Whether he is twisting in the air or wrapping the ball around the hip of an oncoming defender, Nash, is one of the most imaginative passers in the history of the game. It is this type of creativity ultimately leads to him attempt insanely brilliant passes that mere mortals would never even see available to them. Last night in their comeback win, the Heat managed to use this trait against him.

For most of the night, Nash found passing lanes either closing quickly or hard to find. One could guess that head coach Erik Spoelstra had reminded his players to constantly be active with their hands up in passing lanes, which for Nash, is any opening he can squeeze the ball through. Heat defenders guarding the pick and rolls especially, were more active with their hands than most teams have been with Nash all year. One play in particular foreshadowed what was to be a rather rough night for the two-time MVP.

Early in the first quarter, Nash and Gortat engage in a middle ball screen that allows Nash to drive left along the lane. An undisciplined, non-Spoelstra prepared defense would normally collapse around Nash’s penetration and Gortat’s dive toward the rim. On a play like this, Nash normally will be able to find a shooter filling behind the action. Against the Heat, however, he found a turnover.

Individual credit must be given to Mario Chalmers for his on-ball work as well. Chalmers has developed as one of the most devastating on-ball defenders in the league. Nash found Chalmers quick and active hands a nuisance for much of the night.

So there you have it. To frustrate Steve Nash you need to combine a detailed and disciplined defensive coach with a team full of athletic players who just so happen to be among the top on-ball defenders at their position. Why didn’t anyone think of this before?

In a back and forth game, Golden State winds up with a two point lead and a fresh shot clock thanks to an offensive rebound by Dominic McGuire. With 38 seconds left, the Warrior’s still must try to score so Dorell Wright drives to the rim late only to have his pass tipped by the Sun’s Channing Frye toward fellow Sun, Marcin Gortat. Gortat immediately finds the ageless Steve Nash who begins to the move the ball upcourt. The setting is ripe for possibilities as the two-time MVP dribbles at a backpedaling Warrior’s defense, but all that excitement fades when Phoenix calls for a timeout after advancing past halfcourt.

The play itself has no real influence, but is worth viewing to see the subtle advantage the Suns may have had after the steal. Take a look:

While Phoenix didn’t have a primary break opportunity (or even a numerical edge), the video shows that the Warriors defense was still retreating in transition as the ball crossed the timeline. With Nash being, well, Nash, it seems like anytime he can work with an advantage, he should be allowed to do so. However, even the possibility of a timeout forces Nash to further restrain the break by looking back toward head coach, Alvin Gentry, to see if he does, in fact, want to take one.

It seems like a possible opportunity lost until Gentry conjures up some late-game magic with his whiteboard and black marker. He sets up a sideline out-of-bounds play that calls for Hill to inbound, then quickly downscreen for forward Jared Dudley. Dudley makes the play work by catching off the screening, ripping baseline and engaging Hill’s defender with dribble penetration. Hill uses this advantage to circle behind, attack the rim and, viola, tie game. Check it out:

So Gentry is a genius…right?

It certainly is debatable that allowing Nash to orchestrate on the fly after the Gortat steal would have produced a similar result, but there is one thing that Suns timeout caused that isn’t. Before the whistle stopped the action, the Warriors quintet on the floor was David Lee, Nate Robinson, Wright, Monta Ellis and Dominic McGuire. After the timeout, Golden State trotted out a much stauncher unit.

Gone were Robinson and Lee (two subpar defenders) and in their stead were Brandon Rush and Ekpe Udoh (two much more effective ones). Clever screening action or not, the Suns did themselves a major disservice. By stopping the play, Gentry allowed his counterpart, Mark Jackson, to employ a much tougher group to score on.

It brings up the hard truth about the empirical data just released; coaches often put themselves in a worse spot by applying “conventional wisdom”. Instead of letting Nash operate against a weaker, unsettled defense, Gentry made the Suns inbound against a stingier, set one. While the play design was solid and executed well, Gentry, like the intoxicated Vegas tourist, essentially hit on 17 and got a 4.

