Step 1:  Bringing The Double

When you double team a post player, there you have three options when sending the double.  You can either go on the catch, on the first dribble, or on the first attack dribble.  The Nets decided to bring the double team right on the catch against the Spurs (their strategy most of the season has been to come on the first attack dribble), refusing to allow Tim Duncan to even dribble without two defenders on him:

After Matt Bonner makes the entry pass, he is going to go to the high post to set a screen for George Hill (or at least I think that is the play design here).  The double team will be coming from Yi, the man defending Bonner.

As Bonner gets to the high post, Yi sees his opportunity to make the double team.  He is going to leave Bonner and double hard on Duncan before he even puts the ball on the floor.

Step 2:  The Double

The next step of the double team is the actual double.  The man coming for the double team needs to be quick and get a hard double team on the man with the ball.  If you take too long to get there, it is easy to pass out of it and if you don’t get a hard enough double team, a player of Tim Duncan’s quality can get right past it.

Here, Yi gets there in time and gets right into Tim Duncan’s body.  The double team is so good that it actually forces Duncan to take a dribble backwards.

Duncan picks up his dribble and he is now looking to pass out of the double team.  The Spurs tried to counter the Nets doubles by sending a cutter through the paint, which is why Devin Harris sunk to the middle.  Look at where Duncan first made the catch to where he is now.  The Nets did a great job of pushing him backwards and not letting him attack with the basketball.

Step 3:  The Rotations

This is the most important step of the double team.  If you don’t rotate out of the double team correctly, it allows for an easy jump shot or lay-up.

Dunance makes the pass out of the double off of his back foot.  This might seem like a little thing, but because he is passing off his back foot, he can’t really get a ton of zip on the pass.  This allows more time for rotations.  With the ball in the air, the closest man to Matt Bonner (the man receiving the ball), Terrence Williams, leaves his man to defend the pass.

Bonner now swings it to the man Terrence Williams left, Malik Hairston.  To prevent him from getting an open jump shot, Courtney Lee leaves his man (Richard Jefferson) to defend Hairston.  Devin Harris then leaves his area to pick up Lee’s man.

The final piece of the puzzle in this rotation out of the double team is Yi, the man who started it all.  He can’t find the man who he is supposed to pick up (George Hill), because he is on the baseline.  Yi does the smart thing though, he just runs to the middle of the paint to try and stop any dribble penetration.

The penetration happens, and Yi is right there to provide the help, forcing a pass.

The ball gets kicked out to George Hill on the corner, and Brook Lopez is matched up with him.  This is a mismatch for the Spurs, but the Nets have a man on a man, and that is what is important.

Lopez does a nice job of forcing Hill into a tough jumper with the shot clock running out.  Here is the play in real time:

Now I know that Manu Ginobili and Tony Parker weren’t playing, but I think doubling Duncan like this is the key to stopping the Spurs in the playoffs.  If you can turn Duncan into a passer and make him uncomfortable like the Nets did (forcing him to dribble backwards instead of attacking), you have a good chance of preventing Duncan from going off and beating the Spurs.

After Vince Carter’s three, the Magic drop everyone back on defense.  Maybe this is nit-picking, but I would have loved to see the Magic show a little bit of pressure.  Not necessarily press, but at least have one guy pressuring the ball.  If the Magic have Carter defending Joe Johnson the full length of the court, he might have been able to speed him up and force him into a mistake.  Instead, Johnson is able to walk the ball up the court and let things develop.

Joe Johnson gets to the three point line before he is greeted by Vince Carter.  There was a debate in the comments yesterday about whether or not Thabo Sefolosha shot it too soon.  This is the same kind of situation in my opinion.  Joe Johnson could have settled for this three pointer (and it would have been a decent look), but instead he attacks.  I highlighted Josh Smith because I think it is funny he is calling for the ball all the way out there (more on this later).

As Johnson attacks, he sucks in the Orlando defense.  Dwight Howard, Rashard Lewis, and Jameer Nelson all take a step towards Joe Johnson.  Johnson let’s his shot fly with 2.8 seconds left on the clock.

As the shot goes up, the Orlando Magic defenders are in pretty good position to corral the defensive rebound.  However, that is the last good thing they do this possession.  Look at all four players arrowed.  They are all standing flat-footed watching the basketball.  Most likely, they are assuming that the clock will expire before the rebound comes off the rim.

