In game two of their first round matchup, the Dallas Mavericks found themselves in another tight game against the Oklahoma City Thunder..  Early in the fourth quarter, Mavericks head coach Rick Carlisle went to a small line up of Jason Kidd, Jason Terry, Vince Carter, Shawn Marion, and Dirk Nowitzki.

With this lineup on the floor, the Mavs showed a play that starts with: Carter on the weak-side block, Marion and Nowitzki in a perpendicular double screen, Terry heading down the strong-side of the floor, and Kidd bringing up the ball:

The play begins with Carter coming across to set a cross screen for Terry:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3ge4u77I0QY&w=420&h=243]

As Terry goes underneath Carter’s screen, Harden plays off Carter to deny a direct pass under the basket.  Off the cross screen, Terry heads directly to the perpendicular double screen.  Carter drifts to the corner and Marion ducks in the lane towards the strong-side block.  The Thunder play the double screen straight, with Russell Westbrook trailing and Serge Ibaka sticking with Nowitzki, allowing Terry to catch the pass off the double.  Terry chooses to enter the ball into Nowitzki and the two immediately engage in a pick and pop with Terry as the screener.  Westbrook hedges softly as Ibaka fights over the top of the screen, giving Dirk a small window to hit Terry on the pop.  With the entire left side of the floor clear, Terry quickly attacks the feet of the scrambling Westbrook and is able to draw the foul.

Later in the quarter, the Mavs go back to the same lineup and the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LS6_ufep8Z8&w=420&h=243]

Again we see Terry go underneath the cross screen set by Carter.  Marion ducks across and Carter drifts to the corner to form a weak-side “Triangle Away.” Harden plays off Carter to deny and Westbrook trails Terry who continues on to the double screen.  This time, Kendrick Perkins is on Nowitzki and he decides to step out to deny Terry penetration.  Terry gets the ball to Dirk, who also takes advantage of the cleared left side by driving to the basket.  Harden and Durant both go to help Perkins, leaving two Thunder defenders to guard three Mavericks shooters.  The ball is promptly swung to Terry who misses the wide open three.  However, Dirk uses some veteran savvy and ends the Mavs possession with free throws.

On the next possession, the Mavericks run the same play on the other side of the floor:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbjO_vOO1EA&w=420&h=243]

When Carter goes to set the cross screen, the Mavericks know Harden will play off Carter, so the Mavs make a subtle adjustment.  Terry doesn’t bother to go under Carter’s screen, instead Carter uses Terry to seal Harden on the block.  Harden plays solid defense, but Carter uses his size to back into the paint and is able to rise up over the contest to hit a tough banker.

Once again, the Mavericks go back to the same play:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mrFupHibT3I&w=420&h=243]

This time Terry goes under Carter’s cross screen.  Harden denies Carter in the post and Westbrook goes over the top of the screen to deny the direct pass to Terry under the basket.  Kidd attempts to lob the ball over Harden’s denial, but the pass sails on him and Durant is there to steal the ball (as he was playing Marion, who was preparing to duck across).

Unlike the NFL, the NBA season is too long for teams to truly hold onto trump cards.  Eventually, teams must show their hand.  As teams become more familiar with each other, in game adjustments become more crucial.  A coach’s experience making these adjustment not only shifts the outcome of games, but may help determine who is eventually crowned champion.

Joon Kim is the author of NBA Breakdown, and its subsidiaries, Spurs Motion Offense and The Triangle Offense — a tree of sites dedicated to basketball fundamentals.  You can follow Joon on Twitter: @JoonKim00.

To say that Ibaka has been putting on a basket denying clinic this past season would be a severe understatement. Ibaka’s 3.7 blocks per game average is the highest we have seen in the NBA since Theo Ratliff in 2000-01 season. Ibaka’s dominance of that category has been so thorough that the next closest player (Javale McGee) trails him by a difference of 1.5 bpg. Not since the 1984-85 season when Hakeem Olajuwon trailed Mark Eaton by 2.9 bpg have we seen such a discrepancy between the top two shot blockers in the league (Eaton set the NBA mark with 5.6 bpg that year).

With Ibaka’s impeccable timing, high defensive acumen and freakish athleticism, there is no question why he won the NBA’s shot-blocking title this season. Also, unlike other young shot blockers, Ibaka takes the Bill Russell approach of trying to keep the ball inbounds whenever he gets his hands on it. This creates more transition scoring opportunities for two of the best fast-break finishers in the league in Westbrook and Durant. His production this year was one of the reasons that the Thunder sat atop the Western Conference standings for much of the regular season.