Jackson, however, also opened himself up for second-guessing by calling a timeout right after the Hill make with 11 seconds left in the game to draw up this:

A zipper cut to an isolation with Ellis isn’t exactly a form of tactical brilliance. In fact, it’s probably the same thing that would have occurred had the Warriors just inbounded Hill’s make and pushed up the ball up the floor right away. The flip side is that the timeout did allow Jackson to pull McGuire and Udoh for the more offensively inclined duo of Lee and Robinson. Rush, brought in during the earlier timeout as a defensive sub, stayed on the floor.

Did the changing of personnel offset the call of an isolation against a set Phoenix defense? Given that Hill was still able to force Ellis into an extremely challenging attempt, it doesn’t appear so. That’s also not even factoring that having Ellis surrounded by four Ray Allens may not matter when the pass-challenged guard has the ball during end of game scenario. So it begs the obvious question, if the plan is to let Ellis go all John Wayne on Phoenix in the clutch, why not let him do so against an unsettled defense?

Going simply by the results, this game appeared to be managed well down the stretch. All the timeouts produced points (except for the Sun’s final one to set up a desperation 3) and the Warriors escaped with a win by, in coach-speak, putting the ball in the hands of their best player. A closer look, however, seems to reveal that the two head coaches, in this instance at least, may have just been beneficiaries of good fortune. Perhaps they should book a trip to Vegas.

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With the 13th pick, the Phoenix Suns drafted forward and twin, Markieff Morris.  For the past couple of seasons, it seemed that the Suns have employed the worst brother of a NBA tandem, but with the selection of Markieff Morris, the Suns might have finally got the better brother on their team.

Strengths

Post Play

This past season with the Kansas Jayhawks, Markieff Morris really showed that he knows how to play with his back to the basket.  34.1% of his touches on offense were post touches, and he was able to uses those possessions very efficiently.  Out of the 157 post possessions that Morris had this past season, he scored 152 points, posting a PPP of 0.968, which put him in the top 16% among all college players while shooting 50.9%.  Counting foul shots, Morris scored on 51% of his post possessions.  One of the things that makes Morris so effective in the post is that he knows how to use his body to work for position allowing him to get exactly where he wants before he makes the catch on the block:

What I like about Morris and his post game is that he is a smart player.  In the above clip, Morris wants the basketball right on the block, however his defender fronts him.  Instead of trying to get in front and making more work for himself, he simply puts his arm into his defender’s back and pins him, providing a passing lane for his teammate at the top of the key.  Once he makes the catch, he recognizes that he needs to go up quickly to avoid the help coming on the weakside.

Posting up and getting good starting position is all about how you use your body and Morris simply understands that:

In all of these clips there is one constant, once Morris gets his defender on his back, he is not letting him work around to bother the pass.  This allows Morris to set up exactly where he wants and make the catch right on the block.  Once he does that, he is able to use his touch to finish with a nice dribble hook in the middle or a turn around jumper along the baseline (both shots that require good position to be effective).

Post Defense

As good as Morris is on the block with the ball, he is just as good on the block defensively.  This past season, Morris finished in the top 5% of all college players in PPP allowed, giving up 0.463 points per possession when opponents post him up.  In addition, opponents were shooting just 27.4% on post possessions while forcing turnovers 29.5% of the time.  Throughout the course of the season, Morris forced more turnovers on the block (28) than shots made (17):

The key to Morris’ post defense is strength.  When his opponent makes the catch on the post, they try to back him down, but Morris is able to keep opponents from making any type of power move just by being stronger than his opponent.  Also, he’s smart about his strength.  He’s not pushing with his arms, he’s not using his forearms, but he’s sticking his chest out, keeping his arms out of it, and using that chest to meet defenders.  A telling stat is that out of the 95 post possessions that Morris defended, he committed just 7 fouls.  That’s because he is letting his chest and not his arms do the work.

