screener, starts to hedge out and deny Bryant the basketball.  As soon as this happens, Gasol breaks to the rim, slipping his screen.

The slipped screen allows Gasol to get to the rim without a defender even close to him.  Gasol makes the catch and easily finishes the dunk quickly.  Here is the play in real time:

Just a great play by Phil Jackson here.  Jackson uses Kobe and the threat of him making the catch to force the defense into reacting (Okafor’s hedge), and once that happens, Gasol slips the screen for the easy basket.

After taking 10 seconds to get Paul the basketball (they were clearly allowing some time to burn off the clock), he was faced with Derek Fisher defending him.

Looking to create a mismatch, the Hornets ran Paul off of a ballscreen, knowing that the Hornets would switch the screen.  Ariza comes and sets the screen because they wanted the recently injured Bryant to defend Paul.

After getting the switch, the Hornets isolated Paul against Bryant, letting him work on Kobe one-on-one.  Now, the player to pay attention to here is Ron Artest.  Artest is defending Jarrett Jack, and he is currently in help position.

Once Paul starts his dribble attack, Ron Artest turns his back and dives into the paint looking to help.  Artest’s help creates a space at the top half of the paint where Jack can cut to.

Jack makes the cut and Paul is able to find him at the last possible second.  Jack makes the catch in the middle of the lane.

With nobody defending him, Jack is able to rise and fire in the lane, knocking down the shot.  Here is the play in real time:

Before looking at the defense played here, this was a great job by New Orleans of dictating the match-ups. They knew that the Lakers would switch every screen late, and they were able to get a less than 100% Bryant covering Paul.

With that being said, this play is on Ron Artest. Artest commits to the help way too early, and he actually helps too deep as if he is anticipating Paul getting all of the way to the rim. Jarrett Jack does a great job of cutting off of Artest’s back, finding the open space, and knocking down the open jumper in the lane.

Synergy Sports Technology’s new twitter account (seriously, give them a follow.  Tons of great information) gave us the answer to the first thing we want to look at, and they tell us that the Hornets weren’t even close to as successful on the pick and roll:

@Lakers yielded 69.2% FG (1.47 PPP) on the Pick and Roll in Game 1, but only 45.5% FG (0.71 PPP) in Game 2.

0.71 PPP is actually even better than their 0.775 PPP regular season pick and roll defense.  So now the question is if they did they do anything different?  Well, yes and no.  Yes in that they didn’t have their bigs hedging and they didn’t switch, no in that the defense that they did use is actually their normal pick and roll defense.  They just played it better.

Land O’Lakers had a great post the other day before game 2 looking at some adjustments the team needed to make and here is the one that stuck out to me:

Aggression. Following Sunday’s loss, Jackson noted his bigs needed to do a better job in support of the guards. Andrew Bynum said Monday he plans to do his part. “When you’re playing teams that don’t post the ball [frequently], you kind of get lax and stand up and down. I could be a bit more active in patrolling the lane and dealing with those floaters.”

Give up the right shots. The Lakers want to run teams off the 3-point line, and keep them out of the paint. Person noted while Paul was taking a lot of jumpers inside the arc, most were in or at the paint. Too close. The Lakers want to force jumpshooters into a true mid-range shot, that area from 15-19 feet.

This is what I had my eye on when watching the Hornets’ pick and roll, and despite their success over the course of the game, they did struggle a bit with Paul again early.

Here, Bynum does exactly what he said he didn’t want to do.  He got lax and was standing up and down, getting flat footed, and not getting out there to bother Paul’s floater.

On this play, Bynum is getting out there a little more, but he still isn’t there in time.  Though, this shows you that the Lakers are still are conscious of what they had to do and they were working on it.

Also, from here on out, the Lakers played Paul’s pick and roll very well, doing exactly what they needed to do:

Here, Paul comes off of the screen and attacks the rim, but Pau Gasol steps up and bothers the lay-up and forcing the miss.

This time, it is Andrew Bynum who is protecting the rim on the pick and roll, and this time he steps up correctly (giving him space and giving up that midrange jumper, but Paul tries to attack further), blocking Paul’s runner.  This is a perfect example of what Person means by knowing what a true mid-range jumper is.  This is’t one, and he wants Bynum contesting.  Bynum does, and it results in the block.

