When the Memphis Grizzlies tanked to get the San Antonio Spurs, it was safe to say that I didn’t really agree with the opinion. In fact, I predicted that the Spurs would run away with the series in a sweep. The biggest reason why I thought that there was going to be sweep was because I thought that the Spurs offensive system of getting the ball to the middle and kicking it out would cause problems for the Grizzlies’ defense.
At this point, it is safe to say that I was wrong. I don’t know if it was my overestimating of the Spurs’ offense or underestimating of the Grizzlies’ defense, but I obviously didn’t think that the Grizzlies could contain the Spurs. After seeing four games in this series, I think it has become obvious that the Grizzlies are really good at defending passing lanes, taking away what the Spurs want to do, get the ball in the corner and knock down the three point shot.
Game four was more of the same for the Grizzlies:
This camera angle gives us a perfect view of the Grizzlies and their defensive strategy against the Spurs. Here, Parker goes away from the screen and attacks the rim. Most defenses would collapse, giving up an open three to Matt Bonner. Instead of doing that, Zach Randolph stays in the passing lane, taking away the pass to the corner as Mike Conley and Marc Gasol defend Parker at the rim. The Grizzlies are funneling everything back to the middle of the court, where they can rotate and challenge the jumper.
In game two of their series the Memphis Grizzlies once again did a very good job of stifling the Spurs’ offense. However late in the game, there was a possession where the Spurs pushed it in transition and the Grizzlies made a few errors, allowing the Spurs to get a big three that extended the lead to six points with three minutes left. In my opinion, the Grizzlies were forced into these errors by the strong fundamentals of the Spurs in transition.
As soon as Richard Jefferson secures the defensive rebound, Tony Parker does a great job of getting into an area where Richardson can hit him with the outlet pass.
In my preview for the Grizzlies-Spurs matchup, I noticed that the Spurs excel at what the Grizzlies struggle defending. So you can imagine how shocked I was when the Spurs offense only scored 43 points in the first half of action. While you can talk about the poor Spurs’ interior defense being the key to the game, I think the Spurs’ struggles offensively in the first half is what cost them the game (we all knew that the Spurs’ second big defender would have their hands full with either Gasol or Randolph).
Initially on Twitter, that I mentioned this was 100% the fault of the Spurs’ offense, but I have backed off of that stance a little bit after rewatching the first half. The Grizzlies did a solid job defensively, taking away opportunities to kick the ball out to the corner. They were able to do so by doing two things. First, they committed fouls instead of giving up shots, and they also played the passing lanes well.
Whether it was intentional or not, the Grizzlies committed a lot of fouls during the course of the game. A few of them were very timely in the fact that they happened as the Spurs were about to take advantage of them, breaking up a few plays:
This is the first play of the game and here George Hill starts to attack baseline with the help coming from the opposite corner. The kick out is open to the corner, but Tony commits the foul before the kick out can take place.
When it comes to shooting in Spot-Up situations the Spurs are third best team in the league posting a PPP of 1.08 on 42.9% shooting (the 2nd highest FG% in the league). The Spurs have predicated their offense this season on spot-up shooting, particularly in the corners, and it is interesting to see who gets the most spot up possessions on their team. Richard Jefferson, Gary Neal, Matt Bonner, and George Hill make up 56.6% of the Spurs’ spot-up possessions (the only other player in the top 5 is Manu Ginobili). All four of these guys are in the top 20% of the league in terms of PPP and three of them (Jefferson, Neal, and Bonner) are in the top 9%. Even more interesting is that all of these guys seem to be most effective (and get most of their possessions) spotting up off of pick and roll action. Richard Jefferson gets 40.7% of his spot up opportunities out of the pick and roll, and he is shooting 43.6% off of it:
As you probably know, Richard Jefferson gets most of his shot attempts from the corner and this is designed. With the pick and roll drawing the defenses attention, Jefferson is able to spot up and get open look after open look in the corner. Here, Tim Duncan sets a screen for Tony Parker, and Parker is able to get in the lane. This forces the defense to sink in and Jefferson is open for the kick out.
