The play begins with the ball handler (here Tony Parker) passing ahead to the strong-side wing (Manu Ginobili). This pass keys several actions:

1. After passing ahead, the ball handler cuts across the lane. The strong-side wing looks to hit the ball handler as he cuts through:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uo_AA0JojWk&w=420&h=315]

Here, the crafty Ginobili perfectly times the pass and hits Parker in stride for the layup.

2. If the ball handler can’t be hit, the strong-side wing passes up top to the trailing big man. The trailer then swings the ball to the ball handler, who cut through to the weak-side of the floor.

3. As the ball is swung, the weak-side wing goes to set a cross screen for the other big in the post:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LVOdngSe6rE&w=420&h=315]

As the ball is swung to Tony Parker, Ginobili (this time at the weak-side wing) sets a screen for Duncan in the post. Al Jefferson cheats over the top of Ginobili’s screen, leaving Duncan wide open to catch the lob from Parker.

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5BBqowKAHo&w=420&h=315]

We see the pass ahead and cut through the lane, keying weak. This time the cross screen is for Boris Diaw, who is able to seal his defender on the opposite block. Boris quickly feels his defender on his right shoulder, then unleashes a baseline spin for the easy reverse layup.

The post man can also come off the cross screen to set a ball screen:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AEfTMcyBElQ&w=420&h=315]

After the cross screen, Duncan chooses to set a screen for Parker. Parker waits for Duncan then quickly step fakes his defender into the screen. Parker then crosses over away from the screen past the help of Al Jefferson. To prevent an easy basket, Paul Millsap is forced to help from the weak-side corner, leaving Kawhi Leonard wide open for three.

In all these clips, we see the fourth action of weak, a screen-the-screener action.

4. After swinging the ball back to the ball handler, the trailer comes down to set a screen for the weak-side wing, who just set the cross screen for the post.

In this next clip, we will see the Spurs run a counter of this action that still leads to a screen-the-screener for the ball handler instead of the weak-side wing:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vbCEF8khzJs&w=420&h=315]

We see Parker pass ahead to Gary Neal and cut across the lane. Instead of cutting all the way to the weak-side wing, he doubles back to set the cross screen. Meanwhile, the weak-side wing (this time Stephen Jackson) pops out to receive the swing pass from the trailer. After swinging the ball, the trailer (this time Matt Bonner) screens-the-screener allowing Parker to come up to the top of the key and receive the ball.

In the last clip, we will see another counter from the weak action:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiO3virdIho&w=420&h=315]

Parker passes ahead to Danny Green and cuts across. We see the weak-side wing Stephen Jackson move down, but he sets a back pick for Parker instead of screening for Boris Diaw in the post. Parker comes off the back pick towards a waiting Boris Diaw, who is ready to set another screen. Paul Millsap is so concerned with denying Parker that he leaves Diaw a direct line to the basket. Diaw cuts back door and Duncan finds him for an easy layup.

With weak, the Spurs have an equal opportunity play that can naturally flow from screens, to off the ball movement, to post ups, to pick and roll. Players have no fixed positions and Popovich gives them free reign to read the defense and react accordingly. The ability to execute a variety of options with varying personnel, combined with the Spurs great patience and unselfishness, ensures the offense can generate high percentage shots: both in the past – when Duncan was the anchor on the block, to today – with Parker speeding around the court.

Joon Kim is the author of NBA Breakdown, and its subsidiaries, Spurs Motion Offense and The Triangle Offense — a tree of sites dedicated to basketball fundamentals.  You can follow Joon on Twitter: @JoonKim00.

The play starts off with some false action out of a 1-4 High/Horns alignment (key point being both Bonner and Splitter start at the elbows). TJ Ford starts off by hitting Splitter popping outside the arc near the right slot. As Ford cuts through, Splitter reverses to Neal then slides down toward the mid-post. Bonner, patiently waiting at the right elbow, then comes and sprints into a ball screen for Neal. With Neal’s defender, Loul Deng, being of similar size, Taj Gibson (marking Bonner) is given free reign to switch to Neal as he comes off the screen.

