The play starts with Shelvin Mack inbounding on the right sideline and with the rest of his teammates in a box formation (both blocks, both elbows). Nene starts off the play by coming to the ball off the right elbow. Mack hits him with a pass then cuts past him to receive a dribble hand-off.

Mack then continues his dribble toward the top of the key while forward James Singleton sprints up to set a ball screen.

While that is going on, Nene has begun to cut from his initial position toward the left block. In the process, he receives screens from both Maurice Evans and Cartier Martin. Both players are looking to headhunt (as opposed to screening an area) Nene’s defender Drew Gooden hoping to either force a switch for an iso post up or free Nene entirely for a shot at the rim. The timing on this play is important as Nene must time his cut with Shelvin Mack’s movement on the perimeter. If he moves too soon, Mack may not be in a position to deliver the ball.

The play works as scripted as Mack, despite dragging two defenders with him off the ball screen, finds Nene open with great position near the rim. (Note: On the backside of the play, James Singleton prepares to screen for Martin to come to the top as a second option in triangle or screen-the-screener action. However, Martin forgets this and simply floats to the top.)

Then end result is a wide open layup for Brazilian big man. Here is the play in real time:

Due to the rust that the lockout has caused league-wide, the Wizards should improve slightly as the season goes on.  However, in a season that has 7 teams on pace to qualify for the worst 100 offensive season in league history, the Wizards have been playing epically bad basketball.

Whenever a team is this bad on the offensive end, it usually a combination of a lack of talent and poor execution. The Wizards, with a roster full of low basketball IQ players, are no exception. It’s to the point where it’s tough to accurately scout the one player Washington fans should be optimistic about, John Wall. Wall’s progress as a prospect has stalled and it looks as though his teammates may be part of the problem with his development.

While one could fill a 1,500 word post with examples of poor execution, selfish play or bad shot selection from the Wizards this season, we’ll just take a look at a few possessions where Washington starts out in a great position and ends up with a failed result.

This first play is a pick and roll between John Wall and Ronny Turiaf that’s defended by the Sixers’ Jrue Holiday and Nikola Vucevic. The Wizards are immediately put in an advantageous situation because Jrue Holiday goes over the top of Turiaf’s screen. The Wall-Turiaf tandem is tailor-made for a defense to have the on-ball defender go under thanks to Wall’s struggles shooting off the pick and roll (He’s currently at just 27.3% on jump shots coming off pick and rolls).

With Vucevic’s slow lateral foot speed, he doesn’t have a chance of staying with Wall. Wall easily splits the trap and forces Marreese Speights to have to rotate over, leaving an easy kickout pass to Trevor Booker on the left wing.

Booker should straddle the three point line and give Wall the option for an easy kickout pass. This would force Philly’s Jodie Meeks to defend both Booker and the Wizards player stationed in the corner.  When Meeks closes out, the Wizards will have an uncontested corner three.  If Meeks closes out too aggressively, Booker can then pump fake and drive past him. Instead, Booker dives to the paint, changing the angle of John Wall’s pass and giving Meeks a chance to intercept it, which he does.

Here is a video of the play. Watch the angle change as Booker dives to the paint, giving Meeks a chance to intercept the ball and changing a 2 on 1 situation in favor of the Wizards into a fast break opportunity for the Sixers.

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6IbVhL71ls&w=560&h=315]

The second scenario again involves a pick and roll, this time with Nick Young handling the ball and JaVale McGee setting the screen and diving into the paint.

Trevor Booker is in the paint, and Rashard Lewis is standing in the corner. Wall, standing at the top of the key, should be Young’s outlet valve, rotating over to give Young a clear pass if he’s trapped. Lewis should then slide over to his left and Booker should curl over to the corner three slot.  Not only will this movement opening up the paint for McGee, but Young will have pressure-release if trapped, and station the Wizards players to swing the ball around the three point line against a scrambling Sixers’ defense.

Instead, Wall, Booker, and Lewis remain virtually still and don’t start moving until Young is already trapped.  There’s no spacing in the paint, which allows Vucevic and Meeks to double team Young out in the corner, with no clear passing lane to Wall.