This is the shot that the Lakers are willing to give up in the pick and roll.  A pull-up jumper around the free throw line, sure Paul makes it, but this is really a tough shot.  If the Lakers give this up to Paul the whole game out of the pick and roll, I think they are happy.

The concession is the Lakers will let opponents take mid-range jumpers from 15 to 19 feet. The Lakers can stay out on 3-point shooters better and keep point guards from getting all the way to the basket. When Tony Parker got hot early for San Antonio on Sunday, the Lakers moved up their plug just enough to deter him.

Person said “the only true mid-range shooters left in the game” are Kobe Bryant and Paul Pierce anyway. New York’s Carmelo Anthony jumps to mind, but he gets a lot of his work done with physicality and isn’t necessarily a pure shooter. In any case, let’s all watch closely how Atlanta’s Joe Johnson, Miami’s Dwyane Wade and LeBron James and Dallas’ Dirk Nowitzki do with the mid-range jumpers they get the rest of this Lakers trip.

As I mentioned in my series preview (where I predicted a 30+ point game and a win for the Hornets in the first two – ok I’m done bragging now), this is what Paul does best off of the pick and roll.  Yesterday was no different as Paul forced the Lakers to abandon their pick and roll defense early going from their original strategy, to hedging hard, to finally being forced into switching.  None of these defenses worked as the Hornets scored 29 points on 20 possessions with Paul as the ball handler in the pick and roll, good for a PPP 1.45.  That’s almost double what the Lakers give up normally.

Funnel To Bigs:

Here, Paul comes off of the ball screen and attacks the rim.  You can see that the Lakers are funneling him to the middle, preventing any kick pass to his teammates.  The problem is that Paul is so quick that Bynum is unable to step up to Paul in time, allowing him to get the runner at the rim.

Here is that midrange jumper the Lakers were willing to give up.  You can see the defense on the perimeter is worried about defending the Hornets on the outside with Bynum in the paint ready to protect the rim.  Paul is able to pull up and knock the jumper down.

Hedging:

Right after that Paul jumper, there was a noticeable change in the Lakers’ defensive strategy.  Instead of funneling the basketball to the middle when Paul comes off of the screen, they were hedging him, trying to keep him from getting in the lane so quickly.

Here, you see Paul coming off of the ballscreen and Pau Gasol trying to cut him off.  Paul is so quick that he is able to get around Gasol easily and get into the paint.  Because the gameplan isn’t to funnel the basketball into the paint anymore, the defense is forced to collapse on Paul, which allows him to kick the basketball out to the corner for the three.  What’s interesting is this is what the Lakers’ original pick and roll defense was designed to stop.  Again, quoting Ding:

Jackson noted how Miami was trying Sunday to have its big men come all the way out to show on pick-and-rolls by Chicago’s Derrick Rose — to no avail in stopping the ball. Rose could not be checked and thus was easily able to create offense for the Bulls — something that often happened to the Lakers with Bynum and Pau Gasol: “Now when that guard gets around that screen, you’ve got 5-on-3,” Jackson said.

“As a consequence, we’re starting to try and funnel them in to a place where we have Andrew in position,” Jackson said. “He’s a plug. He’s in there stopping penetration.”

The concession is the Lakers will let opponents take mid-range jumpers from 15 to 19 feet. The Lakers can stay out on 3-point shooters better and keep point guards from getting all the way to the basket. When Tony Parker got hot early for San Antonio on Sunday, the Lakers moved up their plug just enough to deter him.

With Paul forcing the Lakers into a different pick and roll defense, he was able to open up that corner three for the Hornets.

Again you have Paul coming off of a screen and Gasol trying to hedge on him.  Paul is able to get by him so quickly that Gasol isn’t really sure what to do so he traps Paul.  What’s interesting is this wasn’t really a designed trap, because if it was, the defense would be rotating on the backend.  They don’t here, and Paul is able to hit Ariza flashing to the rim.

The problem with hedging a guy like Chris Paul is that he is so quick that he is able to get around the hedge so easily that it’s like the hedge man (in this case Gasol) isn’t even there.  So as a defense, you are basically wasting a defender and now forcing the rest of the defense to rotate over.