So what makes him so successful in the art of shot blocking? Let’s take a look at the types of blocks and how Ibaka excels at them.

1. Weakside Rotations

Most elite defenders sacrifice proper team defensive position in order to make a big, defensive play. Gambling is a part of playing defense, but just like in Vegas, you have to know when to pick your spots or you will get busted out.

In this clip vs. the Nuggets (4/25/12), while guarding Faried on the left block, Ibaka does a good job loading over to a rolling Javale McGee on the ball screen.

On the skip pass, Ibaka shifts back to put himself in a defensive position where he can see Faried, the opposite post-up and the ball all while simultaneously moving himself out of the paint to avoid an illegal defense call.

On the post feed, Ibaka now only has to focus on two things, his man and the ball. He watches McGee attempt to baseline quick-spin/counter middle Kendrick Perkins. Perkins does a great job of “walling up” which forces McGee to kill his live dribble. The moment McGee kills his dribble; Ibaka sprints over for the weakside block.

2. Walling Up

Given their height and length, every post defender at all levels is taught to “wall up” when guarding or helping on an offensive player who has killed his live dribble. This is done in an effort to avoid a cheap foul and to also force the offensive player to make a difficult shot over outstretched hands. Ibaka uses his 7’4 wingspan to his advantage in this shot blocking technique as well as anybody not named Tyson Chandler in the NBA.

In this game vs. the Clippers (4/16/12), Ibaka does a good job of showing on the ball screen set by Kenyon Martin. This show causes Chris Paul to have to flatten out his dribble.

When CP3 flattens out his dribble, he calls for another ball screen from the 5 (DeAndre Jordan). Perkins recognizes this and communicates the switch to Ibaka.

Jordan never gets a chance to set a good screen, so the Thunder posts can stay with their current switched matchups. On the retreat back down to Jordan on the left block, Ibaka puts himself in a position where he can see the ball, his man and the opposite corner. When Chris Paul makes a great bounce pass to Randy Foye in the right corner, Sefolosha is slow to react which forces Ibaka’s help on Foye’s drive. Recognizing that he has a huge size advantage and that Foye killed his live dribble early, Ibaka walls up which leads to an easy block and a shot clock violation by the Clippers.

3. Multiple Efforts

Versus the Lakers (4/22/12), Ibaka does a great job of knowing their personnel by being prepared to jump to the next logical pass when Kobe Bryant is funneled to the short corner and remaining disciplined on his close out to the shot-fake happy Pau Gasol.

On the short corner feed to Andrew Bynum, Ibaka waits until Bynum picks up his dribble on the baseline spin move to leave his feet for the 1st block.

With his head completely under the net, Ibaka has enough athleticism to keep his balance and recognizes that Devin Ebanks got the offensive rebound and is about to lay it up. Ibaka explodes for the 2nd block keeping the ball inbounds the entire possession.

4. Confrontation

Every great shot blocker has been dunked on. That is the price you pay when you challenge elite athletes at the rim. But when your primary rim protector makes a huge block during a mid-air confrontation, it can ignite your team. In this game vs. Nuggets, Ibaka displays his fearlessness with a play on Corey Brewer’s drive to the basket.

On this side out of bounds, the Nuggets lift the 5 (Al Harrington) to the right elbow in an effort to catch OKC sleeping on a back door to the 2 (Ty Lawson). When that doesn’t work, the 1 (Andre Miller) reverses the ball to the 4 (Danilo Gallinari) on the left wing for a dribble hand off (DHO) to the 3 (Corey Brewer) lifting from the deep left corner. On the DHO, Brewer catches Sefolosha sliding a step behind his offensive momentum and executes a quick pocket cross over.

After the crossover, Gallinari pins (illegally) Daequan Cook behind him so Brewer only sees daylight on his straight line drive to the basket.

Because Al Harrington has stretched to the short corner, Ibaka has to make a decision to leave an above average jump shooter (39.5% on Overall Spot Ups according to Synergy Sports Technology) or help to stop the ball. Almost always, the leading rim protector will choose to step up to stop the ball and it helps that Derek Fisher is in Corey Brewer’s logical passing lane if he did decide to dump off to Al Harrington for the short corner jumper. Even though Brewer elevates way before him, Ibaka still makes a big-time defensive play while keeping the ball in-bounds.

