After an inadvertent whistle, the Chicago Bulls and the Atlanta Hawks found themselves in a jump ball situation at center court with 2:27 left and the Hawks holding onto a six point lead. After winning the tip, the Atlanta Hawks came down, milked some time off the clock, and then ran a great play to get Al Horford a wide open look in the paint:
On this play, the Hawks use the threat of Joe Johnson coming off of a Al Horford pindown screen to draw the defense to him, allowing Horford to cut into the lane wide open. If this play looks familiar, it should. In fact, the reason why I didn’t break this play down frame-by-frame is because I have already done so once in this series. In game one, the Hawks used this same exact play in a similar situation (time, score, and quarter):
Late in the 4th quarter, during their game against the Utah Jazz, the Golden State Warriors were trying to get the ball to Monta Ellis on the wing using a simple set involving multiple screens. The play was well defended, and Ellis was unable to get the basketball. After that, the Golden State Warriors just looked lost for the rest of the possession, illustrating the importance of having a second option.
Not only did the Nets avoid infamy last night, but they might have also provided the rest of the Western Conference with a blueprint on how to stop Tim Duncan. Duncan really struggled last night, scoring only 13 points on 15 shots in 31 minutes and in my opinion it was because of how the Nets defended him. With Ginobili and Parker out, the Nets were determined to let the rest of the Spurs roster beat them, and they brought a double team just about every time Tim Duncan touched the basketball.
Step 1: Bringing The Double
When you double team a post player, there you have three options when sending the double. You can either go on the catch, on the first dribble, or on the first attack dribble. The Nets decided to bring the double team right on the catch against the Spurs (their strategy most of the season has been to come on the first attack dribble), refusing to allow Tim Duncan to even dribble without two defenders on him:
After Matt Bonner makes the entry pass, he is going to go to the high post to set a screen for George Hill (or at least I think that is the play design here). The double team will be coming from Yi, the man defending Bonner.
Going into tonight’s game with the Orlando Magic, the Atlanta Hawks were hoping to clinch a playoff spot with a win. They were in good shape for most of the game, but they allowed Orlando to get back into it late. After Vince Carter hit a fade away three with 9.9 seconds left, Atlanta had one more chance to win the game.
After Vince Carter’s three, the Magic drop everyone back on defense. Maybe this is nit-picking, but I would have loved to see the Magic show a little bit of pressure. Not necessarily press, but at least have one guy pressuring the ball. If the Magic have Carter defending Joe Johnson the full length of the court, he might have been able to speed him up and force him into a mistake. Instead, Johnson is able to walk the ball up the court and let things develop.
Kevin Durant scored 45 points against the Spurs last night, so when the Thunder needed a basket to send the game into overtime/take the lead (after a fantastic Serge Ibaka block), it was obvious where the Thunder were going. The playcall (and the execution) weren’t the greatest, but the real reason Durant didn’t get off a shot attempt was because of how the Spurs played defense, getting the ball out of his hands and forcing a teammate to take the shot.
As Thabo Sefolosha receives the basketball to inbounds it, Jeff Green is going to set a screen for Russell Westbrook while Serge Ibaka is going to set a screen for Kevin Durant. This is the one critique I have of the Thunder’s play. Ibaka is standing behind Durant, and they way the play is drawn up Ibaka has to run around in a circle to set the screen.
After Russell Westbrook hit a jumper with 3:22 left in the fourth quarter, he was able to cut the Bobcats lead to 4 points. Larry Brown took a timeout, and the possession following it was a pretty important one. If the Bobcats score, they can extend the lead to 6 with about 3 minutes left. If the Bobcats don’t score, the Thunder can cut the lead to 2 or 1 points, and who knows what will happen then. As it turns out, the Bobcats run a beautiful set out of the timeout and push their lead to 6, and the Thunder don’t come closer than that the rest of the ballgame:
Boris Diaw comes to the top of the key and receives the inbounds pass. The beauty of using Diaw (who himself is a pretty good passer for his size) is that you are pulling a front court defender away from the basket, clearing the lane for the potential lob. After Stephen Jackson makes the pass, he cuts through the middle of the lane, using a Tyrus Thomas screen. Over on the far side, Raymond Felton comes up off of a screen set by Stephen Graham. Nothing really important going on over there, as you can tell by the two players jogging through the motions.
In my opinion, the head coaching position is a little undervalued by casual NBA fans. I think the reason for this is because whenever you turn on the game you see guys like Kobe, Dwyane Wade, and LeBron James going 1 on 1, and some people assume (incorrectly) that the players are doing whatever they want out there.
Last night’s Nuggets-Rockets game showed you how important a quality head coach is. The Nuggets were without George Karl (who was receiving cancer treatment), and without him they made a ton of uncharacteristic mistakes you don’t see the Nuggets make. These mistakes ended up costing the Nuggets the game.
Mistake 1: Letting Trevor Ariza Get His Shot Off
Here, the Nuggets are up by 5 points with a little over 1 minute to go. If the Nuggets are able to get a stop here, they would pretty much have the win locked up (after a lot of foul shots). When Trevor Ariza makes his catch, you just get a feeling he wants to shoot a three (Ariza shoots 5.9 threes a game). Carmelo Anthony recognizes it, and he crowds Ariza.
When the Bucks entered the fourth quarter against the Pacers, it looked like it was going to be an easy 12 minutes. The Bucks were leading by 14 at the start of the fourth, and have only allowed 62 points to the Pacers. However, the Pacers decided to make things interesting in the fourth quarter. In fact, with 2:19 left a Solomon Jones dunk made the score 90-94, cutting the lead to 4 points. The Bucks were reeling and they needed a bucket to try and put the game away. This is the quick hitting play that they ran:
The Pacers tried to speed the pace up with a full court press. It almost works, as the Bucks’ inbounder throws a pass to Carlos Delfino who is standing at halfcourt. Delfino could have sped the ball up but knowing the situation (and how important this possession is), Delfino stops at halfcourt and waits for Jennings who meets the basketball.
With the game tied and 9 seconds left, everyone and their mother knows that Kobe Bean Bryant will be getting the basketball. So how was he able to get free for a pretty easy (for Kobe) jumper? Some great execution from the Lakers and some poor execution from the Raptors:
After Ron Artest inbounds it to Pau Gasol, he cuts backdoor while Kobe comes to the basketball. The Lakers have run a play like this in the past, except instead of a backdoor cut, it was a backscreen set. Phil Jackson chose not to go with the backscreen, and I think that is smart. It prevents the Raptors from switching the cut and denying Kobe outright. On the other side, Lamar Odom sets a back screen for Derek Fisher.
Usually when I talk about plays late in games, they end up resulting in a win or a tie. Last night against the Cavs, the Spurs missed a game tying three point shot, but we are still going to talk about it here. Why? It was one of the best late game play calls I have seen in a really long time.
The Spurs start this play by sending George Hill into the far corner, Manu Ginobili into the near corner, and Roger Mason off of a Tim Duncan screen right to the ball. It looks like the Spurs are trying to set up a quick hitter for Roger Mason off the inbounds, but Richard Jefferson inbounds it to Manu instead.