That’s what happens here.  Gasol is unable to impede Paul’s progress and Paul is able to attack the rim easily.  This forces Lamar Odom to step up and protect the rim, leaving his man (Carl Landry) wide open.  Landry gets the pass under the rim and Kobe Bryant is forced to foul him as he was a bit late rotating over.

Switching:

Now, I don’t know if this was a coaching decision, a decision Gasol made on his own after getting beat on the hedge so many times, or just something Gasol was forced into doing, but the Lakers (Gasol in particular) starting switching Chris Paul ballscreens.  As you can imagine, it did not go well:

Here, you see Paul come off of the ball screen and instead of hedging out Gasol straight switches.  Because he is defending the quick Chris Paul, he is forced to play off of him a bit, and Paul knocks down the jumper.

Finally here, you have Chris Paul using the screen and Gasol switching again.  Paul smartly pulls the ball out, gets the ball back, and then takes advantage of the mismatch at the top of the key.

The Lakers are a smart team, and I know they will attempt to make some adjustments but if Paul is making that midrange jump shot, I don’t know what the Lakers can really do to stop this pick and roll.  This isn’t to say that I think the Hornets will win the series or anything, mainly because I don’t expect to see the Hornets’ bench guys playing as well as they did yesterday.

Here is what we looked at for the upcoming Lakers-Hornets series:

• Offensive Breakdown
• Defensive Breakdown

Check in tomorrow when I finish looking at the Thunder-Nuggets series (the defensive breakdown) and the final two Western Conference series (Spurs-Grizzlies/Blazers-Mavs).  Playoffs only 1 day away.

• Defensive Efficiency: 101.3 (6th)
• Opp. TS%: 51.4% (2nd)
• Opp. Assist Rate: 20.95 (20th)
• Opp. Turnover Rate: 12.80 (23rd)
• Defensive Rebound Rate: 72.31 (22nd)
• Block Rate: 5.5 (10th)
• Opp. Free Throw Rate: 23.6 (1st)
• Opp. Three Point Rate: 24.2 (7th)

Los Angeles – Strengths

Pick And Roll Defense

A while ago, Kevin Ding of the Orange County register published an article about the Lakers and how they are developing their new pick and roll defense:

Jackson noted how Miami was trying Sunday to have its big men come all the way out to show on pick-and-rolls by Chicago’s Derrick Rose–to no avail in stopping the ball. Rose could not be checked and thus was easily able to create offense for the Bulls–something that often happened to the Lakers with Bynum and Pau Gasol: “Now when that guard gets around that screen, you’ve got 5-on-3,” Jackson said.

“As a consequence, we’re starting to try and funnel them in to a place where we have Andrew in position,” Jackson said. “He’s a plug. He’s in there stopping penetration.”

…

[Lakers assistant coach Chuck] Person said “the only true mid-range shooters left in the game” are Kobe Bryant and Paul Pierce anyway. New York’s Carmelo Anthony jumps to mind, but he gets a lot of his work done with physicality and isn’t necessarily a pure shooter.

So what the Lakers are doing here is keeping Bynum in the paint when a pick and roll takes place, funneling the action to him and stopping penetration.  This is the Lakers’ new pick and roll defense, and it what has them at the top of the PPP leaderboard for pick and roll defense.  When it comes to defending the ball handler, the Lakers have the 6th best pick and roll defense, allowing just .775 points per possession.  They are even better when it comes to containing the roll man, as they are 5th in terms of PPP.

With this defensive strategy, the Lakers find themselves susceptible to midrange jumpers.  However, as Person mentioned in Ding’s article, they are willing to live with it, because they are confident in their belief that there are only a few guys who can knock down those shots consistently:

This is a perfect example of the Lakers’ strategy in action. Wade comes off of the screen and Andrew Bynum backs up off of him instead of challenging him. The result is a missed jumper/floater in the midrange.

Here is another look at it. George Hill comes off of the screen with Bynum in the middle and Shannon Brown coming over the screen. This is designed to try and funnel Hill into Bynum. Hill picks up his dribble and tries to kick it out, but the ball is stolen.

This defense is very effective for the Lakers, but things could get interesting in their series against the Hornets. As I mentioned in my offensive breakdown, Chris Paul loves taking jumpers off of ball screens, doing so 77% of the time.  He is extremely effective taking these jumpers, so it wil be interesting to see if Paul makes these jumpers early on and forces the Lakers’ hand defensively.