5. Half Court Chase Down

The 5th and final way to successfully block a shot is no doubt the most difficult. More than likely, when a post player has to chase down a block in the half court, he or his teammates probably made a mistake in the assigned defensive scheme. This was the case in the Thunder’s first game of the 2012 Playoffs vs. the Mavericks (4/28/12), but nevertheless Ibaka made up for his teammate’s miscue.

On this 4-5 ball screen, Nick Collison’s man Brendan Wright sets a right wing ball screen on a great shooter in Dirk Nowitzki. Ibaka again recognizing personnel knows he can’t go under the screen because Dirk is a great 3-point shooter. Collison initially looks like he is going to zone/down the ball handler.

When Dirk recognizes how extremely far off the other three Thunder defenders are off from the midline, he picks up his dribble. This causes Collison to switch completely onto Dirk which opens up a passing lane for Dirk to deliver the ball to Wright.

After a subtle push off from Wright, Ibaka notices he is about a step and half behind Wright when Dirk releases the ball. Although he has both heels on the charging semi-circle, Daequan Cook attempting to take a charge forces Wright to have to open up his shoulders on his left-handed layup attempt. This is just the little space Ibaka needs to come in and erase two points.

There are five ways to block a shot and Ibaka has mastered them all. For the Thunder to hoist the Larry O’Brien trophy this June, Ibaka will need to showcase that mastery all postseason long.

The play starts with Harden always in the right corner (so he can drive middle with his dominant left hand) and the ball in the hands of the Thunder’s backup point guard, currently Derek Fisher. Dirk-stopper Nick Collison begins the action by sprinting to set a ball screen for Fisher at the top of the key. This screen, commonly referred to as false action (because it’s used to set up the real threat of the play), forces a quick hedge by Collison’s defender freeing him for a catch on a pass back from Fisher.

This false action now sets up the real design of the play; to get Harden into a dribble hand-off (DHO) while sprinting up from the deep corner.

Harden’s read are simple:
- Backcut if denied getting to the screen
- Curl if the screener’s defender offers no hedge protection
- Straight cut (usually for a 3pt shot) if both defenders sag under or Harden’s man gets caught in the screen

And if no initial opening appears after the DHO, Harden and Collison can re-engage in screening action (Either a step-up or traditionally side pick and roll).

The key to all this is the weakside spacing. The other two perimeter players and second post form what is referred to as a “Triangle Away”. The alignment that allows for gaps to be open both on the baseline and for any middle attack Harden chooses to make off the bounce.

In Game 1 against Dallas, Harden finds the space for 3-point shot thanks largely to Dirk Nowitzki cutting in front of his defender (Delonte West) while trying to recover to Collison’s roll to open space after the DHO.

This set is used so frequently by the Thunder because it is a read-based play. Harden essentially just has to react to both his defender and the screener’s to make the cut that puts the most pressure on the defense. So the result in Game 1 maybe nothing like the results you see the rest of the series. The only certainty about this play is that you will see it.

For the past year, the Thunder have been criticized for their perceived inability to execute in the half-court, especially in the playoffs. But it appears Scott Brooks and his staff designed a play that fits their team’s personnel so perfectly it was almost impossible to defend.

The set usually begins with some false action that leads into a dribble flip (DF) between Kendrick Perkins and of the Thunders two primary ball handlers (Russell Westbrook and James Harden). Perkins then sprints out of the DF into either a rim run or a pin down with Kevin Durant moving off either action on the weakside. The strongside of the floor is usually spread opposite, giving Durant the option to tight curl into the paint and attack the rim.

That is the normal pattern of the play which, even without any wrinkles, poses enough problems for an opposing defense. But in the fourth quarter of last night’s game, the Thunder (perhaps by accident), introduced a new wrinkle that made it nearly indefensible.

Out of a dead ball walk-up, Westbrook passes ahead to Harden and shallow cuts across the key toward the opposite wing. Durant begins to position himself on the left block.

Harden swings the ball to the trailing Perkins who catches and immediately performs the dribble flip with Westbrook.

Here is where the new “wrinkle” comes in. As Perkins goes to pin down for Durant, Ibaka, instead of spacing the floor as a spot up option, begins to move toward Westbrook as if to set a ball screen. With the threat of a ball screen, Haslem must come up with Ibaka in order to be in a position to hedge should Westbrook choose to use it.