Weaknesses

Pick And Roll Offense

When you find out that there is a big that will start playing for the Phoenix Suns, the first question you ask is “can he play in the pick and roll?” and rightfully so.  As long as the Suns continue to have Steve Nash on their roster, they are going to continue to need bigs who play in the pick and roll.  The only area where Morris isn’t in the top 20% of PPP among all college players is as the roll man in pick and roll situations.  Morris is in the bottom 49% among all college players, posting a PPP of just 1.0 while shooting 45.8%.  The reason why Morris struggles in my opinion is that he pops out way too much.  As the roll man in pick and roll situations, Morris rolls to the rim 46.2% of the time.  When he does he is effective, shooting 60%.  On the other hand, Morris pops out 53.8% of the time, where he is shooting just 35.7%:

Sure, Morris is a decent shooter, hitting 43.1% of all jumpers, but he is way more effective when he is cutting to the rim, using his athletic ability to put pressure on the defense (for example he is shooting 77.2% on all cuts to the rim).  Especially playing with a guy like Steve Nash and having a popping option like Channing Frye already on the roster, Morris needs to have the willingness to roll to the rim just about every single time he sets a screen.

Pick And Roll Defense

In addition to playing the pick and roll poor on the offensive end, Morris is pretty bad when it comes to defending the pick and roll as well.  In fact, Morris was in the bottom 6% of all college players when it comes to PPP allowed in pick and roll situations.  In my opinion, Morris’ biggest problem when defending the pick and roll seems to be effort:

Morris usually does a good job initially defending the pick and roll, when it comes to hedging at the ball handler.  But where Morris struggles is when he is returning to his man.  At that point, Morris seems very uninterested in returning to his man and that leads to a lot of open lanes/jumpers for the man that Morris is defending.  Even when Morris does get back to his man, he usually isn’t there quick enough to take away position, allowing his man to finish over him.

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In my opinion, Markieff Morris is a very interesting pick for the Phoenix Suns. He almost immediately gives the Suns a legitimate post threat, something that I don’t know if they had on their roster.  He is also a guy who can defend the block, using his size and strength to keep opposing 4s from scoring on him with his back to the basket.

What is interesting about this pick is that his strength isn’t in the pick and roll game.  He has the potential to be a very nice complement to Channing Frye’s pick and pop style, but he needs to have the rolling to the rim mindset of a guy who doesn’t shoot great out of the pick and pop.  If he rolls to the rim on at least 60% of his ballscreens, I expect him to have a successful rookie season.

What makes it even worse is that the Suns, specifically Steve Nash, weren’t even looking for a three point shot.  Nash gets the basketball and crosses halfcourt with 10 seconds left.  He gets a screen from Channing Frye, forcing the Bulls to switch Joakim Noah onto him.  To me, it looks like Nash saw the mismatch and wanted to go for the quick two.  However, that two didn’t come quickly, or at all, as Nash makes his decision to penetrate with six seconds left.  Even if he scores here, there isn’t enough time to foul, get the ball back, and get a clean look.  Nash needed to look to use the mismatch to his advantage, get Noah going back on his heels, and then using that space to hit a three (something that we have seen Nash do plenty of times).

While Steve Nash gets most of the blame here, he isn’t the only Sun at fault.  Nash has zero teammates to pass it to on the perimeter as he dribbles on the outside with the basketball.  Grant Hill and Vince Carter are standing on one side of the court while Channing Frye, who Derrick Rose switched onto, thinks that down 3 with under 10 seconds left is the best time to try and post-up his mismatch.  It looks like Nash wants to try to pass it off, but when nobody is open he is forced to take it one-on-one.  This is where his poor decision to penetrate takes place.

Here, the Suns run a pick and roll with Marcin Gortat setting the screen and Steve Nash coming off of it.  Gortat rolls straight to the rim, forcing Jason Kidd to sink in the paint, which he correctly does.  Nash makes the correct pass, sending it to Kidd’s man in the corner.  Despite proper rotation initially, this is where the mistake is made.  Kidd closes out on Dudley way too hard, allowing Dudley to drive by him, forcing more help and leading to an easy basket.