Post Defense

It shouldn’t surprise you that with all of the size the Lakers have in the frontcourt, they are the best team in the NBA when it comes to defending the post.  The Lakers hold opponents to just 0.750 points per possession in the post on 37.2% shooting.  The two best defenders in the post for the Lakers are Andrew Bynum and Lamar Odom (Pau Gasol is a decent post defender, but not close to Bynum or Odom).  Again, not a surprise, but the reason why these two are so good at defending the post is because they are able to use their length in a way that they don’t commit too many fouls when they have someone posting them up.

Here, Odom allows David Lee to back him down a bit, knowing that when Lee turns to take the shot, he can get his long arms in the air. Odom doesn’t really go for blocks and he uses his length to bother shots instead (this leads to less fouls in the post).

While Bynum has the length and uses it well, he is also think enough and strong enough to prevent his man from getting good position with the basketball:

Here, you see Al Jefferson trying to back Bynum down. Instead of pushing him with his arms (and picking up a foul), Bynum sticks his chest out and prevents Jefferson from backing him down. Jefferson doesn’t get to the spot he wants and misses the shot.

Los Angeles - Weaknesses

Defending Shooters Coming Off Screens

The only aspect where the Lakers rank in the lower half of the league on the defensive end (in terms of PPP) is when they are defending shooters coming off of screens away from the basketball.  The Lakers give up 0.932 PPP on 41.9% (23rd in the NBA), and the biggest reason why is Kobe Bryant.  Bryant is in the bottom 1/4 of the league in terms of PPP and he allows his opponent to shoot 42.1% when he comes off of screens away from the basketball.

This is a pretty good example of why Bryant gets hurt off of screens.  He tends to get caught watching the ball action, particularly when it is on the opposite side of the court, and when that happens, he is unable to react and effectively get around screens.  That is exactly what happens here as Gerald Wallace (old clip, I know) gets open for the easy jumper.

New Orleans – The Numbers*

• Defensive Efficiency: 102.5 (9th)
• Opp. TS%: 54.3% (15th)
• Opp. Assist Rate: 20.97 (21st)
• Opp. Turnover Rate: 14.37 (6th)
• Defensive Rebound Rate: 76.24 (2nd)
• Block Rate: 4.8 (17th)
• Opp. Free Throw Rate: 28.6 (9th)
• Opp. Three Point Rate: 24.8 (2nd)

New Orleans – Strengths

Post Up Defense

Much like Andrew Bynum, Emeka Okafor is able to use his size to play strong post defense, and Okafor is the anchor for the Hornets, who have one of the best post defenses in the NBA.  The Hornets give up just 0.834 PPP on 41.9% shooting when the offense tries to operate out of the block.  Okafor gets most of these defensive possessions, and he does a very good job of getting stops, holding opponents to 40.6% shooting.

On this play, Okafor is going up against Al Jefferson, who gets the ball on the block.  As Jefferson keeps his back turned to Okafor, feeling for him, Okafor has one arm on him and one arm in the air.  Okafor is able to do this because he is strong enough to keep Jefferson from backing him down with just one arm on Jefferson.  Okafor’s hand in the air before Jefferson made the move allows him to challenge the shot easily and force the miss.

New Orleans – Weaknesses

Isolation Defense

Much like the Pacers against the Bulls, the Lakers are a really tough match-up for the Hornets because the Lakers are a team that loves to isolate, specifically with one superstar (Kobe Bryant), and guys who the Hornets have to defend that guy are really poor.  In terms of points per possession, Trevor Ariza is in the bottom 15% of the league, giving up 1.04 PPP on 49% shooting.  Even worse than Ariza and the fact that he gives up 49% shooting is the amount of fouls he takes when defending in isolation.  In fact, out of the 315 players who have been isolated at least 20 possessions, Ariza’s FT% (% of possessions where the opponent goes to the line) finds him 297th in the league as his opponents end up taking FTs 18.5% of the time.  Ariza’s biggest problem is that he can’t stay on his feet on a pump fake:

In both of these cases, Ariza has no business leaving his feet.  The shot clock is running down and it looks like the offensive player is going to be forced into a tough shot.  In both cases, Ariza bails them out by biting on a pump fake and then jumping into them.