Due to Durant’s effectiveness as a catch and shoot player, the defender guarding the screener must be very active in help. Here, Chris Bosh shows well above the screen (which Perkins immediately slips) in order to make things difficult on Durant. Normally, there would be a low defender to rotate over to Perkins in order to prevent a lay-up, but Ibaka’s move toward the top has pulled everyone near or above the free throw line extended making a rotation extremely difficult.

The result of the play is a wide open dunk by Perkins with nary a Miami player in sight.

Here is the play in real time:

This type of outcome screams “blown rotation”, when in all reality, it’s not. Any help defender who might rotate over to help out on the pin down action would free up something equally destructive

James dropping leaves Westbrook free in the middle of the court to do as he pleases. A rotation from Wade (hidden behind Ibaka in the fourth picture) is not only impossibly difficult, but has the side effect of leaving Harden alone on the wing. Haslem, as mentioned before, is the closest rotation, but leaving Ibaka opens up three dicey propositions: Ibaka can

- sprint from the elbow to the right side of the rim for an uncontested lob
- screen away for Harden on the wing with no big to protect Wade
- screen on the ball for Westbrook without a big to slow the explosive point guard down as he turns the corner

Perhaps the simplest way to defend this play is for Bosh to stay flat with the screener, instead of hedging so aggressively out on Durant so no rotation is necessary. If that’s the choice, than the result is letting Durant tight curl for a shot or rim attack 10-12 times per game while his defender (Shane Battier in this case) trails helplessly behind. Oh, and if Durant’s defender decides to shoot the gap instead of trail, he’ll be met with a fade cut and a barrage of wide open corner 3’s.

Just when it seems all hope is lost for a defense, it’s important to remember that any offense with Kendrick Perkins will still have a weakpoint. On a set like this, the ball should be funneled to him, just not in the manner which leads to Perkins getting easy shots at the rim.

One way teams could try to slow this maneuver down is by switching the pin down between Durant and Perkins. Durant’s defender could jam Perkins while the big guarding Perk would switch out hard on Durant, looking to deny him the ball. The hope would be that the Thunder, if unable to get the ball to Durant, would either be forced to run secondary action or feed the ball into Perkins on the block. Given the aforementioned scenarios above, Perkins in the post against a wing defender seems like pretty palatable.

The danger would be Durant getting the ball against the switched out big. Whichever player ends up isolated on Durant, should pressure the ball (looking to deny a 3-point attempt) and force Durant baseline in hopes a swift rotation forces him to settle for a mid-range pull up. Not ideal, but something an opponent could consistently concede and still stay in the game. (The Heat, with Bosh, Ronny Turiaf, Joel Anthony and Haslem are probably better equipped to handle this strategy better than most teams.)

The play won’t work every time. Durant will occasionally get bumped off his curl by his primary defender, or another Thunder player won’t make the right read. But this set is just more proof that the Thunder no longer are searching for the best way to incorporate their outstanding talents into a cohesive whole on the offensive end.

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In the first clip, the Thunder come out of a sideline out-of-bounds looking to run Durant off a screen from Kendrick Perkins on the left side of the floor. KD comes off and immediately kicks to Russell Westbrook sliding on along the 3-point arc after delivering the pass. Westbrook attacks hard rip off the pass back and draws a foul in the middle of the paint.

What makes this opening possible is Memphis’ Tony Allen stunting ever so slightly on his catch to ward off a middle drive by Durant as his defender, Rudy Gay, recovers through the screen.

This movement and quick pass back to Westbrook creates a small closeout situation that the explosive Westbrook easily exploits.
The next possession is something most fans are used to seeing, Durant curling off a screen and draining a mid-range jumper.

What allows this to happen is Marc Gasol failing to offer curl protection on a trailing Gay. If Durant has a trailing defender and doesn’t see a hard show, it makes his read very simple; catch and shoot.

Perhaps overcompensating from Durant’s open jumper the previous trip down the floor, the Grizzlies Mareese Speights shows out a little too early on the next screen in the following possession. Durant and Ibaka combine to read the play and the result is an uncontested dunk by Serge Ibaka.

We’re starting to see how complicated this seemingly simple action can be. In the following picture, we’ll realize that if Speights hedges hard to contest a Durant jumper. With Durant making such an efficient read coming off the screen, the only saving grace is an extremely quick rotation from Gasol over to Ibaka.

Gasol’s rotation, as the video showed, doesn’t get there and it’s two more Thunder points.

With all this attention centered around the screening action itself, it’s easy to forget about the weakside of the floor. Durant takes care of that by coming off another screen from Ibaka, taking one dribble toward the middle of the paint, then kicking out to a wide open Daequan Cook for 3.

