When Passing > Posterizing….
….you usually find Steve Nash involved. No real post today. Just read this before you watch the video.
Nash gets burned by Heat’s D
Part of the drawback to Steve Nash’s passing brilliance has always been his penchant for the occasional high-turnover game. It seems odd to think that a player of his ilk would be associated with a higher turnover rate than say, Tony Allen, but it’s true. The explanation for this actually lies in what should be considered his greatest strength; his unparalleled court-vision. Nash first locates, then works incredibly hard to get to and/or find narrow windows to deliver the ball to open teammates.
Whether he is twisting in the air or wrapping the ball around the hip of an oncoming defender, Nash, is one of the most imaginative passers in the history of the game. It is this type of creativity ultimately leads to him attempt insanely brilliant passes that mere mortals would never even see available to them. Last night in their comeback win, the Heat managed to use this trait against him.
For most of the night, Nash found passing lanes either closing quickly or hard to find. One could guess that head coach Erik Spoelstra had reminded his players to constantly be active with their hands up in passing lanes, which for Nash, is any opening he can squeeze the ball through. Heat defenders guarding the pick and rolls especially, were more active with their hands than most teams have been with Nash all year. One play in particular foreshadowed what was to be a rather rough night for the two-time MVP.
Early in the first quarter, Nash and Gortat engage in a middle ball screen that allows Nash to drive left along the lane. An undisciplined, non-Spoelstra prepared defense would normally collapse around Nash’s penetration and Gortat’s dive toward the rim. On a play like this, Nash normally will be able to find a shooter filling behind the action. Against the Heat, however, he found a turnover.
Individual credit must be given to Mario Chalmers for his on-ball work as well. Chalmers has developed as one of the most devastating on-ball defenders in the league. Nash found Chalmers quick and active hands a nuisance for much of the night.
So there you have it. To frustrate Steve Nash you need to combine a detailed and disciplined defensive coach with a team full of athletic players who just so happen to be among the top on-ball defenders at their position. Why didn’t anyone think of this before?
The Timeout Conundrum Continues
Just a short while ago, Beckley Mason shook the basketball world to the core (hyperbole alert) with his mind-blowing, end-of-game timeout research. The stats in that article (albeit containing a few variables) show that NBA coaches, perhaps hemmed in by the expectations of their profession, are overusing timeouts and playing with worse odds than a drunk tourist in Vegas at a blackjack table. Thankfully, the NBA saw a number of close finishes last night. Armed with this new data, a fresh perspective, and a gambling metaphor, it was interesting to watch these games unfold. Of particular interest was the conclusion of Golden State’s 106-104 win in Phoenix.
In a back and forth game, Golden State winds up with a two point lead and a fresh shot clock thanks to an offensive rebound by Dominic McGuire. With 38 seconds left, the Warrior’s still must try to score so Dorell Wright drives to the rim late only to have his pass tipped by the Sun’s Channing Frye toward fellow Sun, Marcin Gortat. Gortat immediately finds the ageless Steve Nash who begins to the move the ball upcourt. The setting is ripe for possibilities as the two-time MVP dribbles at a backpedaling Warrior’s defense, but all that excitement fades when Phoenix calls for a timeout after advancing past halfcourt.
The play itself has no real influence, but is worth viewing to see the subtle advantage the Suns may have had after the steal. Take a look:
While Phoenix didn’t have a primary break opportunity (or even a numerical edge), the video shows that the Warriors defense was still retreating in transition as the ball crossed the timeline. With Nash being, well, Nash, it seems like anytime he can work with an advantage, he should be allowed to do so. However, even the possibility of a timeout forces Nash to further restrain the break by looking back toward head coach, Alvin Gentry, to see if he does, in fact, want to take one.
It seems like a possible opportunity lost until Gentry conjures up some late-game magic with his whiteboard and black marker. He sets up a sideline out-of-bounds play that calls for Hill to inbound, then quickly downscreen for forward Jared Dudley. Dudley makes the play work by catching off the screening, ripping baseline and engaging Hill’s defender with dribble penetration. Hill uses this advantage to circle behind, attack the rim and, viola, tie game. Check it out:
So Gentry is a genius…right?
It certainly is debatable that allowing Nash to orchestrate on the fly after the Gortat steal would have produced a similar result, but there is one thing that Suns timeout caused that isn’t. Before the whistle stopped the action, the Warriors quintet on the floor was David Lee, Nate Robinson, Wright, Monta Ellis and Dominic McGuire. After the timeout, Golden State trotted out a much stauncher unit.