Had this been a straight up pick and pop between Bonner and Neal, switching the screen would have easily thrawted it thanks to Gibson’s ability to guard smaller, quicker players on the perimeter. However, with Splitter coming to set another screen, the Bulls find themselves in a bit of jam. Gibson, due to perhaps a combination of inexperience guarding the ball handler in screening situations and lack of preparation, drops low to avoid the second screen. His decision is going to force Asik (defending Splitter) to be responsible for showing hard, above the screen, in order to prevent a jumpshot for the sweet-shooting Neal.

Miscommunication now plays a part as both Asik and Gibson attempt to contest any Neal jumper. Both of them being above Splitter allows him to cleanly roll to the basket.

As Splitter dives hard toward the rim, CJ Watson is forced to scramble over from the weakside in a vain attempt stop the roll.

The result is an assist for Neal on a rather easy finish for Splitter. Here is the play in real time:

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Out of nowhere, the Spurs made a trade for Kawhi Leonard, a player that they seemed to be very high on.  So high, they were willing to trade back-up point guard, and Gregg Popovich favorite, George Hill to Indiana so they could acquire Leonard.

Strengths

Forcing Turnovers

If I were to pick out Leonard’s biggest strength, it would be his on ball defense.  Maybe the biggest indicator of how good he is defensively is his ability to force turnovers when defending ball handlers, both in isolation situations and in the pick and roll.  When in isolation situations, Leonard forced a turnover 23.8% of the time, holding opponents to 37.5% shootings.  In pick and roll situations where he defended the ball handler, Leonard 23.7% of the time, giving up a PPP of just 0.658 (putting him in the top 35% of all college players).  The first thing that you notice about Leonard on tape is his length.  He has an incredibly long wingspan, 7’3″ according to DraftExpress, and that allows him to do things defensively that some other defenders can’t do:

With that length, he doesn’t have to reach in on dribble penetration, allowing him to stay in front and bother drives by being in the passing lanes (again with his long arms). However, when the offensive player does stick the ball in front of him, his hands are quick enough to go for the steal without drawing contact or committing a foul.

In pick and roll situations where he is defending the ball handler, Leonard’s length is really on display.  Leonard’s length allows him to play the pick and roll in a pretty interesting way:

What Leonard does is he forces the ball handler into the screen, goes over it, and reaches in as the ball handler tries to penetrate.  I don’t how many defenders can be successful doing this, especially at the NBA level, but Leonard makes it work because of his length.  Almost every time that Leonard gets the steal in the pick and roll, the ball handler thinks he is clear but then at the last second Leonard gets his hand on the ball and knocks it away.

Defensive Rebounding

Last season, Kawhi Leonard was one of the best defensive rebounders in college basketball, not just for his position, but as a rebounder in general.  When looking at the top players in terms of Defensive Rebounding Percentage, Leonard finished 13th among all college players, grabbing 26.6% of available defensive rebounds according to KenPom.  Leonard isn’t the most fundamentally sound rebounder, but he uses his physical attributes well enough to allow him to get his hands on opponents’ misses:

In addition to his length, Leonard has freakishly large hands, and once he gets those hands on the basketball he is going to be the one coming out of a crowd with it.  Leonard doesn’t hold his box-out as long as I would like to see someone hold their box-out, but he does do a good job of reading the basketball off the rim and putting himself in a position where he can get his hands on the ball off the rim and secure the rebound.  If you are good enough reading the ball off of the rim, boxing out isn’t as important as it would be for someone who isn’t in the right position more times than not.

Weaknesses

Shooting

We’ve seen how beneficial Leonard’s length is on the defensive end, but on the offensive end it is a bit of a hindrance, especially when it comes to shooting.  According to Synergy Sports, Leonard shot just 31.1% on his jump shots and the biggest problem that I have seen with his shot in college was his length:

When Leonard is rising up and getting into his shooting motion, all that length needs to go somewhere.  The result is Leonard’s form naturally taking the basketball way behind his head, and that is where he was releasing the basketball from.  You don’t see too many shooters who are comfortable/consistant with a release point that is way behind his head.  There is word that Leonard shooting form is revamped and his release point is now in front of him (I was looking for video of this, but unfortunately couldn’t find/acquire it), if this is in fact the case, that is a step in the right direction and it is a way for Leonard to turn this big weakness into a lesser one.