In addition to this, Ariza is simply too handsy when his opponent has the basketball.  This leaves him susceptible to the “rip-through” move that seems to be trending throughout the league.

Whether you like the rip through move or not, a rule is a rule and you need to learn to adjust. Ariza has shown that he isn’t able to do this.

With Ariza most likely going up against Kobe Bryant for a good chunk of this series, I wouldn’t be surprised to see Bryant really go off one or two games this series, getting to the free throw line a ton.

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*All numbers come from the fantastic website Hoopdata.com

• Pace: 93.3 (18th)
• Offensive Efficiency: 107.9 (7th)
• True Shooting Percentage: 54.5% (11th)
• Assist Rate: 20.70 (10th)
• Turnover Rate: 12.33 (3rd)
• Offensive Rebound Rate: 29.19 (5th)
• Free Throw Rate: 29.3 (16th)
• Three Point Rate: 22.0 (16th)

Los Angeles – Strengths

Posting Out Of The Triangle

The Los Angeles Lakers are one of the best teams in the NBA in terms of posting up their opponents.  As a team, the Lakers are 4th in the league in PPP and are shooting 46.8% on post up opportunities.  One of the reasons why they are able to be so successful is because they are able to use their Triangle Offense to get post up opportunities.  The first set the Lakers run (and they seem to run this the most out of their post plays) is a basic set designed to give the man posting up room to work with:

On both of the above plays, the design is to get the basketball into the paint and then clear out for their big with the basketball.  This gives the big a whole half of the court to work with, and with everyone clearing out, there isn’t a worry about a double team.  This allows the Lakers’ bigs to take their time, make their move, and finish.

The Lakers also like to get post up opportunities from the weakside:

Here, Gasol flashes from the weakside to the strong side, completing the triangle.  Once that happens, he gets the basketball on the block.  You then have the same basic clear out, allowing Gasol to work one-on-one.

In addition to the Lakers’ bigs posting up, Kobe Bryant is also very successful on the block.  According to Synergy, out of Lakers’ 1,716 post up possessions, Bryant has gotten 409 (or 23.8%).  On these post touches, Bryant posts a PPP of 1.02 on 48.5% shooting.  The Lakers don’t really do anything special for Bryant to get him the ball on the post, in fact, they use him just like a big.

The reason why this is so successful is because this is just another way the Lakers are able to isolate Kobe one-on-one.  Here, Bryant gets the basketball, faces up, and hits the step back jumper in the paint.

Isolation Offense

We all know how much Kobe Bryant likes to get isolated in the Lakers offense, and while many may argue (effectively in my opinion) that there is too much of this late, you can’t question how successful Kobe is in the isolation.  When Kobe Bryant looks to score in isolation, he posts a PPP of 1.00 (this is good for 24th among players with at least 20 isolation possessions).  This success scoring out of isolation sets allows for Bryant to have success when passing out of his one-on-one situations.  Bryant’s overall isolation offense (including his passes out of isolation situations) has a PPP of 1.049.  When Bryant does make the pass (20% of his total number of isolation possessions) he is able to get his teammates wide open looks:

Here, Bryant gets isolated in the corner, right off the opening tip.  Artest’s man leaves him to double Bryant, which forces Derek Fisher’s man to help on Artest’s cut.  This leaves Fisher wide open behind the three point line.  Bryant hits him with the pass and Fisher knocks down the three.

Los Angeles – Weaknesses

Scoring Off Of Ball Screens

When looking into the Lakers’ recent slide for Basketball Prospectus, I noticed that the Lakers were running more pick and rolls than average.  This is a problem because the Lakers are a poor pick and roll team, especially when the ball handler tries to create coming off of the screen.  Bryant uses ballscreens to try and create off of the dribble, but when you are bringing screens to him, you are actually bringing more defenders to the area:

Here, Bryant comes off of the screen looking to score. Bryant tries to attack the rim, but the screen actually brought more attention to him as the defense collapses on his drive. Eventually, Serge Ibaka, who switched onto Bryant after his man set the screen, blocks the shot.