I highlighted Josh Smith a little bit earlier as he was standing at the three point line calling for the ball.  Well now, he is crashing the boards.  I think this really shows the growth of Smith over the past year.  Last year if Smith doesn’t get that basketball, he sulks and watching the shot bounce off the rim as time expires.  Last night, Smith keeps his head and makes the right basketball play by crashing the boards.

By the time Rashard Lewis notices that time won’t be expiring and the rebound is live it is too late.  Lewis jumps, reaching for the basketball but Smith is already on his way to winning the game.  He corrals the basketball and slams it home all in one motion.  Here it is in real time:

One interesting thing to note on Vince Carter’s game tying three.  He actually goes the wrong way around a double-screen.  It actually crosses up the Hawks’ defenders and that is what frees him up for the three.  If Josh Smith doesn’t happen, I am probably writing about that right now.

As Thabo Sefolosha receives the basketball to inbounds it, Jeff Green is going to set a screen for Russell Westbrook while Serge Ibaka is going to set a screen for Kevin Durant.  This is the one critique I have of the Thunder’s play.  Ibaka is standing behind Durant, and they way the play is drawn up Ibaka has to run around in a circle to set the screen.

Because Ibaka is looping around, he actually overshoots where he should be to set the screen, and Durant ends up leaving before Ibaka is set.  This means that Keith Bogans is able to stay with Durant.

As Durant continues to the basketball, you can see what the effect of the bad screen has.  Bogans is right up on Durant, riding him out farther out to the sideline then he would like.

Bogans is still attached to Durant as he makes the catch.  This means that Durant isn’t going to be able to pivot, and as soon as the catch is made, Manu Ginobili (the man covering the inbound passer) leaves his man and doubles Durant.

Because Durant isn’t able to pivot, he gets hit with the double team hard.  Thabo Sefolosha breaks open (which is what the Spurs want), and Durant is forced to pass him the ball.

Thabo Sefolosha makes the catch and rises up for three, he misses.  According to 82games.com, Sefolosha is an ok shooter (46.9 eFG%), but in the clutch his eFG% plummets to 35%.  The Spurs really do a fantastic job of pushing Durant out close enough to the sideline where it was easy for Ginobili to turn and get an effective double team there, forcing Durant to pass up the game winning attempt.

Boris Diaw comes to the top of the key and receives the inbounds pass.  The beauty of using Diaw (who himself is a pretty good passer for his size) is that you are pulling a front court defender away from the basket, clearing the lane for the potential lob.  After Stephen Jackson makes the pass, he cuts through the middle of the lane, using a Tyrus Thomas screen.  Over on the far side, Raymond Felton comes up off of a screen set by Stephen Graham.  Nothing really important going on over there, as you can tell by the two players jogging through the motions.

As Jackson completes his cut in the middle of the lane, he pops back out towards the three point line, once again a using Tyrus Thomas screen.  The way this play is being set up, it seems like the Bobcats are going to try and free up Jackson for the jumper.

You know that is what Nenad Krstic is thinking as he starts to lean forward, getting ready to help on Jackson.  All that Tyrus Thomas needs is that little lean, and he slips the screen.  This was the designed play from the start, because Diaw is letting this pass go before Thomas even makes his cut.  Like I said earlier, with Diaw making the pass, that is a big body on defense not clogging the lane.  Also, the defensive three second rules can’t come off any further and help.

Though you would like to see him try to get in the way of the pass, but that isn’t much of an error.  That is how awesome this play was, all it took was Nenad Krstic leaning the wrong way for a second for the Bobcats to get a wide open dunk, and effectively put the game away.  Here it is in real time:

Last night’s Nuggets-Rockets game showed you how important a quality head coach is.  The Nuggets were without George Karl (who was receiving cancer treatment), and without him they made a ton of uncharacteristic mistakes you don’t see the Nuggets make.  These mistakes ended up costing the Nuggets the game.

Mistake 1:  Letting Trevor Ariza Get His Shot Off

Here, the Nuggets are up by 5 points with a little over 1 minute to go.  If the Nuggets are able to get a stop here, they would pretty much have the win locked up (after a lot of foul shots).  When Trevor Ariza makes his catch, you just get a feeling he wants to shoot a three (Ariza shoots 5.9 threes a game).  Carmelo Anthony recognizes it, and he crowds Ariza.