On this play, Gortat is able to get an easy bucket from a very nice Steve Nash pass.  While Tyson Chandler immediately turns and yells at Rodrigue Beaubois, it wasn’t his mistake that lead to the easy basket.  Dirk Nowitzki needs be ready to sink in and help on the roll man, instead he has his back turned to the basket face guarding Channing Frye.  The rotation was off, and it lead to an easy basket.

Here, after the offensive rebound the Suns kick the ball out and get into their pick and roll set on the wing.  Chandler steps up to stop the basketball and the get the ball at Nash’s hands.  Jason Kidd rotates over too slowly and he whiffs at his steal attempt, giving up the easy dunk.

After the first quarter, it was obvious that Rick Carlisle that the rotations were off and he made adjustments, because after that first quarter the Mavericks shut down the Suns’ pick and roll.  In 27 pick and roll possessions for the remainder of the game, the Suns scored just 16 points (0.59 PPP).  Again, it all came down to the Mavericks’ rotations:

Here, Nash comes off of the Gortat screen with Gortat rolling straight to the rim off of it.  Nash leaves his feet, looking for Gortat, but at the last second Jason Kidd steps in the passing lane.  This forces Nash to try and pass it to a different Sun, Josh Childress, but this pass is deflected (by Shawn Marion who also rotated over, picking up Kidd’s man) and stolen.

This pick and roll stop is a perfect example of team defense forcing a difficult shot.  As Nash comes off of the screen, you have Chandler hedging and Dirk Nowitzki sinking off of his man.  The help from both defenders is key in preventing Nash from getting all of the way to the rim.  You also have Jason Kidd in position to stop any pass over the top to Gortat.  This means there is only one option for Nash here, and he is forced to take an off balance jumper that he misses.

Finally here, the Suns run a pick and roll with Nash coming off of it and attacking towards the baseline.  As Nash comes off of the screen, Chandler hedges, giving Gortat a free roll to the rim.  Jason Terry sinks from the opposite corner to the middle of the paint discouraging any pass to Gortat by being in position to steal the pass as soon as it is made.  This forces Nash to keep his dribble alive along the baseline, and with Chandler trailing him he attempts a tough reverse lay-up that he misses.

The first quarter of this game is a perfect example of what Steve Nash coming off of screens can do to the defense.  If the rotations aren’t perfect, they will pick you apart with it, and that is exactly what happened.  Credit the Mavericks coaching staff for getting them to rotate properly for the rest of the game, stifling the Suns’ pick and roll offense.

Play 3 (1 Point) – Alvin Gentry/Phoenix Suns

As Steve Nash brings the basketball up, he hits Jared Dudley on the elbow with the pass. As that happens, Vince Carter gets a staggered pindown set for him, and he curls off of it, turning it into a cut through the lane. After Carter completes his cut, Channing Frye (who was the front man on the staggered screen) comes off of the pindown from Marcin Gortat (the second screener in the staggered).

Play 2 (2 Points) – Gregg Popovich/San Antonio Spurs

On this play, the Spurs start the set by getting the ball to Antonio McDyess at the top of the key. After making the catch, McDyess hands it off to Ginobili, who is cutting off of him. The play looks like it is developing into a play on the left side with Steve Novak coming off of a cross screen set by Gary Neal. However, Neal comes off of a pindown, Manu stops his dribble, and the ball quickly gets swung to Neal. Neal makes the catch and knocks down the wide open jumper.

Play 1 (3 Points) – Tom Thibodeau/Chicago Bulls

This was the Bulls’ first play of the game, and it was a very nice one involving a bunch of screens and a nice screen the screener conclusion to the play. Rose brings the basketball up, gets the ball to Keith Bogans on the wing, and comes off of a backscreen set by Luol Deng. Deng then sets a cross screen for Carlos Boozer who comes up to the elbow. After setting his screen for Deng, Rose sets a screen for Deng. Deng comes off of the screen and has a wide open short jumper that he knocks down.