The play once again results in a turnover. Here’s the video:

[youtube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NIkWpAXnMw&w=560&h=315]

Flip Saunders is likely to be a casualty before any player movement occurs, but many of the Wizards core players (Andray Blatche, JaVale McGee, Nick Young, and Jordan Crawford, primarily) had questionable basketball IQ’s long before they stepped onto an NBA court. It’s not uncommon for a top overall pick to come into a team that lacks talent, but is uncommon to belong to a team as dysfunctional as this current Washington Wizards team. Only time will tell how it affects Wall’s development going forward.

Past Editions: Ricky Rubio

Vesley comes to the Washington Wizards with a reputation as a high flyer, calling Blake Griffin “the American Jan Vesely” but outside the big dunk highlights, nobody really knows much about him.  In this scouting report, we are going to look at a few strengths and weaknesses outside the big dunks.

Strengths

Post Offense

Vesely is a player who offensively is very comfortable posting up with his back to the basket.  In the 92 post up possessions that Vesely had over the course of the season, he posted a PPP of 1.022 (good for a top 14% finish among international basketball players) on 65.4% shooting.

One of the biggest reasons for his success in the post is his ability to establish very good position down low:

Jan Vesely does a fantastic job of using his body and his butt as a tool that lets him be physical with his defender and get his body on the block.  Position is so important when posting up, if you start too far away, you aren’t going to be efficient as a post player.  When Vesely gets the ball so deep in the post, it makes all of his moves so much easier.

What I really like about Vesely is that he is very active and smart when establishing position.  The perfect example is how he handles being fronted.

Here, Vesely’s team is running a cross screen for him, allowing him to set up on the block.  As Vesely comes off of the screen, his man trails him and then plays him over the top.  Instead of working to get in front of him (and basically giving up position), he sticks his left arm out, holds his defender off, and calls for the ball with the other hand, basically setting up a post-pin situation.

Here, Vesely gets another cross screen, and as he tries to establish position, he gets fronted.  Again, instead of working hard to get in front, and possibly giving up position, Vesely changes his feet position and puts his arm in the back of his defender (all in one smooth move).  He gets the lob over the top and finishes easily.  Out of his 92 post possessions, Vesely had 24 of them turn into post pins.  If you front him, he pins you.  If you stay behind him, he establishes terrific position.  That’s tough to defend.

What is so strange about Vesely’s high efficiency in the post is that he wastes a lot of possessions by turning the ball over a ton in the post.  When getting the ball on the block, Vesely has turned it over 19.6% of the time.

So where do these turnovers come from?  Well, Vesely loves passing out of the post, and he is good at it when he isn’t forcing the basketball.  When he completes his passes, his teammates are posting a PPP of 1.585 (top 6%) on 60% shooting.  The problem that Vesely has is that he tends to force passes, looking to make the perfect pass or thread the needle (he loves throwing the jump pass out of the post):

This is a very correctable problem with coaching in my opinion and why I listed his post offense as a strength despite the high turnover number.

Defense

We know that Vesely has athletic ability and have seen it with his dunking, however, he uses that athletic ability for more than dunks.  On the defensive end, Vesely is a very good one on one defender, holding opponents to a PPP of 0.524 (top 12%) on 33.3% shooting, while forcing a turnover 33.3% of the time.

Vesely is quick and athletic enough that guys can’t really get by him to get to the rim.  They are forced to settle for outside jumpers, where Vesely can use his length to contest shots.

Weaknesses

Ball Handling

85.5% of Vesely’s offense came off of the ball (Spot-Ups, Post-Ups, Cuts, Transition, Offensive Rebounds), and there is a reason why, he’s not entirely comfortable with the ball in his hands.  Just 2.8% of Vesely’s offense were isolation sets where he was forced to create for himself, and while it was a small sample size, you could see his sturggles.  Vesely posted a PPP of 0.500 (bottom 9%) and shot just 18.2% in isolation, turning it over 14.3% of the time.

To me, Vesely is just too loose with the ball when he tries to create for himself.  Aslo, unlike when he is posting up, Vesely seems to get tunnel vision when he is attacking for himself.  Putting himself in tough positions to try and finish when attacking out of isolation sets.