Seeing the three is not open, Ariza tries to drive by Anthony.  Carmelo plays very good defense and gets his hand on the basketball.

However, as Ariza regains possession, Carmelo seems to let up.  He doesn’t close that gap and gives Trevor Ariza too much space.

As Ariza dribbles it up to the three point line, Carmelo Anthony still doesn’t close the gap, giving Trevor Ariza a wide open three point look and he knocks it down.  Here it is in real time (notice the let-up Carmelo has as the ball gets knocked away).

Mistake 2:  Poor Transition Defense

The next possession following Ariza’s three, the Nuggets get a real good look for Arron Afflalo coming off of a Carmelo drive and kick.  He can’t knock it down though, and Luis Scola grabs the rebound.  He kicks it ahead and then sprints ahead, forcing the Nuggets to play transition defense:

It is a four on three fast break for the Rockets, and while two defenders are in proper position (Afflalo on the ball and Billups in help), Carmelo Anthony is jogging back on defense, not even looking for the basketball.  This is what allows Scola to cut to the middle of the court, and get the and one (Chauncey Billups’ 5th foul).  You really need to see it in real time to see how poor Carmelo looks on this:

While Melo’s error is probably the biggest one on this play, it isn’t the only one.  Another key error is made by both Nene and J.R. Smith.  Both guys pressure the basketball, which is 94 feet from the hoop they are defending.  The ball gets passed ahead, and this is what starts the fast break that Carmelo doesn’t defend properly.

Mistake 3:  Fouling Too Early

Even with all of these mistakes, the Nuggets are still only down 1 point with 41 seconds left.  They do an interesting thing here, they draw up a play not for Billups or Carmelo, but for Nene.  It is actually a pretty nice play-call, and it works because the Nuggets were trying to get a two for one.  Nene can’t get the shot to fall, but with a 9 second differential between the game clock and the shot clock, the Nuggets had enough time to get a stop and have a chance at the win.  That’s not what happens though:

The crazy thing is that J.R. Smith tries to foul (and misses) before Billups actually gets it done.  Here it is in real time:

If the Nuggets are leaving the huddle going with the knowledge that they are going for a two for one (which is pretty much given since that is what the play was designed for), you need to know that you aren’t fouling if you don’t score.  The head coach is the guy who lets the players know the situation as they leave the huddle, and George Karl wasn’t there to do that last night.  Even more important, this foul was Chauncey Billups’ 6th and final foul.

Culmination Of Mistakes

With Chauncey Billups out, the Nuggets have to turn to Anthony Carter to try and get the final game-winning stop.  It didn’t work out too well:

Now, if Billups is on the court do the Nuggets win for sure?  No, but there is no question that the Nuggets would rather have him on the court instead of Anthony Carter.  The worst part of it is that Billups’ final two fouls (the one on Scola, and the one to stop the clock when they didn’t need to) could have been avoided had the Nuggets played smarter.  With Billups on the court, who knows, maybe the Nuggets win.

The Pacers tried to speed the pace up with a full court press.  It almost works, as the Bucks’ inbounder throws a pass to Carlos Delfino who is standing at halfcourt.  Delfino could have sped the ball up but knowing the situation (and how important this possession is), Delfino stops at halfcourt and waits for Jennings who meets the basketball.

As Brandon Jennings dribbles it out to the left wing, John Salmons goes from the left block to the right elbow to set a screen for Andrew Bogut.  This is something just about every NBA teams run to get their big man the basketball (the Nets run this a ton).  Usually teams run their big man through the center of the paint to get a seal on the low block, but every once in a while, the big man will cut off the other side of the screen to try and get a quick basket.

Solomon Jones notices that Bogut is cutting backdoor, and I think he tries to get over the screen to beat him to the block.  However, Salmons sets a fantastic screen, stopping Jones’ progress.

Now, Jones probably shouldn’t have tried to go over the top of the screen, but he isn’t the biggest Pacer at fault here.  Brandon Rush should be seeing this screen (and seeing the Jones is stuck on the screen), should be sinking into help position.  Rush is in position to get to the block before Bogut to cut off the play and defend the pass.  Instead, his eyes are fixated on his man, John Salmons, watching him set an effective screen.

Because of this poor help defense (and communication - it looks like he doesn’t even call out the screen), Bogut has the whole bottom half of the paint to himself.