A team’s performance after a timeout may be the best way to judge a coach’s Xs & Os knowledge, and his ability to draw up plays. The Clipboard Awards is a competition where I choose the top three post-timeout plays each night, adding up the scores over the course of the season.
Play 3 (1 Point) – Tom Thibodeau/Chicago Bulls
We catch this play in the middle of it (due to the Pistons broadcast showing a full-screen interview with Dennis Rodman), but here you have Kyle Korver coming off a staggered pindown screen to get a wide open look off of the screens.
Last night, against the Houston Rockets, the San Antonio Spurs dropped their sixth straight game, losing in overtime. While the first five losses weren’t really anything to worry about considering the injuries and the opponents (the first four had all or some of the Spurs’ big three sitting out, the fifth loss was to the Boston Celtics), this one was a little more worrisome.
With the Lakers breathing down the Spurs’ neck for the first seed and while playing a non-playoff team, the Spurs were really going for the win, but they were unable to get it due to a number (nine to be exact) of really bad mistakes made in the final minute of the fourth quarter and throughout overtime. Mistakes that you don’t really see Gregg Popovich coached teams make:
Mistake 1: Turnover In The Backcourt
Up by three points with 1 minute left in the game, the Spurs play fantastic defense, forcing the Rockets into a tough shot that is missed. After securing the rebound, the Spurs could have realistically ran the clock all the way down to 30 seconds looking to get a basket and turn it into a two possession game. The Spurs never get that chance because of some sloppy play. Manu Ginobili throws a pass to Tony Parker without really looking. This forces Paker to tap the ball to Tim Duncan just to avoid a turnover. Duncan quickly gets the ball to George Hill who now has to rush the ball up the court to avoid an eight second violation. As soon as Hill crosses the half court line, he is trapped, the ball gets deflected, and it leads to a turnover. Once that results directly into a fast break opportunity for the Rockets. This turnover all comes down to the lazy pass thrown by Ginobili. If he hangs onto the basketball and brings it up himself, a turnover probably doesn’t take place.
Down by eight points with about nine minutes left, the San Antonio Spurs were looking to put together a few stops so their offense could get them back in the game. One way was trying to trap Rajon Rondo in the backcourt, forcing the basketball out of his hands. However, a poor angle taken by one of the men trapping Rondo lead to a fast break coming out of a timeout:
This starts with Glen Davis entering the basketball to Rajon Rondo along the opposite baseline. As soon as Rondo gets the basketball, both Manu Ginobili and Tiago Splitter head towards Rondo, trying to trap him.
A team’s performance after a timeout may be the best way to judge a coach’s Xs & Os knowledge, and his ability to draw up plays. The Clipboard Awards is a competition where I choose the top three post-timeout plays each night, adding up the scores over the course of the season.
Play 3 (1 Point) – Nate McMillan/Portland Trailblazers
This play by Portland is a perfect example of a quick hitter. Andre Miller brings the basketball down along the sideline and gets it to Gerald Wallace at the top of the key. Wallace then hands it off to Rudy Fernandez, and this handoff basically turns into a ballscreen with Wallace rolling to the rim. Fernandez hits the rolling Wallace for the easy finish.
After seeing the Spurs botch a final play of their own with 0.9 seconds left (the ball ended up being thrown out of bounds without being touched), the Portland Trailblazers had the basketball on the side with the game tied, looking to take the lead. While the Blazers were able to use a decent play to get the game winning tip, it is my opinion that the flawed defensive strategy of the Spurs and the execution of that strategy was more responsible for the basket than the actual play.
As the basketball goes to the trigger man, the Blazers have a lot of things going on. Wesley Matthews flashes to the basketball near the halfcourt line as LaMarcus Aldridge flashes to the corner behind the three point line. The main action however is Brandon Roy coming off of a screen set by Nicolas Batum.