Shooting

In addition to his inability to create for himself, Vesely struggles with his shooting touch.  Vesely shot just 27.1% (39.3 eFG%) on 107 jump shots.  On catch and shoot chances, Vesely shot 30.5% (30.8% guarded/30.2% unguarded).  Off of the dribble, Vesely shot just 11.8%.  With the team that he is playing on and the roll that he should be playing in my opinion, these shooting percentages shouldn’t be a huge problem (though, of course, you would like to see them get higher), because I don’t see him taking a lot of jump shots.

However, in my opinion the biggest problem related to Vesely’s shooting is his free throw shooting.  While attempting close to 4 free throws a game, Vesely shot just 43.8% from the free throw line in EuroLeague play.  With his domestic league combined, Vesely got his FT% all the way up to 50.9%.  There are a few things that I don’t really like with Vesely’s free throw shooting form:

The first thing is while Vesely has the same repeatable routine, there is a problem with it.  The whole time he is at the free throw line, he looks at the basket for one second before he shoots.  Vesely keeps his head down the entire time he is taking his three dribbles, gets set, then looks up to find the rim, and finally shooting the ball.  It may sound simple, but how are you supposed to shoot at a target you don’t have your eyes on?  Nobody is defending you.  Take your dribble and bend your knees with the eyes on your target.  I think just by doing that, he can be more accurate.  Also, due to the ball with the multi-color panels (I love those and wish the NBA would adopt them) we can see Vesely doesn’t get a ton of rotation on the shot, which is part of the reason you never see him get the “shooter’s roll.”

—

With the 6th pick overall, you are hoping for an impact guy who will be a starter for your team.  I think the Wizards have that, but not this season.  This season, I can see Vesely having an impact, but his role will probably be (and in my opinion should be) coming off of the bench.  He can come in, play defense, make a few high energy plays, and work the post.

One interesting thing on Vesely.  To me he seems like an ideal pick and roll screener, but was rarely used in that situation.  I could definitely see the Wizards using him as a screener in the second unit, trying to take possessions away from his spot-up shooting, which is poor at this point.

We pick up the Pistons’ possession as Tracy McGrady dribbles the ball at the top with 10 seconds left on the shot clock.  McGrady attacks the rim, and when this happens Will Bynum slides to the corner.  This leaves Austin Daye as the man responsible for getting back on defense.  Initially, he makes the right play by sliding towards the top of the key, replacing McGrady.

As McGrady penetrates, he is met by a few Wizards’ defenders so he kicks the ball out to the corner.  Daye remains in decent position to get back on defense.

However, as soon as Tayshaun Prince puts the ball up, Daye dives to the front of the rim, crashing the boards despite the four other Pistons below the free throw line.

Daye doesn’t get the offensive rebound, and as JaVale McGee collects the basketball you have all five Detroit Pistons below the free throw line.  Wall recognizes this and quickly leaks out as soon as he sees McGee securing the basketball.

Nobody on the Pistons is quick enough to catch up with Wall, especially when given a 5-10 foot head start.  Wall finishes with the dunk, and gives his team a 2 point lead with 15 seconds left.  Here is the play in real time:

It’s hard to say what was on Daye’s mind when he attacked the front of the rim looking for a rebound.  Maybe he saw the lane and instincts took over, maybe he was frustrated that the ball didn’t get swung to him and he lost his mind.  Either way, Daye crashing the boards with nobody back on defense denied the Pistons a chance to get a stop and force this game into overtime.

Towards the end of the third quarter, Avery Johnson threw out his small lineup, featuring Travis Outlaw at the 4 and Anthony Morrow at the 3.  With John Wall at the foul line, Outlaw and Morrow were faced with the challenge of boxing out a bigger Trevor Booker.  Normally when faced with a bigger man in the middle, the side with two players tend to “pinch” the bigger offensive player by having both guys boxing him out.  That is what the Nets do here.

With Morrow and Outlaw pinching Booker and Brook Lopez boxing out JaVale McGee, nobody on the line is responsible for John Wall.  This means that either Sasha Vujacic or Sundiata Gaines are responsible from coming off of the three point lane and getting in front of Wall, boxing him out.  The reason this works is because the defenders behind the three point line (Gaines and Vujacic) can cross the three point line once the ball is release while John Wall needs to wait until the ball hits the rim.