In the following freeze, you’ll see that literally all five Grizzlies defenders are in the paint, focused on the Durant. Cook is left with more than enough space to knock down the shot.

After making great reads to find teammates, Durant’s read the next possession allows him to find his offense. Durant comes off an Ibaka screen that Speights is now hesitant to show on. Durant is then able to hangs in the air and nail a right-hand runner.

Taking a closer look, we see that Speights failure to show forces Tony Allen to attempt to disrupt Durant’s move toward the middle of the paint. Allen, unable to get his body in front of KD and force and non-penetrating pass out, can only swipe at the ball.

As this crazy saga continues, we see that Durant’s last attempt causes the newly inserted Dante Cunningham to focus too much on him. This time, Westbrook finds a slipping Ibaka for a two shot foul.

The final result of this series is similar to how it began. This time, the defense is so focused on defending the pin down action, they forget all other help responsibilities. Westbrook, taking advantage of Tony Allen perhaps shading toward Durant’s side of the floor, blows by him toward the rim en route to another foul.

Cunningham, focused entirely too much on the possible screen coming away from the ball, doesn’t realize Westbrook is barreling toward the rim until it’s too late.

This entire sequence of playcalling allowed the Thunder to be incredibly efficient and stay in the game until Durant took over late in the fourth. Scott Brooks, sometimes maligned for his offensive acumen, does a great job during this stretch of simply pounding Memphis with an action they were unable to contain. If the Thunder and Brooks can continue to exploit defense like this, OKC won’t be falling back to the pack anytime soon.

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The biggest thing that I noticed with Ibaka is not only the fact that he was knocking down jumpers, he was comfortable taking them, and he had a very good pace/rhythm with the basketball.  This is important because with the roster Oklahoma City has, they don’t need Ibaka to be an offensive powerhouse, but they need him to be comfortable with the basketball and comfortable taking 15-17 footers.  Before we get into all that let’s talk about Ibaka’s jumper.  I always thought he had good form and when he shot it confidently he had a good shot a making it.  The numbers show us this.  When Ibaka took an open jumper (situations where he was the most comfortable), he knocked it down, shooting 50% (55-110 on unguarded jumpers according to Synergy).  Against France, Ibaka looked comfortable:

Here, Ibaka makes the catch, sees that he is open, and simply pulls up.  When Ibaka is being confident with his jumper, he seems to be more patient.  When he is more patient, he’s better offensively.  After knocking down that first jumper, look at how Ibaka reacts to the defense closing out hard on him:

Here, Ibaka makes the catch, turns to see Ronny Turiaf closing hard at him after he knocked down the jump.  Instead of panicing, Ibaka jab steps, takes a couple of dribbles, and gets in a position where a turn around jumper isn’t a crazy shot from him, using his height to get a shot over Turiaf.

Where confidence in his jumper helps Ibaka the most is on the block.  According to Synergy Ibaka was a below average post player.  Working from the left block (where he posted up 72.9% of the time) Ibaka was most dangerous when facing up, something he did 42.6% of his left block posts.  Ibaka used his speed, being most effective when facing up and driving to the middle.  However, once teams realized this and backed off of him, he was forced to take a jumper, and he struggled with those.  Again, Ibaka’s newfound confidence and patience helped him here against France:

Watch how Turiaf is playing off of him, worried about the dribble penetration because of Ibaka’s quickness.  Instead of rushing into a move, Ibaka faces up, identifies how the defense is playing him, and confidently takes a jump shot.  If that starts happening consistently, Ibaka will be pretty tough to guard when facing up (you have to play the shot, but if you get too close he’ll go right by you).

With all this being said, it is still obvious that Ibaka isn’t all the way there, as a few times against France he went back into “rushing it” mode:

When he rushes, Ibaka looks very sloppy, falling down and getting blocked in this particular instance.

–

With Serge Ibaka, I don’t know if he needs to develop any physical skills during the offseason, but he does need to develop mentally, and watching Spain play against France, you can start to see that development.  Now, whether this is Ibaka doing work on his own, becoming more comfortable with his shot (therefore being more confident), or getting all this experience working with Pau Gasol watching him work, either way you can see that he is already way ahead of where he was at the end of the postseason with Oklahoma City.

If this continues, and Ibaka plays well during EuroBasket, teams in the Western Conference have another reason to be scared of Oklahoma City.  After Durant, Westbrook, and Harden, you know have a guy like Ibaka playing confidently and smartly.