Updated Standings (Previous)

1. Doc Rivers – 33 points (1st)
2. Erik Spoelstra – 30 points (2nd)
3. Gregg Popovich – 21 points (3rd)
4. Monty Williams – 18 points (4th)
5. Rick Carlisle – 13 points (5th)
6. Frank Vogel – 12 points (6th)
7. Phil Jackson – 12 points (7th)
8. Alvin Gentry –  11 points (8th)
9. Tom Thibodeau – 10 points (9th)
10. Rick Adelman – 7 points (10th)
11. Nate McMillan – 6 points (11th)
12. Larry Drew – 6 points (12th)
13. Scott Brooks – 6 points (13th)
14. Avery Johnson – 6 points (14th)
15. Jay Triano – 5 points (15st)
16. Jerry Sloan – 4 points (16th)
17. Ty Corbin – 4 points (17th)
18. Lionel Hollins – 3 points (18th)
19. George Karl – 3 points (19th)
20. Scott Skiles – 3 points (20th)
21. Mike D’Antoni – 3 points (21st)
22. Byron Scott – 2 points (22nd)
23. Stan Van Gundy – 2 points (23rd)
24. Flip Saunders – 2 points (24th)
25. Doug Collins – 2 point (25th)
26. Paul Silas – 1 point (26th)
27. John Kuester – 1 point (27th)
28. Keith Smart – 1 point (28th)
29. Vinny Del Negro – 1 point (29th)

All three coaches (Tom Thibodeau, Gregg Popovich, and Alvin Gentry) get points, but none of them move up from their respected spots in the rankings.

I have defended Kobe Bryant in the past when he has made some strange decisions regarding shot selection.  I don’t think I can here, except for the fact that he made it.  There are just so many things that can go wrong if Bryant misses this shot.  Especially considering that the Suns still had timeouts left.  If Bryant misses, the Suns now have a chance to tie/win the game, and they are coming off of a possession where they got a really good look (and they have been known to knock down game winning/tying three pointers from time to time). It isn’t like it was just a lay-up either (which you can understand taking), that’s a contested jumper with three defenders around him.  Furthermore, with the rest of the team standing around expecting Bryant to run out the clock, there is no chance for an offensive rebound.

One of the reasons I find myself writing about this even though he made it is because it just is so unlike Kobe Bryant but at the same time it is.  Bryant always seems to be aware of the time and wanting to make correct play, but this shot almost seems like he had no idea how much time was left compared to the shot clock.  At the same time, I wouldn’t be surprised if you told me that he did know how much time was left.

I know it is hard to say this considering the shot was made, but that shouldn’t have been taken.  What Bryant should have done was come to a stop and let the Suns foul him, sending him to the line.  Even if Bryant misses one of the two foul shots, the Suns would be playing for a tie instead of possibly the win (which would have been the case if Bryant missed it).  It didn’t come back to hurt the Lakers this time, but if Bryant does it once he will do it again, and if he misses that time, a shot like this will be a much bigger deal.

First, we are going to look at the Suns’ PNR offense in the first half, where the Suns were running an interesting set to get in their pick and roll sets.  What they were doing was screening the man defending the big setting the ball screen:

Here, as Aaron Brooks brings the basketball down the court, Grant Hill comes over and sets an off ball screen on Dwight Howard, who is covering Robin Lopez.

Lopez comes off of the Hill screen and sets a ballscreen for Aaron Brooks.  Look at where Dwight Howard is when Brooks comes off of the ball screen.  He is at the elbow getting screened, quite a distance away from where the pick and roll is taking place.

As Brooks comes off of the screen, Dwight Howard isn’t a threat to do anything to challenge Brooks.

This allows Brooks to take one dribble, and pull up in rhythm coming off of the screen, knocking it down.  Here is the play in real time:

As you can see, Dwight Howard is never in on the defense of the Suns’ pick and roll here due to the off ball screen.  This allows Brooks to come off the screen comfortably, not worrying about Howard stepping out on him.