Outlaw and Morrow do a good job of boxing out Booker as Lopez does a decent job of boxing out McGee.  However, instead of busting it and getting in front of Wall, both Gaines and Vujacic go through the motions and walk to the elbow.  With nobody in front of him, boxing him out, Wall has all of this space in front of him to grab the rebound.

Sure enough, the ball takes a hard carom off of the rim, bouncing off of Lopez, and landing right in the hands of John Wall.

To make matters worse, after grabbing the rebound all five New Jersey Nets seem to focus on the basketball and forget about everyone else on the court.  This leaves McGee wide open on the block.

Wall spots McGee and hits him with the pass.  McGee makes the catch and starts towards the rim before anyone can rotate over.

The result is a big dunk for McGee and two points that the Nets could have prevented by showing effort instead of going through the motions.  Here is the play in real time:

Now one can argue that Lopez probably should have grabbed the ball as it came towards him, and there is some merit to that.  However, if either Gaines or Vujacic (without knowing the Nets’ strategy when pinching, we don’t know who is supposed to come down and box out.  My guess would be Vujacic, since he seems to have less ground to cover) would have gotten in front of Wall and boxed him out, Lopez not securing the ball would have been a moot point.

Play 3 (1 Point) – Flip Saunders/Washington Wizards

This play starts with John Wall bringing the basketball up along the sideline.  As that happens, Josh Howard sets a backscreen for Nick Young.

Young curls the screen at the block and sets a backscreen for Trevor Booker, who uses it to flash to the block.

Booker makes the catch on the block, turns, and hits the open lay-in.  Here is the play in real time:

This is a strong play drawn up by Saunders.  The defense focuses on John Wall who is dribbling out the basketball, and they aren’t ready to defend the cross screen.

Play 2 (2 Points) – Alvin Gentry/Phoenix Suns

As soon as the ball goes to the trigger man, Grant Hill, Aaron Brooks dives to the corner.  As soon as Brooks clears the area, Steve Nash comes off of a screen set by Channing Frye.

As Nash continues towards the basketball, Marcin Gortat sneaks in and sets a screen for Frye, who pops out behind the three point line.

Before Frye even finishes his cut, Grant Hill has gotten the ball out of his hands, making the pass to where he knows Frye will be.

Frye makes the catch, squares up, and knocks down the three. Here is the play in real time:

The Suns do a very good job of using Steve Nash, who happens to be a fantastic shooter, to set up Channing Frye, a big who can knock down the three.

Play 1 (3 Points) – Doc Rivers/Boston Celtics

After inbounding the basketball to Rajon Rondo, Paul Pierce walks his man to the block and then comes off of a pindown screen set by Kevin Garnett.

Pierce isn’t spotting up off of this pindown, but he is coming all the way around and taking the ball off of Nenad Krstic via a dribble handoff.  After handing the ball off, Krstic curls to the block.

Where he sets a pindown screen of his own for Kevin Garnett, who uses it to pop out on the wing.

Garnett makes the catch, pulls up, and knocks down the open jumper.  Here is the play in real time:

The Celtics love running a lot of stuff with backside action.  Here is another example of that.  It looks like the play is going to be a dribble handoff for Paul Pierce, allowing him to ISO on the elbow, but all of a sudden a pindown screen from Krstic off of the ball frees up Kevin Garnett.

Updated Standings (Previous)

1. Erik Spoelstra – 22 points (1st)
2. Doc Rivers – 20 points (2nd)
3. Frank Vogel – 12 points (3rd)
4. Phil Jackson – 12 points (4th)
5. Gregg Popovich – 12 points (5th)
6. Monty Williams – 10 points (6th)
7. Alvin Gentry –  7 points (11th)
8. Tom Thibodeau – 7 points (7th)
9. Rick Adelman – 6 points (8th)
10. Scott Brooks – 5 points (9th)
11. Nate McMillan – 5 points (10th)
12. Rick Carlisle – 4 points (12th)
13. Larry Drew – 4 points (13th)
14. Jerry Sloan – 4 Points (14th)
15. Lionel Hollins – 3 points (15th)
16. George Karl – 3 points (16th)
17. Jay Triano – 2 points (17th)
18. Byron Scott – 2 points (18th)
19. Stan Van Gundy – 2 points (19th)
20. Flip Saunders – 2 points (20th)
21. John Kuester – 1 point (21st)
22. Keith Smart – 1 point (22nd)
23. Ty Corbin – 1 point (23rd)

Doc Rivers continues his chase of Erik Spoelstra and the top spot.  Meanwhile, Alvin Gentry cracks the top 10 as Flip Saunders gets a second point.