Running Pick And Roll

As of right now, with the lockout going on and with no Summer League or preseason games, it is hard to say how the San Antonio Spurs plan to use Leonard offensively.  Will he be in the Bruce Bowen/Richard Jefferson mode, spotting up in the corner and waiting for the basketball to come to him or will he have ball handling responsibilities (sort of like George Hill)?  If the Spurs plan on using Leonard as a ball handler, one of the things the he is going to have to work on is his decision making when handling the basketball in pick and roll situations.  Leonard isn’t a great in the pick and roll, posting a PPP of 0.723, putting him in the bottom half of all NCAA players.  The reason for the low PPP is the amount of turnovers that Leonard commits in these situations, giving the ball away 14.9% of the time:

The biggest reason for all of these turnovers is Leonard’s poor decision making. Almost every time that Leonard gets a ball screen, he is looking to score out of it. He’s not looking for the roll man, he’s not looking for a screener popping out around the elbow, he’s looking for his own offense.  This mentality is great when there is a lane to drive through, but Leonard is looking to attack even when there is no lane.  The problem here is the defense is able to get in position to take the charge or force the turnover.

—

Despite the obvious weaknesses, I do think that Kawhi Leonard has the potential to be a very good NBA player, especially considering the team that drafted him has a knack of drafting and developing players.  Leonard’s physical tools put him at a great advantage on the defensive end, but it remains to be seen if he can overcome them on the offensive end and have an immediate impact with San Antonio.

So with his team in the huddle for a timeout he just called, Hollins had to choose, keep Tony Allen in for his defense, or replace him with the more offensive minded O.J. Mayo.  Hollins chose to take Allen out and refocus the offense, deciding that the ball had to go to Zach Randolph on the block.It was a decision that paid off:

Including this basket, Randolph scored 11 points in the final 4:24 with the Grizzlies pumping the basketball into him, allowing the Grizzlies to pull away from San Antonio and close out the series.

This was a great decision by Hollins because he knew if he could get things calm on the offensive end, the Spurs would be unable to stop him, and because of that, he didn’t need Allen on the defensive end.  Now, if Tony Parker or Manu Ginobili would have gone off with Allen on the bench, this could have been a game losing decision, but the Grizzlies were able to contain San Antonio, proving Hollins’ decision to be correct.

With possession of the basketball and a two point lead, the Spurs were looking to milk a little clock, allowing 10 seconds to burn off of the shot clock before they get into their offense.  After flattening out, Antonio McDyess comes up and sets a screen for Tony Parker.

Parker attacks, trying to draw help from Manu Ginobili’s man, Tony Allen.  Allen does something he has been doing the entire series, jabbing at him and then returning to his man.  As this is happening, McDyess is rolling to the rim, trailing the play.

Because he can’t make the pass to Ginobili, Parker dumps it off to McDyess.  As this happens, Tony Allen settles into the passing lane in an effort to prevent the pass to Ginobili.

This is a play the Spurs have been running all season, get the ball into the roll man in the middle and kick it out.  McDyess tries to do that here, but Tony Allen is able to come away with the steal.  Here is the play in real time:

Great play by Tony Allen here, executing the Grizzlies defensive strategy to perfection. The Grizzlies aren’t out of this series yet, and their defense will continue to give the Spurs problems in game six.

The play starts with Mike Conley cutting off of Zach Randolph to make himself available for the inbounds pass from Shane Battier.

After Conley gets the basketball, Randolph walks down his defender (Antonio McDyess) to the block.  As this is happening, O.J. Mayo comes over to set a cross screen on this play.