Again, we see Howard getting screened by Hill as his man, Marcin Gortat, sets a ballscreen.  Dwight Howard never really gets into his pick and roll defense, allowing Brooks to eat up the space given to him and then kicking it out to Gortat for the pick and pop.

This clip here shows you the kind of confusion this off ball screen can create.  You have the off ball screen taking place, then the ball screen, with Brooks coming off of it.  As Brooks comes off of it, all three defenders are focused on him.  The problem with this is that you have two defenders who think they have the hedge responsibility on the screen (Brandon Bass and Hedo Turkoglu).  This allows Hill to cut to the rim and get the pass for the easy lay-up.

In addition to this double screen set that the Suns were running, the Magic’s philosophy for defending straight ballscreens was flawed in the first half.  The Magic were giving Aaron Brooks way too much space, allowing Brooks to step in and knock down the easy jumper:

Here, Brooks comes off of the screen, and Howard is in help position, but he doesn’t really step up on Brooks.  Instead, he is playing Brooks to make the pass to Gortat.  The problem with this is that Aaron Brooks is a scorer, and a point guard who looks for his shot first most of the time.  You give him this much space, he is going to take, and most of the time make, this jumper off of the dribble.

Again, you see Brooks coming off of a screen with Howard more worried about the pass to Gortat then the pull up jumper off of the dribble.  Again, Brooks knocks it down.

Going into the second half, Orlando made some pretty good adjustments, making it obvious that pick and roll defense was one of the things focused on in the huddle.  First, with regards to the Suns’ double screen set, they seemed better prepared for it, and more aware of who needs to step up and hedge on the ball handler.

We pick up this possession as Hill is in the process of setting his screen off of the ball with Gortat setting the ball screen.  Brooks comes off of it, looking to attack.  Instead of a situation where the Magic’s defense was confused about who to pick up (and when they figured it out, it was too late), Turkoglu steps up and meets Aaron Brooks right away with Howard sticking with Hill, meaning the adjustment was the man defending the player setting a screen on Howard (Turkoglu here) is the man responsible for hedging on the pick and roll.

Because Turkoglu meets Brooks on the elbow, he is unable to take a straight path to the lane.  Turkoglu forces him to loop around and attack the rim at the right side.

This gives Howard enough time to get over in help position and bother Brooks’ lay-up, forcing the miss.  Here is the play in real time:

The key to this defensive stand is Hedo Turkoglu stepping up quickly and forcing Brooks to take a longer path to the rim.  Turkoglu’s quick step up is due to the adjustment the Magic made at halftime, assigning responsibilities to their defenders in anticipation that they would be seeing this play again.

In addition to the adjustments made on the Suns’ double screen set, the Magic’s staff also made a key adjustment when it came to defending the straight pick and roll.  They stopped giving Aaron Brooks space.

Here, Brooks comes off of the ball screen, and the defense is right on him, taking away any space that would normally be available.  Brooks looks for the pull-up, but because Bass is up not giving any space, he is able to challenge the shot and force Brooks to pass it to an unready Gortat, who misses the jumper.

Finally here, as Brooks comes off of the screen, Howard steps up, taking away his space.  This prevents Brooks from probing the defense and forces him to make a pass to Gortat on the roll a little sooner then he would normally like.  Because Gortat gets it a little farther from the rim than he would like, Bass is able to come with the rotation and bother the shot, forcing the miss.

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The difference in the way the Magic defended the Suns’ pick and roll shows you that coaches are paying attention to what the opposition is doing and making adjustments accordingly.  This is a great adjustment by the Magic’s coaching staff, and their ability to stop the pick and roll in the second half is what lead to their blowout win against the Suns.

Play 3 (1 Point) – Doug Collins/Philadelphia 76ers

This set starts with Evan Turner bringing up the basketball as the sharp-shooting Jodie Meeks comes off of a set of staggered pindown screens.

Meeks curls the screen and flashes to the ballside wing.  Meeks shooting ability forces Josh McRoberts to show to prevent a quick catch and shoot.  Once Meeks clears, McRoberts starts back to his man.  The problem with that is the Sixers are running another pindown, this time being set for Lou Williams.