Play #3 (1 point)- Flip Saunders/Washington Wizards

Coming off of the jump ball, John Wall brings the basketball down and as that happens, Kirk Hinrich comes off of a backscreen set by Andray Blatche

After coming off of the backscreen, Hinrich sets a screen on the block, allowing JaVale McGee to post up on the ball side block.  As this happens, John Wall enters the ball to Blatche.

The cross screen is what allows McGee to get strong post position on Tim Duncan, allowing him to use his length to get a basket.  Here is the play in real time:

McGee i a long basketball player, but he is so thin he tends to struggle when fighting for position.  A set like this allows him to get strong post position, which means he can use the length advantage he has.

Play #2 (2 points)- Tom Thibodeau/Chicago Bulls

Derrick Rose brings the basketball up, entering the ball to Keith Bogans on the wing.  After making the pass, Rose gets a backscreen from Luol Deng on the elbow.

After setting his screen, Deng gets from the elbow and sets a screen on the opposite block for Carlos Boozer, who uses it to get to the elbow.

After Deng sets his second screen, Rose sets a screen in the middle of the lane for him, allowing Deng to get open on the block.

Bogans hits Deng with the pass as his defender gambles for the pass.  The result is an easy basket.  Here is the play in real time:

A great set here to start the second half for the Bulls.  With both Boozer and Rose on the ball side, the last thing you would expect is a cross screen from Rose to Deng, and that’s why it works.

Play #1 (3 points)- Gregg Popovich/San Antonio Spurs

Manu Ginobili inbounds the basketball, and after that, he comes off of a backscreen set by Antonio McDyess as the ball goes from George Hill to the opposite side of the court.

After Hill makes his pass, he comes down and sets a pindown screen for McDyess, who uses it to spot up on the opposite elbow.

McDyess gets the pass with no defender near him.  He easily knocks down the jumper.  Here is the play in real time:

I like this play because it looks like they are running something for Ginobili, but he is simply a decoy here, and the result is a wide open jumper for McDyess.

Updated Standings (Previous)

1. Doc Rivers – 12 points (1st)
2. Frank Vogel – 11 points (2nd)
3. Erik Spoelstra – 11 points (3rd)
4. Gregg Popovich – 8 points (5th)
5. Phil Jackson – 5 points (4th)
6. Tom Thibodeau – 5 points (11th)
7. Rick Adelman – 5 points (6th)
8. Monty Williams – 5 points (7th)
9. Jerry Sloan – 4 Points (8th)
10. Nate McMillan – 3 points (9th)
11. George Karl – 3 points (10th)
12. Rick Carlisle – 2 points (12th)
13. Byron Scott – 2 points (13th)
14. Stan Van Gundy – 2 points (14th)
15. Scott Brooks – 2 points (15th)
16. Flip Saunders 1 point (NR)
17. John Kuester – 1 point (16th)
18. Keith Smart – 1 point (17th)
19. Alvin Gentry – 1 point (18th)

Flip Saunders, a coach who has a reputation for a deep playbook, finally makes his way onto the leaderboard.  Thibodeau gets himself in the top ten as Gregg Popovich closes the gap between himself and the top three, for now.

Without a doubt, the main culprit on this play is John Wall.  There is no way that Pooh Jeter should be driving on him like that at any point of the game, let alone on the final play of the game.  That being said, partial blame does need to go to JaVale McGee.  With the remaining Wizards’ defenders on the hips of the Kings’ three point shooters, McGee needs to be the man responsible for help defense if Jeter gets ball Wall (which does in fact happen).  The main problem that I have with McGee is his defensive positioning.  He is denying DeMarcus Cousins the ball strongly, and this deny leaves him up high and puts him in a position where he can’t help.  I would have much rather seen him playing behind Cousins (but still defending him), ready to help on any dribble penetration.  Doing so gives up the pass to DeMarcus Cousins in the post, but Cousins really struggled with his driving from a distance (fell and threw up a shot at the same time on his previous attempt), so if Cousins makes the catch, I am less worried about that than an open lay-up.