Randolph goes underneath the screen as Mike Conley dribbles the basketball to the other side, looking to his Randolph on the post up.  However, instead of trying to trail Randolph underneath the screen, McDyess fights over it.

By fighting over it, McDyess is able to beat Randolph to his spot on the block.  After Randolph tries to post farther out, he realizes he isn’t going to get the basketball.  Eventually, the Grizzlies get into their second option (a pick and roll with Marc Gasol as the screener), where Gasol eventually gets a post up chance.  However, so much clock was used, Gasol was forced to take a tough jumper that he misses.  Here is the play in real time:

This is just a great job by McDyess to get over the screen, beat Randolph to the spot, and getting his body in front of Randolph to prevent the entry pass.  You can see how this threw off the Grizzlies offense since it took them so long to get the ball into Gasol’s hands, forcing him to make a quick move and take a tough shot.

The inbounds pass to Ginobili gets deflected, and after a few more deflections, the basketball ends up back in his hands.  Ginobili tries to get behind the three point line, but is unable to and gets off one of the longest twos you can take, knocking it down and putting his team down one point.

It was a crazy play, but I couldn’t help but wonder what the Spurs were trying to run, because it did look familiar.  If you were reading this site over a year ago, you might have recognized it from a Spurs-Cavs game last March:

It is hard to tell if these two plays are the same live, but if you break it down piece by piece, you notice that it was the same play:

The first thing that you should probably notice is the clock.  No, not the fact that the score was the same (eerie!), but look at the time.  There was 9.0 seconds left last season, and there was 9.4 seconds left tonight.  The play starts with George Hill (in both instances) running a rub screen for the man in the corner, Gary Neal instead of Roger Mason Jr.

As Neal (and Mason Jr.) is coming off of the rub screen to the top of the key, Manu Ginobili takes off towards the corner.  This is where the plays start to get a little different, but not by design.  Instead of going under Parker against the Grizzlies, Ginobili goes over Duncan, taking a strange path to the basketball.

Once Ginobili makes the catch in the corner, the play is designed for Gary Neal (or Roger Mason Jr.) to come off of a backscreen set by Duncan, get the pass from Ginobili, and take the three.  That never happened last night because the ball got deflected. Here is another look at Ginboili’s crazy shot:

First, I can just imagine coach Popovich with a notebook of his plays categorized by how much time he needs to run each one, and that is a pretty awesome image.  Second, and maybe most importantly, if the pass doesn’t get deflected, I don’t know if the Spurs get off a clean look.

This is all because Ginobili goes over top of Duncan for whatever reason.  Maybe it was the defensive pressure, maybe he just had a gut feeling that he had to get to the basketball, but the second Ginobili goes over the screen, the play is dead.  You notice it takes longer for the ball to get to Ginobili, forcing Neal to step up and be a safety valve.  This makes him too far away from Duncan to actually run off of the screen effectively.

We will never know if they play would have worked or not, and in the end it all worked out for San Antonio, but it is interesting (at least in my opinion) to see what they were at least trying to run late.

The play starts with George Hill sprinting to the corner.  Almost simultaneously Antonio McDyess goes from the top of the key to set a screen for Tim Duncan on the elbow.

This first screen set by San Antonio shows you Memphis’ strategy to playing screens late, and they are switching everything.  Darrell Arthur picks up McDyess and Shane Battier picks up Tim Duncan.

After coming off of McDyess’ screen, Tim Duncan sets a screen of his own, setting one for Gary Neal.  Neal uses it to try and get free at the top of the key.

Now, based off of what we have seen, Battier should be switching on this screen, getting his body in front of Neal and cutting off the passing lane, preventing Ginobili to get the ball to him.  However, this doesn’t happen and Battier gets caught chasing Duncan after setting the screen.

This allows Gary Neal to not only catch the basketball, but to catch the basketball with space.  This allows Neal to put the ball on the ground, take one dribble to the right, and pull up.