Gone were Robinson and Lee (two subpar defenders) and in their stead were Brandon Rush and Ekpe Udoh (two much more effective ones). Clever screening action or not, the Suns did themselves a major disservice. By stopping the play, Gentry allowed his counterpart, Mark Jackson, to employ a much tougher group to score on.
It brings up the hard truth about the empirical data just released; coaches often put themselves in a worse spot by applying “conventional wisdom”. Instead of letting Nash operate against a weaker, unsettled defense, Gentry made the Suns inbound against a stingier, set one. While the play design was solid and executed well, Gentry, like the intoxicated Vegas tourist, essentially hit on 17 and got a 4.
Jackson, however, also opened himself up for second-guessing by calling a timeout right after the Hill make with 11 seconds left in the game to draw up this:
A zipper cut to an isolation with Ellis isn’t exactly a form of tactical brilliance. In fact, it’s probably the same thing that would have occurred had the Warriors just inbounded Hill’s make and pushed up the ball up the floor right away. The flip side is that the timeout did allow Jackson to pull McGuire and Udoh for the more offensively inclined duo of Lee and Robinson. Rush, brought in during the earlier timeout as a defensive sub, stayed on the floor.
Did the changing of personnel offset the call of an isolation against a set Phoenix defense? Given that Hill was still able to force Ellis into an extremely challenging attempt, it doesn’t appear so. That’s also not even factoring that having Ellis surrounded by four Ray Allens may not matter when the pass-challenged guard has the ball during end of game scenario. So it begs the obvious question, if the plan is to let Ellis go all John Wayne on Phoenix in the clutch, why not let him do so against an unsettled defense?
Going simply by the results, this game appeared to be managed well down the stretch. All the timeouts produced points (except for the Sun’s final one to set up a desperation 3) and the Warriors escaped with a win by, in coach-speak, putting the ball in the hands of their best player. A closer look, however, seems to reveal that the two head coaches, in this instance at least, may have just been beneficiaries of good fortune. Perhaps they should book a trip to Vegas.
Draft Pick Scouting Report: #13 Markieff Morris
For the past two offseasons, we have been looking at players coming to the NBA after playing at least as season overseas. With the lockout, we are going to have plenty of time on our hands. With that being said, I plan on doing scouting reports for each of the 30 first round picks from this past draft.
Past Editions: Kyrie Irving (#1) | Derrick Williams (#2) | Tristan Thompson (#4) | Jonas Valanciunas (#5) | Jan Vesely (#6)| Bismack Biyombo (#7) | Brandon Knight (#8) | Kemba Walker (#9) | Jimmer Fredette (#10) | Klay Thompson (#11) | Alec Burks (#12)
With the 13th pick, the Phoenix Suns drafted forward and twin, Markieff Morris. For the past couple of seasons, it seemed that the Suns have employed the worst brother of a NBA tandem, but with the selection of Markieff Morris, the Suns might have finally got the better brother on their team.
Strengths
Post Play
This past season with the Kansas Jayhawks, Markieff Morris really showed that he knows how to play with his back to the basket. 34.1% of his touches on offense were post touches, and he was able to uses those possessions very efficiently. Out of the 157 post possessions that Morris had this past season, he scored 152 points, posting a PPP of 0.968, which put him in the top 16% among all college players while shooting 50.9%. Counting foul shots, Morris scored on 51% of his post possessions. One of the things that makes Morris so effective in the post is that he knows how to use his body to work for position allowing him to get exactly where he wants before he makes the catch on the block:
What I like about Morris and his post game is that he is a smart player. In the above clip, Morris wants the basketball right on the block, however his defender fronts him. Instead of trying to get in front and making more work for himself, he simply puts his arm into his defender’s back and pins him, providing a passing lane for his teammate at the top of the key. Once he makes the catch, he recognizes that he needs to go up quickly to avoid the help coming on the weakside.
Steve Nash Misreads The Situation
Trailing the Chicago Bulls by two points, the Phoenix Suns were forced to foul Kyle Korver with 13.1 seconds left. Korver opened the door for the Suns by missing his first of two foul shots. However, when the Suns got the basketball back down by three points, they didn’t get a three point shot off:
What makes it even worse is that the Suns, specifically Steve Nash, weren’t even looking for a three point shot. Nash gets the basketball and crosses halfcourt with 10 seconds left. He gets a screen from Channing Frye, forcing the Bulls to switch Joakim Noah onto him. To me, it looks like Nash saw the mismatch and wanted to go for the quick two. However, that two didn’t come quickly, or at all, as Nash makes his decision to penetrate with six seconds left. Even if he scores here, there isn’t enough time to foul, get the ball back, and get a clean look. Nash needed to look to use the mismatch to his advantage, get Noah going back on his heels, and then using that space to hit a three (something that we have seen Nash do plenty of times).