This lay-up by Jeter lead to overtime, and in that overtime there was still bad basketball being played.  However, there was one smart defensive play that took place, and it was made by Kirk Hinrich:

Down by 2 points with 15 seconds left, the Kings look to run a pick and roll with Beno Udrih as the ball handler and DeMarcus Cousins as the screener.  Udrih uses the screen, and Cousins rolls off of it.  Being in the corner on the weakside, it is Hinrich’s responsibility to sink down and help on the roll.

That is exactly what Hinrich does and he seems to be in perfect position to defend any pass that is made.

After a pivot, Udrih tries to force the basketball into Cousins and Hinrich is able to get his hand on the basketball and force the turnover.  Here is the play in real time:

What I like about Hinrich’s play the most is that he doesn’t show quickly and returns to his man.  He hangs around the post, waiting for Cousins’ man to get back to him, knowing that if Udrih skips the pass to his man he has enough time to get back and close out.

The reason why Fisher was able to get his hands on the ball was because Seraphin brought it back down to an area where Fisher could reach it. The overhead angle really shows Seraphin’s mistake:

This first clip shows when Seraphin gets his hands on the basketball.  As you can see his hands, and therefore the basketball, are up high.  You also see Derek Fisher lurking around the basketball.

Seraphin has two options here.  The first option is hee could keep the ball up high, out of the reach of Fisher.  If he didn’t want to keep the ball up high (and risk Gasol poking it away), Seraphin could have simply chinned the basketball and pivoted.  Chinning is what big men are taught at an early age, and it is the process of grabbing the rebound and bringing it directly to your chin.  This process naturally brings your elbows to your side, and by pivoting you are protecting the basketball with your elbows out.  If Seraphin does this, there is no way Fisher is going to get his hands on the basketball.

Instead, Seraphin brings the basketball all of the way down to his stomach, almost cradling it, and basically showing it off to Derek Fisher.

Fisher gets his hand on the basketball, knocking it loose, and eventually forcing the jump ball.  Here is another look at the play from the overhead angle:

The Lakers would eventually win the jump ball and run more time off the clock before missing a jumper.  By the time the Wizards regained possession, there wasn’t really any chance to make up the two possessions they were down.  Rookie mistakes like this are going to happen.  However, it is unfortunate for Seraphin and the Wizards that it came late in a winnable game against the Lakers.

This time, the Sixers were up three with 8.0 seconds left and Evan Turner at line.  Turner misses both free throws (this wouldn’t be his biggest mistake of the game – more on that later), and John Wall starts the basketball up the court.

As John Wall brings the basketball towards half court, Jrue Holiday comes running towards him.  With 5.5 seconds left and a three point lead, there is no reason Holiday should be out there defending Wall.  This was the first give-away that the Sixers were going to foul.  John Wall even said it was after the game:

“I could tell how he was walking up to me that he was going to foul me,” Wall said. “Luckily I got the call and got to shoot three free throws.”

When John Wall takes a step over halfcourt, he picks up his dribble.  Wall brings the ball up high on his hip, and this should be an indication that he is picking up his dribble.  At this point, Holiday needs to back off of Wall to leave him with no options.

Instead of backing off, Holiday still attempts to foul Wall by reaching in.  By now it is too late because Wall has already started his shooting motion.  Also, look at where the ref is positioned, staring right at the play.

By the time Holiday realizes what is happening and tries to pull back, it is way too late.  Here is the play in real time:

The key to pay attention to is where Wall picks up his dribble. Holiday needs to recognize this and back off of Wall instead of fouling. He doesn’t and the Sixers pay the price.

We have now seen two of the three things that could go wrong when you foul up three happen to the Sixers.  I expect the next time they are in this situation and they foul up three the shooter will hit the first foul shot, miss the second on purpose, and hit a three to win the game.