New Orleans – The Numbers*

• Pace: 90.7 (29th)
• Offensive Efficiency: 103.8 (19th)
• True Shooting Percentage: 53.7% (16th)
• Assist Rate: 20.33 (16th)
• Turnover Rate: 12.85 (8th)
• Offensive Rebound Rate: 25.11 (20th)
• Free Throw Rate: 29.6 (15th)
• Three Point Rate: 19.2 (21st)

New Orleans – Strengths

Paul Using Ball Screens

When Chris Paul comes off of ball screens, he is one of the most effective and efficient players in the NBA.  Paul has gotten more than half (54.2% to be exact) of the Hornets ballscreens posting a PPP of 1.04 which is the 11th best number in the league of out players with at least 70 ball screen possessions.  The reason why this is important in this series is because without David West, there isn’t that popping threat anymore (West was one of the most effective pick and pop players in the league despite being a terrible screener).  Paul now has Carl Landry, a more traditional screener, setting most of his screens so this means that Paul will have more space to operate (and he needs to take this space, because as I shown in the past, Landry can’t replace West in the pick and pop game).  When Paul comes off of the screen, he is usually taking a jumper and does so 77% of the time.

This is a perfect example of why Paul needs to look to create on his own when Landry sets screens.  If this was David West, he would have popped out already and probably have been open.  Instead, Landry resets the screen, sets and effective screen, and creates the space for Paul to get an easy jumper.

Here, Landry sets a strong screen, forcing the defender to go under the screen and giving Paul plenty of space to knock down the jumper.

This doesn’t mean that Paul can’t be effective when he attacks the rim as well, posting a PPP of 1.242 when he attacks the rim coming off of ball screens.

Here, Landry’s screen gets just enough of Grant Hill and forcing Hill onto Paul’s hip.  With Hill no longer in front of Paul, he is able to attack the rim and get the lay-in.

New Orleans – Weaknesses

Cutting Off The Ball

In terms of cutting off of the basketball, the New Orleans Hornets are 26th in the NBA in terms of points per possession.  This is in large part due to Carl Landry and his poor finishing at the rim.  Landry is shooting just 53.3% (remember these are cuts, meaning that they take place right at the rim, meaning higher FG%s, so 53.3% is actually at the lower end in this case), and that is because he doesn’t have the size to finish at the rim:

Here, Landry gets the ball cutting to the rim and since he lacks the height to go right over the defense, he is forced to put the ball on the ground and try to make a spin move, missing the shot.

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*All numbers come from the fantastic website Hoopdata.com

This is because if Landry can’t replace West and what he does, and do it in the same way, the Hornets are going to be forced into switching around what they do on the offensive end.  So the first thing that we need to look at when asking if Carl Landry can replace David West is the possession breakdown.  The following graph shows how both players have been used this season with the Hornets (numbers from Synergy Sports Technology):

When looking at the possession breakdown you notice West gets isolated a little bit more and the Hornets run more plays for West to come off screens for jumpers while Landry gets more chances off of offensive rebounds and cuts to the rim.  That makes sense since West was the better shooter and overall player of the two.  Other than those small changes things look pretty similar, especially with the two most used categories.  Both players get posted up 28% of the time, while the percentage of possessions used for both is also similar (West uses 15% of possessions for the pick and roll while Landry uses 14%).

Now that we see the Hornets using Landry the same way as West, we have to ask, should they be?  To figure this out, we need to look at the points per possession of two key categories, post-ups and pick and rolls:

While we see that David West is much more effective when in the pick and roll, we also see that Carl Landry has been much more effective in the post than West during his time with New Orleans.  So why has West been more effective than Landry with the pick and roll?  Because West is the much better player when being used in the pick and pop.  The following graph shows how each player has been used when coming off of screens they have set:

Though West pops out vs. rolling to the rim at a higher percentage than Landry, you can see that the Hornets have asked Landry to do the same.  Landry pops 67% of the time he sets a screen, (45th most in the NBA.  West’s % is 31st in the NBA).  While both players pop out at almost the same rate, they aren’t even close in terms of success.  Landry has posted a PPP of 0.900 on 45% shooting vs. West and his PPP of 1.028 on 51.8% shooting.  So why is Landry less successful than West?  It’s the way they set screens:

I have said it in the past, but David West is the best worst screener in the NBA.  He almost never makes contact, and while that doesn’t help Chris Paul get open, it is one of the reasons why West is able to be so successful in the pick and pop.  The lack of contact allows West to get to his spot, make himself available for the pass, get the ball, and knock down the wide open jumper.  It is almost like a slipped screen, so when West’s man hedges on the screen, it is hard for him to recover and close out on the shot.