As Jennings fires the pass in there, Bogut actually stops his cut, and this is a pretty crafty move by the big man.  Bogut doesn’t meet the basketball (like most players are taught), and he lets the ball get to him.  Bogut doesn’t meet the basketball because he is already in terrific position to make the catch (right under the basket).  If he meets the ball on the block (as he finishes his cut), he would have gave the defenders a chance to catch up.

After Bogut makes the catch, he quickly takes it to the rim and finishes with the dunk as three Pacers watch.  Here it is in real time:

After Ron Artest inbounds it to Pau Gasol, he cuts backdoor while Kobe comes to the basketball.  The Lakers have run a play like this in the past, except instead of a backdoor cut, it was a backscreen set.  Phil Jackson chose not to go with the backscreen, and I think that is smart.  It prevents the Raptors from switching the cut and denying Kobe outright.  On the other side, Lamar Odom sets a back screen for Derek Fisher.

Pau looks over to the other side to keep the defense honest as Kobe makes his cut to the basketball.

Kobe makes the catch, and actually has the baseline drive if he wants it.  Instead, he hangs onto the basketball and allows for Antoine Wright to get back into defensive position.

The double team now comes at Kobe.  However, Bargnani has to run a long way to get to Kobe.  This is because of the great floor spacing by the Lakers.

Before Bargnani can get to Kobe in time, he simply dribbles away from the double team towards the baseline and calmly hits a jumper for his 7th game winner of the season.

Now the Lakers did a good job of spacing the floor and executing the play Phil drew up, but it wouldn’t be right to ignore what the Raptors did wrong on this play to allow Kobe to hit the jumper.  So, let’s take a look at this from the perspective of the Raptors.

The first error made by the Raptors is when Pau Gasol has the basketball.  Remember that token fake that he offers up?  Well, Bargnani bit on it and that freed up a passing lane for Gasol to get the ball to Kobe.  Look at what is going on over on the left hand side.  Nobody is even ready to make the catch, which makes Bargnani going for the ball fake even worse.  Bargnani should have had the recognition to know where Kobe was on the court, and he should have been on Pau’s right side, not even letting him look over to the side where Kobe is.  Make him dribble, make him shoot, or make him pass to the left.  All of those options are better than letting him Pass to Kobe.

Alright, so after Kobe makes the catch, you know the Raptors want to send a double team.  Like I said before, the Lakers spaced the floor out real well, so there weren’t too many chances to send another man at Kobe, but here was one.  As Ron Artest retreats to the corner with his back to the basketball, Hedo Turkoglu had a chance to run at Kobe.  If he comes at him from the baseline, he probably would have prevented the baseline jumper.

However, Turkoglu doesn’t come.  Bargnani comes from the other side.  Now, this isn’t the worst thing, but since Bargnani had a lot of ground to make up, Antoine Wright needs to do a good job of keeping Kobe there until the double comes.  However, this doesn’t happen, and Kobe gets to the baseline.  Let’s look at this from another angle.

You see where Wright is?  He is giving up the sideline by doing this.  Now, I am sure the Raptors talked about where the double was coming from in the timeout, and if Wright knew the double was coming from Bargnani over the top.  If he knew that, he should cheated towards the sideline, letting Bargnani come for the trap.  Instead, he insisted in being in Kobe’s shorts, which makes sense if he is playing him straight up, but that isn’t what was happening here.

The Spurs start this play by sending George Hill into the far corner, Manu Ginobili into the near corner, and Roger Mason off of a Tim Duncan screen right to the ball.  It looks like the Spurs are trying to set up a quick hitter for Roger Mason off the inbounds, but Richard Jefferson inbounds it to Manu instead.

As Ginobili starts to back down his man, it looks like Roger Mason is going to continue off of the Duncan screen and get a handoff for the three point shot.  Mason’s man, Anthony Parker, recognizes this and seems to try and beat him to the spot.

However, as soon as Parker gets in front of Mason, he stops and comes off of another Duncan screen on the opposite side.  This action happens quick and the Cavs aren’t really expecting it which is why there is no help from Anderson Varejao as Mason comes off the second screen.

Manu makes the pass, and now Jamario Moon is put into a pretty tough spot.  He is one guy who has to now defend two.  If he closes out too hard, there is still enough time for Mason to pass it to Hill for the open three.  Trying to figure out what to do causes Moon to hesitate a bit.