Picking up the play halfway through, we see that the Mavericks have isolated Dirk Nowitzki at the top of the key.  Nick Collison is up on him (as he has been for much of the series), taking getting into his body and being physical with him.

As Nowitzki makes his move, Kevin Durant leaves his man and gets in the middle of the paint to prevent any drive from coming.  Continuing the rotation, James Harden comes down and picks up Shawn Marion (the man Durant left), which is a good play from Oklahoma City.  They are sending a help man at Dirk and giving up the pass to the corner, to J.J. Barea, who is not a strong three point shooter.

As the shot goes up, we now see the Thunder’s defense failing.  Instead of turning and finding a player to box out, all four defenders who are around the basket simply look up to watch the basketball in the air.  With everybody watching the ball and nobody boxing out, Shawn Marion is able to get from the block to the front of the rim untouched.

With Marion at the front of the rim, he is able to cause havoc as the basketball comes off of the rim, getting his hands on it and backtapping the basketball.

Marion backtaps it to Jason Kidd (also not boxed out), who is able secure the ball and kick it out to Dirk Nowitzki, forcing the foul and essentially ending the game.  Here is the play in real time:

It is said that a defensive possession doesn’t end until you secure the basketball, and this is the perfect example.  Oklahoma City (and Nick Collison in particular) played great defense initially, but a lack of a box out allowed Shawn Marion to get his hand on the basketball and clinch the game for the Mavericks.

After James Harden inbounds the basketball to Russell Westbrook, Westbrook hands it off to Harden on the wing and then clears out to the weakside corner.

The primary action (which is a solid one) is a double screen for Harden with both Durant and Collison coming over and setting a screen for Harden, giving him an option to go whichever way he wants.  Harden decides to use Collison’s screen and take the basketball to the middle of the court.  Dallas does a fantastic job of stifling the play by switching as Tyson Chandler steps up to pick up Harden and Jason Terry picking up Collison.

With Chandler stepping up to play defense, it forces Harden to take a dribble backwards.  Now, with the first option (the Harden/Collison) pick and roll dead, the Thunder should be moving on to the second option.  However, there is no second option.  Instead the three Thunder players not involved in the pick and roll (Durant/Maynor/Westbrook) just stand there, watching the action.

The Mavericks’ defense on this play shouldn’t be ignored, because it was solid, as the Mavericks do a good job of switching back and recovering on the pick and roll, eventually forcing Harden to pick up his dribble at the three point line.  Now forced to try and pass it, Harden looks around for a pass as all three players not involved in the pick and roll continue to stand around.

Eventually, the ball goes to Eric Maynor, who sees Dirk Nowitzki covering him and trie to take advantage of the mismatch, waving off his teammates to work one-on-one.

Maynor is unable to get to the rim, so he is forced to take a fall away jumper with Nowitzki closing out on him, forcing Maynor to shoot an airball.  Eventually, Nick Collison saves the ball right to the Mavericks, and that leads to a dunk plus the foul, stretching Dallas’ lead to four points.  Here is the play in real time:

Much like Russell Westbrook, Eric Maynor really isn’t at fault here.  In my opinion, coach Scott Brooks is for not providing a second option or any weakside action off of the basketball.  Without a gameplan to stick to, you have your young guy (Maynor in this case) deciding to try and go with the basketball.  This has been a problem for Oklahoma City all postseason long, where the Thunder run don’t run an offense, or they run one set and just expect it to work.  You look at the best coaches in these situations (Doc Rivers and Gregg Popovich in my opinion), and one of the common threads in their sets is that they run a ton of backside action.  Whether or not this action will directly result in a shot, the defense has to respect it, and it makes everything easier.

Maybe the most frustrating thing about the Thunder’s offense is when they have movement and have action on the weakside, they are usually successful.  Take a look at a similar play from earlier in the series:

You have the same starting action with the Harden getting the basketball and the play starts with the Thunder setting a double screen for him. As this takes place, there is a backscreen for Cook off of the ball. With everyone watching Harden, Cook is able to get wide open for the three.

Now, I’m not saying run that exact play (they didn’t really have the personel to run it in that situation), but the concept remains the same. Why not as Harden comes off of the screen have Eric Maynor set a pindown screen for Russell Westbrook, allowing him to curl off of that pindown and get the ball on the move (something Westbrook was doing a great job of doing all game long), allowing him to finish on the cut.