Dallas Mavericks Sharpen Up Their Rotations, Stop The Suns’ Pick And Roll
During the first quarter of their game against the Dallas Mavericks, the Suns were able to jump out to a 26-17 lead. Powering this lead was the Suns’ pick and roll offense, whose 10 possessions resulted in 14 of the Suns’ 26 first quarter points (good for a PPP of 1.4). What makes the Suns’ pick and roll offense so hard to stop is that it puts pressure on the defense to rotate perfectly. If not, it will lead to baskets. That is exactly what happened in the first quarter of their game against the Mavericks. The Mavericks were a bit sluggish with their rotations, and it lead to easy baskets for the Suns:
Here, the Suns run a pick and roll with Marcin Gortat setting the screen and Steve Nash coming off of it. Gortat rolls straight to the rim, forcing Jason Kidd to sink in the paint, which he correctly does. Nash makes the correct pass, sending it to Kidd’s man in the corner. Despite proper rotation initially, this is where the mistake is made. Kidd closes out on Dudley way too hard, allowing Dudley to drive by him, forcing more help and leading to an easy basket.
The Clipboard Awards: March 21st & 22nd – Bulls, Spurs, Suns
A team’s performance after a timeout may be the best way to judge a coach’s Xs & Os knowledge, and his ability to draw up plays. The Clipboard Awards is a competition where I choose the top three post-timeout plays each night, adding up the scores over the course of the season.
Play 3 (1 Point) – Alvin Gentry/Phoenix Suns
As Steve Nash brings the basketball up, he hits Jared Dudley on the elbow with the pass. As that happens, Vince Carter gets a staggered pindown set for him, and he curls off of it, turning it into a cut through the lane. After Carter completes his cut, Channing Frye (who was the front man on the staggered screen) comes off of the pindown from Marcin Gortat (the second screener in the staggered).
Kobe Bryant’s Curious Shot Attempt
Down by two points, the Phoenix Suns were able to get a pretty good look for Vince Carter behind the three point line. Carter missed, and Ron Artest grabbed the rebound and quickly got the basketball in the hands of Kobe Bryant. Despite the shot clock and the game clock being in sync, the Suns didn’t foul right away, opting to try and get the steal. They were unsuccessful, but before the Suns could foul Bryant he forced up a tough shot. Luckily enough for the Lakers, he knocked it down, clinching the game for the Lakers. Still, it was a strange decision, one that is worth looking at a little bit closer:
I have defended Kobe Bryant in the past when he has made some strange decisions regarding shot selection. I don’t think I can here, except for the fact that he made it. There are just so many things that can go wrong if Bryant misses this shot. Especially considering that the Suns still had timeouts left. If Bryant misses, the Suns now have a chance to tie/win the game, and they are coming off of a possession where they got a really good look (and they have been known to knock down game winning/tying three pointers from time to time). It isn’t like it was just a lay-up either (which you can understand taking), that’s a contested jumper with three defenders around him. Furthermore, with the rest of the team standing around expecting Bryant to run out the clock, there is no chance for an offensive rebound.
Orlando’s Halftime Pick And Roll Adjustments
In the first half against the Orlando Magic, the Phoenix Suns had success running the pick and roll with Aaron Brooks as the ball handler. In the 14 possessions where Brooks was the ball handler in the 1st half, the Suns scored 25 points, good for a PPP of 1.78. The Suns’ success was due to a creative pick and roll strategy and the Magic’s defensive strategy when it came to defending straight ball screens. After halftime, the Magic came out and made some key adjustments and really shut down the Suns’ pick and roll offense. In the 7 possessions in the third quarter (Brooks didn’t play in the 4th) where Aaron Brooks ran the pick and roll, the Suns only scored 3 points, good for a PPP of 0.43.
First, we are going to look at the Suns’ PNR offense in the first half, where the Suns were running an interesting set to get in their pick and roll sets. What they were doing was screening the man defending the big setting the ball screen:
Here, as Aaron Brooks brings the basketball down the court, Grant Hill comes over and sets an off ball screen on Dwight Howard, who is covering Robin Lopez.
The Clipboard Awards: March 8th – Suns, Bucks, Sixers
A team’s performance after a timeout may be the best way to judge a coach’s Xs & Os knowledge, and his ability to draw up plays. The Clipboard Awards is a competition where I choose the top three post-timeout plays each night, adding up the scores over the course of the season.
Play 3 (1 Point) – Doug Collins/Philadelphia 76ers
This set starts with Evan Turner bringing up the basketball as the sharp-shooting Jodie Meeks comes off of a set of staggered pindown screens.