This hesitation is what allows Roger Mason to get off a wide open look.  He misses it, but that doesn’t mean it wasn’t a great play.  Here is a look at it in real time:

In the fourth quarter of a really good game, the Thunder are coming out of a timeout under their own basket.  Everyone in the building knows that the Thunder want to get the ball to Durant, and somehow they still get him an open lob-pass.

The play starts with the lane being real crowded.  You have 3 guys in there already, and as a result there are 4 defenders in the paint. It looks like the Thunder are going to go away from the paint to a corner, away from the defenders.

As the ball gets handed to James Harden, Kevin Durant starts to the opposite block, as if he is going to set a backscreen for Russell Westbrook.  Also, Serge Ibaka is setting a screen for Eric Maynor (this is going t o be important later).

Once Durant reaches the opposite block, he quickly spins and heads towards the basket.  Grant Hill isn’t in proper position to defend him because he was overplaying Durant, trying to cut him off.  Also, Channing Frye isn’t in proper position either.  Usually he would be farther down in the paint to prevent a backdoor cut, but with the pick action going on at the top of the key, Frye needs to be in position to help defend Maynor if he comes off a screen.

Harden throws a perfect pass, and Durant uses his size (and the free space given from Frye not being in proper position) to make the catch and finish at the basket.  Channing Frye tries to get back in time, but he doesn’t make it, so he ends up committing the foul.  Another 3 easy points for Kevin Durant and the Thunder.

As the Cavs lined up, the play looked really familiar.  As a matter of fact, the play started the same was as the one from this past Sunday.

I don’t like tooting my horn (that’s a lie), but when I said the Cavs like to run this play late, little did I know that they were going to run it during their next game…against the same coach.  So back to last night:

There are some differences.  First, there aren’t 10 All-Stars on the court (there are 3/2 on the Nuggets), obviously.  This lead George Karl to do a few different things.  First, Karl has decided to put someone on the inbounder this time.  Why?  Well, in my opinion, with 1.9 seconds left a perfect pass is more valuable than when there is 7.7 seconds left (how much time was left in the All-Star game).  If Carmelo, the defender on the inbounder can force Anthony Parker in making a bad pass, the game is over (because if someone has to reach and catch an errant pass, the game is over before a shot can be attempted).  The second difference is who is covering LeBron.  At this point Kenyon Martin is covering LeBron while Arron Afflalo is covering Anderson Varejao.  This tells you that George Karl is anticipating a screen and that he is going to be switching it.

Mike Brown to his (dis) credit does something different than what Stan Van Gundy did.  He sends Boobie Gibson over the top of the three point line instead of down the baseline.  This doesn’t really make sense, because cutting this way doesn’t make him a threat at all in my opinion.  You also have Mo Williams in the corner.  We will get back to him.

LeBron pretends to set a screen for Mo Williams, even going as far as pretending to call him down the baseline.  Williams starts a cut, but for whatever reason, he doesn’t complete it and fades back into the corner.

After LeBron’s fake screen, he comes up the middle using a screen from Varejao.  However, the Nuggets switch it.  Why did Karl play this differently?  Well, in the All-Star game, you had Dwight Howard setting the screen for LeBron.  If you switch that, it leaves an opening for a lob pass to Dwight.  Karl comfortably switched last night, because they were not scared of a lob to Varejao.

Afflalo executes the switch on his end perfectly.  He gets right in the middle of the foul line, between the basketball and his man (LeBron).  This is going to force LeBron to venture way outside the three point line to catch the basketball.

LeBron finally gets around Afflalo, and now he is running away from the basket to make himself available.  Anthony Parker is holding onto the basketball because it is obvious that LeBron is the only option here.  For some absurd reason, Mike Brown sends his two best shooters away from the ball and put them in no position to make the catch.  The release valve on this play is Anderson Varejao running to the corner…really?  At the very least, you could have had Mo Williams sprint across the baseline into the corner.  At least the Nuggets would have to pay attention to him.

With Carmelo defending the inbound pass, LeBron has to go out even farther to get into Anthony Parker’s line of sight.  LeBron makes the catch 40-45 feet away from the basket.  LeBron then slips as he makes the catch, struggles to keep his balance and then takes two dribbles.

After those two dribbles, LeBron takes a long-three with a hand in his face.  He is about 30-35 feet away from the basket at this point.  Here it is in real time (and again in slow motion):