On the other hand, Landry sets a more traditional screen, waiting until Paul uses the screen before popping out:

Doing so allows his man to hedge, and get back in time to prevent a dribble drive and contest a shot.  Landry is already a worse shooter than West, add the fact that Landry is taking more contested jumpers, and that means he is going to be much less effective in the pick and pop.  Landry isn’t much better when he is rolling to the rim, as his PPP when doing so is 1.0 (good for 101st in the NBA).

So when asking if Landry can replace West, you see that he can/the Hornets are trying to make it work. Will it be successful in the playoffs? I just don’t see it happening.  The Hornets need to make a few changes, including using screens more to get Chris Paul to the rim rather than using them to get the basketball to the roll man, and posting Landry up more.  So far as a Hornet, Landry has been pretty effective in the post.  I think that if the Hornets use take a few of his pick and roll plays and change them into post-up opportunities, the Hornets will be more effective on the offensive end and harder to stop in the playoffs.

Play 3 (1 Point) – Doug Collins/Philadelphia 76ers

The Sixers beat the Blazers’ full court press and get into their set with Lou Williams taking the basketball to the wing and then hitting Thaddeus Young at the top of the key.  Young swings the basketball and then sets a pindown for Jodie Meeks.  After setting that screen, Young comes off of an Elton Brand screen, coming open in the corner.  Young makes the catch and knocks down the open jumper.

Play 2 (2 Points) – Monty Williams/New Orleans Hornets

This play comes off of the opening tap after Emeka Okafor wins it.  Chris Paul brings the basketball up and gets it to Marco Belinelli.  Paul fakes a cut in the lane and then pops back out to the top of the key and gets the basketball back.  Okafor then sets a ballscreen for ball, and instead of rolling, he sets an off ball screen for Belinelli.  Belinelli comes off of Okafor’s screen, makes the catch, and knocks down the open jumper.

Play 1 (3 Points) – Doc Rivers/Boston Celtics

Here, the Celtics are running a SLOB set with only one second left on the shotclock.  To get an open look, the Celtics go to their calling card coming out of timeouts, multiple options.  Kevin Garnett comes off of a backscreen towards the rim as if he is getting a lob.  Paul Pierce comes off of a Glen Davis screen and flashes to the corner.  Finally, Ray Allen comes off of that same Davis screen towards the top of the key.  With the defense forced to focus on so many different things, Allen, one of the best shooters in the history of the NBA, is able to come off of a screen wide open and knock down a jumper.

Updated Standings (Previous)

1. Doc Rivers – 33 points (1st)
2. Erik Spoelstra – 30 points (2nd)
3. Gregg Popovich – 19 points (3rd)
4. Monty Williams – 18 points (4th)
5. Rick Carlisle – 13 points (5th)
6. Frank Vogel – 12 points (6th)
7. Phil Jackson – 12 points (7th)
8. Alvin Gentry –  10 points (8th)
9. Tom Thibodeau – 7 points (9th)
10. Rick Adelman – 7 points (10th)
11. Nate McMillan – 6 points (11th)
12. Larry Drew – 6 points (12th)
13. Scott Brooks – 6 points (13th)
14. Jerry Sloan – 4 points (14th)
15. Ty Corbin – 4 points (15th)
16. Avery Johnson – 3 points (16th)
17. Lionel Hollins – 3 points (17th)
18. George Karl – 3 points (18th)
19. Scott Skiles – 3 points (19th)
20. Mike D’Antoni – 3 points (20th)
21. Jay Triano – 2 points (21st)
22. Byron Scott – 2 points (22nd)
23. Stan Van Gundy – 2 points (23rd)
24. Flip Saunders – 2 points (24th)
25. Doug Collins – 2 point (26th)
26. Paul Silas – 1 point (25th)
27. John Kuester – 1 point (27th)
28. Keith Smart – 1 point (28th)
29. Vinny Del Negro – 1 point (29th)

After Erik Spoelstra tied him, Doc Rivers was able to pull away from him once again, taking control of sole possession of first place.  Meanwhile Monty Williams inches closer to Gregg Popovich and third place as Doug Collins hops Paul Silas towards the bottom of the standings.