With O.J. Mayo concerned about fouling, Neal is able to rise up over him and knock down the three point shot.  Here is the play in real time:

This is definitely a blown assignment by Shane Battier.  He absolutely can’t chase stick to Duncan on this screen.  If Battier hops in front of Neal, yes, he is leaving Tim Duncan open, but Tim Duncan isn’t a threat behind the three point line.  Also, if the Spurs go for two, there is not enough time to get the ball back.  With Neal denied, Manu Ginobili is forced to go to his second option, which is probably George Hill in the corner (and the Denver/OKC game showed us what happens when the ball goes to the corner).

Now, the one issue is whether or not Memphis should have fouled.  In my opinion, they made the right decision not to.  Whenever looking at a decision whether to foul or not, I always reference what Del Harris mentioned at the Sloan Conference a few months ago:

He teaches his teams to foul only with less than six seconds left and only if a player’s back or side is facing them; if a player is facing the rim, he wants his players to just defend the shot (in addition, Harris also mentions that you need to let the ref know you are fouling to ensure that it does in fact get called). Both Buford and Harris mentioned that nobody seems to remember when fouling up three does work and that it only gets talked about when it fails, and this is what is in the coach’s mind when they decide not to foul.

By the time Mayo gets to Neal, Neal is already facing the rim in a position to shoot.  If he tries to foul here, it is going to be a shooting foul.

The play starts with Matt Bonner setting a downscreen for Tim Duncanwho flashes to the top of the key to receive the basketball.

The Grizzlies do a good job here of switching this screen with Marc Gasol picking up Matt Bonner and Zach Randolph picking up Tim Duncan and trying to stay between Duncan and the basketball.

Duncan actually does a very good job of fighting through Randolph’s body to get the basketball.  As soon as Duncan makes the catch, he starts to pivot away from the sideline.  With this happening, Manu Ginobili starts towards Duncan as if he is going to look for a pass or a handoff.

With the Grizzlies looking to deny the game tying three point shot, Tony Allen steps up to keep himself between Ginobili and the basketball.  When this happens, Ginobili puts his foot in the ground and cuts backdoor hard.

The beauty of this play is the Spurs keeping someone in the corner on the weakside.  Normally, teams wouldn’t do this because it would allow help defense to come, but in this situation with this team, Popovich knows that Shane Battier is not going to leave Gary Neal under any circumstance (same actually goes with Matt Bonner on the strong side block).

Ginobili makes the catch and finishes, running about two and a half seconds off of the clock.  The Spurs’ immediately foul after and extend the game.  Here is the play in real time:

The key part of this play in my opinion is Tim Duncan fighting through Zach Randolph’s body to make himself available for the pass.  If that pass doesn’t happen, the play blows up, and Duncan knows this.  Memphis isn’t a fault here. They executed exactly what they wanted, running the Spurs off of the three point line and allowing a two point shot. Just better offense and execution by San Antonio.

Eventually, this decision to go for two and extend the game would pay off as the Spurs tie the game at the buzzer, sending the game into overtime, where they win.

After creating a turnover, the San Antonio Spurs were able to get out in transition with Parker bringing the ball down the court and Richard Jefferson running down the sideline.

Once Parker picks up the basketball, he is looking to pass it to Jefferson in the corner for the three in transition.  However, Jefferson isn’t spotting up in the corner.  He is cutting to the rim, looking for an attempt at the rim.

The result is a turnover due to miscommunication as the ball sails out of bounds with Jefferson being unable to make the catch.  Here is the play in real time:

This is just a simple case of Parker thinking that Jefferson is going to be spotting up in the corner, and Jefferson trying to get the ball to the rim.  The reason why I think this was the Spurs getting away from their usual offense is because during the regular season, Jefferson was sprinting ahead and spotting up in the corner.  Heck, this happened earlier in the series:

For whatever reason (maybe because the Grizzlies were so good running the Spurs off of the line, that they never really developed a flow/rhythm), Jefferson simply didn’t want to spot up at the three point line, and the result was a turnover.  This was a big one, considering that the Spurs could have cut the lead to two points.  However, that didn’t happen, and after this turnover, the Grizzlies were able to end the third quarter with a 13 point lead.  By that point, the game was probably over.