Williams comes off of the screen as McRoberts starts back to him man.  McRoberts tries to get back to the elbow to close out, but he doesn’t get there in time and Williams is able to knock down the open jumper.

Plays like this are designed to go at one specific defender.  Here, Doug Collins wants to single out Josh McRoberts and run two pindown screens with his man as the screener.  McRoberts retreats too soon and fails to recognize the second pindown, and that is what opens up Lou Williams.

Play 2 (2 Points) – Scott Skiles/Milwaukee Bucks

This set starts with Brandon Jennings bringing up the basketball with a big at each elbow.  Jennings enters the ball to Andrew Bogut who gets the backscreen from the opposite elbow.  As this happens John Salmons goes from the corner to the middle of the paint, under the basket.

Once Jennings gets to the corner, he puts his foot in the ground, turns around and comes off of a staggered screen, with the second screen actually being a dribble handoff between Bogut and Jennings.

Jennings gets the basketball and quickly starts attacking towards the opposite elbow.  As this happens, the defense starts to focus on Jennings.

Once Jennings gets to the opposite elbow, Salmons comes off of a staggered screen set by both Milwaukee bigs, curling it and taking it to the elbow.

Salmons makes the catch and pulls up for the jumper without a dribble, knocking it down.  Here is the play in real time:

This is a perfect example of misdirection action that a lot of teams like to run out of timeouts.  They like to show one thing while actually setting up something else off of the basketball and that is what happens here.  The defense is focusing on Brandon Jennings and the dribble handoff, not even worrying the staggered screens getting set off of the basketball.

Play 1 (3 Points) – Alvin Gentry/Phoenix Suns

Here, we get to see a BLOB set run by the Phoenix Suns late in the 4th quarter.  Nash is the inbounder and as he gets the ball the Suns are set up in a three man stack with Grant Hill being the only one not involved, and he is standing at the free throw line.  Once Nash gets the basketball, Marcin Gortat flashes to the corner as Vince Carter backs up to the three point line.  Grant Hill dives from the foul line to the ballside block.

Hill flashes to the block so he can set a screen for Hakim Warrick.  Warrick uses the screen by going behind it, and curling right to the front of the rim.

The screen is an effective one, and Steve Nash is able to throw a pinpoint lob pass to Warrick who converts the lob.  Here is the play in real time.

This play works because the Suns are bringing the screen for Warrick from behind.  The defense never sees it coming and Warrick is able to get the easy lob.

Updated Standings (Previous)

1. Erik Spoelstra – 22 points (1st)
2. Doc Rivers – 20 points (2nd)
3. Monty Williams – 16 points (3rd)
4. Gregg Popovich – 13 points (4th)
5. Frank Vogel – 12 points (5th)
6. Phil Jackson – 12 points (6th)
7. Alvin Gentry –  10 points (8th)
8. Rick Carlisle – 8 points (7th)
9. Tom Thibodeau – 7 points (9th)
10. Rick Adelman – 6 points (10th)
11. Scott Brooks – 5 points (11th)
12. Nate McMillan – 5 points (12th)
13. Larry Drew – 4 points (13th)
14. Jerry Sloan – 4 Points (14th)
15. Lionel Hollins – 3 points (15th)
16. George Karl – 3 points (16th)
17. Scott Skiles – 2 points (NR)
18. Jay Triano – 2 points (17th)
19. Byron Scott – 2 points (18th)
20. Stan Van Gundy – 2 points (19th)
21. Flip Saunders – 2 points (20th)
22. Doug Collins – 1 point (NR)
23. John Kuester – 1 point (21st)
24. Keith Smart – 1 point (22nd)
25. Ty Corbin – 1 point (23rd)
26. Vinny Del Negro – 1 point (24th)

After Vinny Del Negro reached the leaderboard yesterday, we have two new coaches getting on the board today with Scott Skiles and Doug Collins.  Alvin Gentry jumps Rick Carlisle with his day-winning play.